State v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 31 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14629,14629
• Citation: 227 Conn. 534,630 A.2d 1059
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Edward F. JOHNSON.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1059

630 A.2d 1059

227 Conn. 534

STATE of Connecticut v. Edward F. JOHNSON.

No. 14629.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 30, 1993.

Decided Aug. 31, 1993.

Mario Paul Mikolitch, Sp. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John T. Redway, State's Atty., Mitchell S. Brody, Asst. State's Atty., and Russell P. Zentner, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

NORCOTT, Associate Justice.

After a jury trial, the defendant, Edward F. Johnson, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of General Statutes § 14- 227a(a)(1), ¹ and evasion of responsibility in operating a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224(b). ² The defendant was sentenced to a total effective term of imprisonment of eight months and was fined $1100 plus fees and costs. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the conviction. State v. Johnson, 28 Conn.App. 708, 613 A.2d 1344 (1992). We granted certification to appeal limited to two issues: "(1) Was the Appellate Court correct in refusing to review the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss which claimed that a peace officer does not have probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed outside the presence of that officer? [and] (2) In order to establish a violation of General Statutes § 14-224(b), must the state prove that the defendant knew that the accident in which he was involved caused 'injury or damage to property?' " State v. Johnson, 224 Conn. 911, 617 A.2d 168 (1992). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The facts in this case are adequately set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "On April 23, 1990, Catherine Mangels was driving her car on Route 1 in Westbrook when it was struck by a car driven by the defendant. As a result of the collision, the cars became hooked together. Robert Pandora, who had been driving behind Mangels and had witnessed the collision, helped unhook the two cars. Pandora then drove Mangels' car into the parking lot of a nearby restaurant.

"The defendant drove his car to the back of the restaurant lot. Pandora got out of Mangels' car, went to where the defendant had driven, and told him that a bystander had called the police. The defendant responded that he would not wait for the police, and then tried to leave the restaurant lot. The defendant was having trouble getting his car into gear, so Pandora reached into the defendant's car, turned off the ignition and removed the keys. Pandora went into the restaurant with the keys, and the defendant followed him in an unsuccessful attempt to retrieve his keys. When the police arrived, Pandora was walking out of the front door of the restaurant with the defendant behind him. The defendant, upon seeing the police, retreated into the restaurant bathroom and locked himself in a bathroom stall.

"Pandora led Trooper Michael Polansky of the state police to the bathroom the defendant had just entered. Polansky identified himself and asked the defendant to come out of the stall. After refusing several times, the defendant finally staggered out. The defendant smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes and was slurring his speech. Pandora identified the defendant as the operator of one of the cars involved in the collision. Polansky asked the defendant if he had been involved in the collision and the defendant replied that he had not. Polansky then asked the defendant to take a number of field sobriety tests. After the defendant refused to take the requested tests, Polansky arrested him without a warrant.

"On the way out of the restaurant, the defendant acknowledged that he was the owner of one of the cars that had been involved in the collision. At the police station, Polansky asked the defendant to take a breathalyzer test. He refused. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, and of evading responsibility." State v. Johnson, supra, 28 Conn.App. at 709-11, 613 A.2d 1344.

I

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information against him on the ground that there was no probable cause for his arrest because the arresting officer had not been an eyewitness to the misdemeanor with which the defendant was charged. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion. The defendant later filed a motion for articulation of the trial court's decision. In its articulation, the trial court stated that there had been probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence and evading responsibility and rejected the defendant's claim that a police officer must be an eyewitness before he can arrest a misdemeanant.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to dismiss. The defendant argued that General Statutes § 54-1f(a), ³ which governs warrantless misdemeanor arrests and permits a warrantless arrest to be made "on the speedy information of others," expands the common law rule that a peace officer cannot arrest a person for a misdemeanor committed outside of his presence. The defendant claimed that this expansion of the common law violated the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution, ⁴ and therefore that the arrest was illegal and required dismissal of the charges against him. The Appellate Court concluded, however, that the defendant had failed to provide any analysis of either the federal or state constitutional claims, and the court, therefore, refused to address them.

The defendant argues that the Appellate Court improperly declined review of his constitutional claim on the basis of inadequate briefing. Even assuming, without deciding, that the Appellate Court improperly refused to review this claim, we conclude that the underlying law is so clear that there is no basis for the defendant to prevail on this argument. The defendant argued in the Appellate Court that, by virtue of the illegal arrest, the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss. Under both federal and state constitutional law, however, an illegal arrest does not operate as a per se jurisdictional barrier to a defendant's subsequent prosecution. See State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 259-63, 502 A.2d 886, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143, 106 S.Ct. 1797, 90 L.Ed.2d 342 (1986), and cases cited therein. In Fleming, we held that "[w]here the fairness of a subsequent prosecution has not been impaired by an illegal arrest, neither the federal nor the Connecticut constitution requires dismissal of the charges or a voiding of the resulting conviction." ⁵ Id., 198 Conn. at 263, 502 A.2d 886; see also State v. McPhail, 213 Conn. 161, 169-70, 567 A.2d 812 (1989).

In the present case, there is no indication that the allegedly illegal arrest tainted the defendant's trial. The defendant does not claim that evidence was seized as a result of the arrest and was later used to obtain a conviction. Indeed, the defendant maintains that his claim involves only his motion to dismiss, and acknowledges that he never moved for the suppression of evidence introduced at trial. On this record, there would be no basis for the defendant to prevail on his argument that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss. ⁶ The issue of whether the Appellate Court improperly declined to reach this claim is, therefore, academic.

II

At trial, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the charge of evasion of responsibility in operating a motor vehicle as follows: "The state must prove both, that there was an accident that caused damage to another's property, and that the defendant knew of such accident. It is only necessary that the defendant knew that he was involved in an accident. Knowledge by the defendant that the collision caused damage to property of another is unnecessary."

The defendant claimed in the Appellate Court that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury that it was not necessary that the defendant knew that the accident had caused damage to property. The defendant contended that, under the provisions of § 14-224(b), the state must prove that the defendant had knowledge, not only of the accident, but also of any resulting property damage. The Appellate Court rejected this argument on the ground that the defendant's interpretation of the statute would thwart its purpose. It held that the "only knowledge required is knowledge that there has been an accident." State v. Johnson, supra, 28 Conn.App. at 717, 613 A.2d 1344.

Section 14-224(b) provides: "Each person operating a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident which causes physical injury ... to any other person or injury or damage to property shall at once stop and render such assistance as may be needed...." In this court, the defendant reiterates his argument that § 14-224(b) unambiguously requires an individual charged with evading responsibility to have knowledge of the accident and of the damage caused by the accident. Therefore, he argues, the Appellate Court improperly construed the statute to require only knowledge of the accident, and not knowledge of the damage as well. We disagree.

"It is fundamental that statutory construction requires us to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to construe the statute in a manner that effectuates that intent. Green v. Ward, 178 Conn. 634, 637-38, 425 A.2d 128 (1979); Sillman v. Sillman, 168 Conn. 144, 147, 358 A.2d 150 (1975); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands) § 45.05." All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control, 213 Conn. 184, 194, 567 A.2d...