State v. Johnson
Citation | 383 P.2d 862,94 Ariz. 303 |
Decision Date | 10 July 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 1287,1287 |
Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Tom JOHNSON, Appellant. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
R. Kelly Hocker, Phoenix, for appellant.
Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Merton E. Marks, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles N. Ronan, County Atty. of Maricopa County, for appellee.
Tom Johnson was convicted of two counts of illegally selling Marijuana in violation of A.R.S. § 36-1002. He appeals to this court from the verdict, judgment and sentence of the lower court.
Defendant assigns as prejudicial error the trial court's refusal to order testimony stricken concerning the defendant's failure to testify at his preliminary hearing. After the question had been asked and answered, defense counsel objected and moved that the answer be stricken and the jury instructed concerning it. The court sustained the objection but did not strike the testimony or admonish the jury as to its effect.
Our statements in State v. Garaygordobil, 89 Ariz. 161, 359 P.2d 753, fully answer and are determinative of the question:
'The defendant's failure to take the stand in the preliminary examination was in no way an admission of guilt. He had a right to refuse to testify and such refusal could not be used against him at the trial.
89 Ariz. at 166, 359 P.2d at 757.
Defendant further asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce evidence of other crimes independent and distinct from the crimes charged. After the state had asked defendant on cross-examination, without objection if he had sold 3 Marijuana cigarettes to a state's witness, Alfred Moore, seven days after the last sale charged in the information and had received a negative answer, defendant was asked by his counsel, on redirect examination, these questions:
'Q Now, Tom, on any date, you have stated before, stated to Mr. Roper that you--just answer the question--did you ever sell any narcotics of any kind, wait till I finish the question, any narcotics of any kind to Alfred Moore?
'A No.
'Q Or anyone?
'A No.' (Emphasis supplied.)
Later the state in rebuttal, recalled Moore who over objection was allowed to testify concerning the purported later sale.
It has long been settled in this state that a witness can not be impeached by showing specific acts of misconduct not amounting to a conviction of a felony. State v. Polan, 78 Ariz. 253, 278 P.2d 432; State v. Harris, 73 Ariz. 138, 238 P.2d 957; State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P.2d 920; State v. Peters, 60 Ariz. 102, 131 P.2d 814.
For example we said in State v. Harris:
73 Ariz. at 142, 238 P.2d at 959.
Even if a witness is cross-examined without objection concerning past misconduct not amounting to a felony conviction and denys the misconduct, there may not thereafter be presented proof to impeach the witness on such a collateral issue. State v. Harris, supra.
The state, however, argues to this court a purported exception found in California whereby the state may be allowed to introduce evidence showing specific acts of misconduct not amounting to felony convictions when the defendant makes broad, all-inclusive statements that he never at any time committed an offense of the kind for which he is on trial. This exception is based on the theory of curative admissibility where the defendant has overemphasized his absolute innocence and the failure to rebut might be damaging to the state's case. People v. Whipple, 192 Cal.App.2d 179, 13 Cal.Rptr. 378; People v. Downs, 114 Cal.App.2d 758, 251 P.2d 369; People v. Lindsey, 90 Cal.App.2d 558, 203 P.2d 572; People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 190 P.2d 9.
We think, however, that the prejudicial effects of showing specific acts of misconduct which are not sustained by a conviction are such as to greatly outweigh the purported damaging effect to the state's case. The danger is twofold: First, that the jury may conclude that the defendant is a 'bad man' and convict on lesser evidence than might ordinarily be necessary to support a conviction, and second, that if the door is opened to such evidence, the defendant is in danger of having to defend every incident of an entire lifetime in a single trial. We adhere to our prior holdings rejecting the suggested exception.
This is not a case where the state offered the evidence...
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