State v. Johnson
Decision Date | 21 January 2014 |
Docket Number | No. DA 13–0011.,DA 13–0011. |
Citation | 373 Mont. 330,317 P.3d 164 |
Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jeremiah Allen JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
For Appellant: Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender; Nicholas C. Domitrovich, Assistant Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana.
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana, Fred R. Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Jennifer Clark, Deputy County Attorney; Missoula, Montana.
¶ 1 Jeremiah Allen Johnson (Johnson) appeals from his conviction in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, of burglary in violation of § 45–6–204(1), MCA. We affirm and restate Johnson's sole issue on appeal as follows:
¶ 2 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson's motion to excuse Juror Harsell for cause?
¶ 3 On February 11, 2012, Johnson drove to the home of his ex-girlfriend, Kristy Horvath (Horvath), and her roommate, Tye Diamond (Diamond). As the result of a previous disagreement between Johnson and Diamond, Johnson had been told by Diamond that he was not welcome there. When Johnson arrived that night, Horvath asked him to leave because Diamond was present. Johnson complied, but continued to drive around the neighborhood for some time.
¶ 4 Later that night, Johnson returned to the home and knocked at the door, which was answered by a guest, Katrina Brenna (Brenna). Although Brenna opened the door to Johnson in the hope of calming him down, he pushed his way into the home and punched another guest, Tommy McDonald (McDonald), in the face, breaking his nose. Diamond attempted to intervene and was struck several times by Johnson. Eventually, the parties went outside where the altercation continued until Johnson said “I'm done” and law enforcement arrived.
¶ 5 The State subsequently charged Johnson with one count of burglary and two counts of misdemeanor assault. On July 17, 2012, Johnson pleaded guilty to the assaults, but proceeded to a jury trial on the burglary charge. During voir dire, Johnson's counsel asked the venire panel if anyone “would inherently think that a law enforcement officer is more believable than a non-officer, a citizen?” Juror Harbaugh responded in the affirmative, and was dismissed by the District Court after explaining his view that law enforcement officers never lie under oath. Johnson's counsel then asked again if “[a]nybody ... believes that officers are more inherently believable,” whereafter the following exchange took place with Juror Harsell (Harsell):
¶ 6 Following this discussion, Johnson's counsel challenged Harsell for cause. The District Court did not immediately rule on the motion, but instead questioned Harsell further:
The District Court then denied Johnson's motion to excuse Harsell for cause, which resulted in Johnson's decision to exercise his final peremptory challenge on Harsell.
¶ 7 Johnson was convicted and sentenced to ten years to the Montana State Prison with three years suspended on the burglary charge, and six-month sentences on each of the assaults, running concurrent with the ten-year prison term. Johnson appeals.
¶ 8 We review a district court's denial of a challenge for cause using an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Golie, 2006 MT 91, ¶ 6, 332 Mont. 69, 134 P.3d 95 (citation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a challenge for cause when a juror's statements during voir dire raise serious doubts about the juror's ability to be fair and impartial,” State v. Allen, 2010 MT 214, ¶ 25, 357 Mont. 495, 241 P.3d 1045 (citations omitted), or “actual bias is discovered,” State v. Rogers, 2007 MT 227, ¶ 18, 339 Mont. 132, 168 P.3d 669 (citation omitted).
¶ 9 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Johnson's motion to excuse Juror Harsell for cause?
¶ 10 Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee the right to a trial by an impartial jury. State v. Hausauer, 2006 MT 336, ¶ 20, 335 Mont. 137, 149 P.3d 895. During voir dire, “[e]ach party may challenge jurors for cause, and each challenge must be tried by the court.” Section 46–16–115(1), MCA. A specified ground for a challenge for cause is that a potential juror has “a state of mind in reference to the case or to either of the parties that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.” Section 46–16–115(2)(j), MCA. We evaluate challenges for cause under this provision in light of the statutory language and the totality of the circumstances presented. State v. Marble, 2005 MT 208, ¶ 10, 328 Mont. 223, 119 P.3d 88. We have held that “jurors should be disqualified based on their prejudices only where they have ‘form[ed] fixed opinions of the guilt or innocence of the defendant which they would not be able to lay aside and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court.’ ” State v. Falls Down, 2003 MT 300, ¶ 23, 318 Mont. 219, 79 P.3d 797 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, we have also clarified that the “ ‘fixed opinion’ rule is only one argument that may be made under the basis for a challenge for cause set forth in § 46–16–115(2)(j), MCA.” Golie, ¶ 25. When reviewing a challenge for cause, we emphasize a juror's “spontaneous, and usually initial, statements or responses.” Hausauer, ¶ 23. If a district court improperly denies a challenge for cause, “such an abuse of discretion is conclusively prejudicial and requires automatic reversal.” State v. Freshment, 2002 MT 61, ¶ 14, 309 Mont. 154, 43 P.3d 968. However, we will affirm a district court's denial of a challenge for cause if “the juror convincingly affirms his ability to lay aside any misgivings and fairly weigh the evidence.” Allen, ¶ 26.
¶ 11 Johnson does not argue that Harsell expressed a “fixed opinion” of his guilt or innocence, but rather, that Harsell raised serious questions about his ability to act with entire impartiality when he said, “I'm inherently more likely to believe a police officer than the general public, I think.” Johnson also argues that Harsell “upped the ante when he stated that he could not take law enforcement testimony with a grain of salt ... because he thought ‘a grain of salt is way too light.’ ” Johnson asserts that these remarks amounted to a “stated bias” which prevented Harsell from acting impartially in a case relying heavily on law enforcement testimony. In support, Johnson notes that “dismissal for cause is favored when a serious question arises about a juror's ability to be impartial,” citing State v. Richeson, 2004 MT 113, ¶ 14, 321 Mont. 126, 89 P.3d 958.
¶ 12 The State maintains that Harsell's responses as a whole “did not establish that he harbored actual bias or that his state of mind prevented him from acting impartially.” The State notes Harsell's stated belief that law enforcement officers do not always tell the truth and his assurance that he would judge the credibility of each witness individually. The State also points to other remarks by Harsell indicating some negative feelings about law enforcement and his willingness to set aside his personal experiences and listen impartially to the evidence presented:
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