State v. Johnson, 93-670
| Decision Date | 23 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-670,93-670 |
| Citation | 513 N.W.2d 717 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Vicki Lynn JOHNSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Richard N. Tompkins, Jr., Mason City, for appellant.
Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Robert P. Ewald, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul L. Martin, County Atty., and Douglas Hammerand, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
Considered by CARTER, P.J., and NEUMAN, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.
The defendant, Vicki Johnson, appeals from her conviction of possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code sections 204.401(1)(c)(6) and 204.206(4)(b) (1991). Johnson argues the district court (1) focused exclusively on her prior record regarding probation in sentencing her to a ten-year prison term; and (2) erred in not publicly announcing that she may be eligible for parole before the sentence is discharged, as required by Iowa Code section 901.5(9)(b) (1993). We affirm.
On May 27, 1992, Johnson was stopped by a police officer for making an improper left turn, an improper license plate, and no license plate light. Johnson allowed the officer to look inside her purse for a weapon. The officer discovered several containers containing methamphetamine. Johnson was arrested and subsequently charged with possession with intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance. Following several unsuccessful attempts to suppress both the containers and statements made to the arresting officer, Johnson decided to enter a guilty plea to the offense charged. The State agreed to concur with the presentence investigation recommendations.
The presentence investigation report revealed that Johnson was first placed on probation in 1982. She was again placed on probation in April 1985, August 1985, and April 1987. Johnson's probation that started in April 1985 had been revoked. All other probations had been terminated due to noncompliance with probation rules. Johnson had an extensive history of substance abuse and had failed to recognize that she has a problem. Johnson had not currently enrolled herself in any type of counseling or support groups. Because of these facts, the presentence investigation officer recommended that Johnson be placed in a highly structured environment.
At the sentencing hearing, a number of people testified on Johnson's behalf. Johnson's boyfriend, Russell Roath, testified that Johnson had made dramatic changes since her latest arrest, particularly in acting like an adult. Roath and a friend, Carol Prause, testified that Johnson no longer uses drugs. Johnson's employer, Rod Michael, testified that her performance had been very good and that she has had no problems with attendance. Johnson testified she had quit using drugs "cold turkey," and that she would be willing to proceed with a substance abuse evaluation and enter any substance abuse program.
In sentencing Johnson, the district court stated that it had considered Johnson's criminal history; her personal, educational, and employment background; the nature of her prior and present convictions; the prospects for rehabilitation; society's interest; and the matter of deterrence. The district court also noted that Johnson had been placed on probation numerous times and had not successfully completed any of them. The district court sentenced Johnson to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years and informed her that there was a mandatory minimum period of confinement of one-third of the maximum term before she would be eligible for parole. Johnson appeals.
Johnson first argues the district court focused exclusively on her extensive criminal record and her history of unsuccessful probation in sentencing her to a ten-year term of imprisonment. Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor, and a sentence will be disturbed by a reviewing court only upon a showing that the district court abused its discretion. State v. Neary, 470 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Iowa 1991). No abuse of discretion will be found unless the defendant shows that such discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. In exercising its discretion, the district court is to weigh all pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant's age, character, and propensities or chances for reform. State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979). Each...
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