State v. Johnson, No. 9-623/08-0320 (Iowa App. 12/17/2009)
| Decision Date | 17 December 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 9-623/08-0320.,9-623/08-0320. |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHNNY LEE JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County, Paul R. Huscher, Judge.
Johnny Lee Johnson appeals from the judgment and sentence entered on his convictions for two counts of murder in the first degree. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Thomas Gaul, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor and Doug Hammerand, Assistant Attorneys General, and Mary Benton, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Danilson, JJ.
Johnny Lee Johnson appeals from the judgment and sentence entered on his convictions for two counts of murder in the first degree. He contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress his post-arrest statements to police. Because we find Johnson's counsel was not ineffective, we affirm.
Sometime in March 2007, Johnson's wife, Kim Johnson, left the family's home in Coon Rapids and moved to an apartment in nearby Bayard. Johnson's teenage daughter, Jessica, moved in with Kim, and his teenage son, Josh, remained with him. In early April 2007, Johnson ran into an acquaintance, Mark Bonney, at the lumberyard in Bayard. Johnson asked Bonney if he knew that Kim had begun dating Greg White, and stated that he would like to get "his hands on" White. Bonney warned Johnson that White was strong and that he carried knives, but did not give serious consideration to Johnson's comment.
On the evening of April 29, 2007, Johnson built a bonfire at his home and drank "four or five" cans of beer. He then retrieved a loaded handgun from inside his home and drove to Kim's apartment in Bayard. Johnson parked about a block away from the apartment at just after 10:00 p.m. He was wearing a black sweatshirt with the hood pulled up over his head. As Johnson approached the apartment he noticed the wooden front door was open. Through the screen door, Johnson saw White in the kitchen, wearing only pajama pants. White did not notice Johnson outside the door.
Johnson knelt and shot White three times through the screen door. He then entered the apartment and shot White once more. Kim ran from Jessica's bedroom, saw White on the floor, and ran back into the bedroom screaming and trying to shut the door behind her. Johnson followed Kim into the bedroom and shot her four times. He then went back into the hall and beat White on the head with the butt of his gun to make sure he was dead, crushing his skull. Johnson reentered the bedroom and beat the back of Kim's head with his gun, also crushing her skull. At that point, Jessica tried to push him off Kim, but he shoved her back to the bed. Johnson's hood fell away from his face, and Jessica realized he was her father. Johnson told her, Johnson then left the apartment.
Jessica checked her mother for a pulse and tried to call 911. A neighbor, Shanda Thomas, heard the gunshots and ran outside. Jessica told Thomas that "her fucking dad shot her mom." As they waited for police to arrive, Jessica called her grandmother. Thomas heard Jessica tell her grandmother, Jessica then called her uncle, Joseph Johnson, and said, "Your fucking brother shot my mom."
Soon after receiving the call from Jessica, Joseph also received a call from Johnson. Johnson asked, "Did you hear what I did?" to which Joseph responded, "Yes, Jessie told me."1 Joseph talked his brother into meeting him at the Guthrie County Sheriff's Office to turn himself in. When they arrived at the sheriff's office, Johnson noticed a scrape on his hand and told Joseph that he must have gotten it while "beating them . . . to make sure they were dead."
Johnson was handcuffed and brought inside the sheriff's office. Officer Jeremy Long read Johnson his Miranda rights, asked him a few questions, booked him, and placed him in a jail cell. At 1:27 a.m. Johnson submitted to a breath test, which measured his blood alcohol at .019. Johnson also gave a DNA sample.2 At 1:39 a.m. Special Agent Mitch Mortvedt began to interview Johnson. The interview concluded at 3:38 a.m. Mortvedt interviewed Johnson again later that morning, from 10:02 to 11:31 a.m. During the course of these interviews, Johnson confessed to the shootings of Kim and White. Johnson explained the marital problems he and Kim had been going through, his discovery that Kim was dating someone else, and what led him to shoot the victims earlier that evening. Johnson also described exactly where he had thrown his gun on his drive home.3
On June 4, 2007, the State filed a trial information charging Johnson with two counts of murder in the first degree. Johnson pled not guilty. A jury trial began on January 8, 2008. During the trial, Johnson's counsel tried to limit Johnson's culpability to a manslaughter charge.4 At the close of the evidence Johnson's motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. On January 14, 2008, the jury returned verdicts finding Johnson guilty as charged. Johnson filed a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment. Following a hearing, the court denied both motions. Johnson was sentenced to a life sentence on each count, to be served concurrently. He now appeals.
We conduct a de novo review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the defendant a fair trial. Id. A defendant's failure to prove either element by a preponderance of the evidence is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance. State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2003). Although we generally preserve ineffective assistance of counsel claims for postconviction proceedings, we consider such claims on direct appeal if the record is sufficient. State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Iowa 2006). In this case, the record is sufficient to address Johnson's claim.
To prove counsel breached an essential duty, a defendant must overcome a presumption that counsel was competent and show that counsel's performance was not within the range of normal competency. State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994). Although counsel is not required to predict changes in the law, counsel must exercise reasonable diligence in deciding whether an issue is worth raising. In accord with these principles, we have held that counsel has no duty to raise an issue that has no merit. State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 620 (Iowa 2009). To prove prejudice resulted, a defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001).
Because counsel has no duty to raise a meritless issue, the validity of Johnson's constitutional claim must be determined. See Dudley, 766 N.W.2d at 620. Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Iowa 1990). "If his constitutional challenges are meritorious, we will then consider whether reasonably competent counsel would have raised these issues and, if so, whether [Johnson] was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to do so." Id.
Johnson contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress his post-arrest statements to police and object to their introduction at trial. He argues his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution () was violated because police improperly continued interrogation and obtained his statements after he had requested an attorney.5 Johnson alleges his counsel breached an essential duty by failing to seek suppression of his statements, and that he was prejudiced by this omission because "counsel would have had a good chance for success" had a motion to suppress been filed. Johnson also contends the "inculpatory statements were critical evidence against [him] and played a substantial role in linking [him] to the crime . . . ."
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 726 (1966), the United States Supreme Court determined the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the police to inform a suspect he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. Absent Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of those rights, statements made during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725; State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2007). When a suspect invokes his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, the police must stop questioning immediately until an attorney is present. State v. Walls, 761 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 2009).
The request for counsel must be unambiguous and unequivocal; that is, a suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clear that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. See, e.g., Harris, 741 N.W.2d at 7. Although it is generally considered good police practice to clarify a suspect's unclear request, officers have no obligation to stop questioning when an ambiguous or equivocal request occurs. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 373 (1994); Harris, 741 N.W.2d at 7; State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Iowa 1997).
When a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, he is not subject to further police questioning "unless the...
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