State v. Johnson, 40659
| Citation | 279 Minn. 209,156 N.W.2d 218 |
| Decision Date | 02 February 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 40659,40659 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Russell Terry JOHNSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Defendant was not denied due process merely because the trial court may have accepted his plea of guilty to a criminal charge without first ascertaining that defendant understood his constitutional rights, where the record shows that the court immediately thereafter did ascertain that before entering his plea defendant had received advice of counsel and had understood his rights.
2. Plea bargaining is not against public policy provided that at least the following conditions are satisfied: (a) The plea negotiations are conducted only between the prosecutor and competent counsel for the defense, with the defendant's intelligent acquiescence; (b) the plea of guilty is made by the defendant himself and in open court; and (c) the court ascertains of record that there is a factual basis for the plea in that defendant is not innocent of any crime and that the bargained plea bears a reasonable relationship to defendant's conduct. Defendant was not denied due process where the court, under these conditions, accepted his plea of guilty to an information charging third-degree murder, rather than first-degree manslaughter, in lieu of the original indictment for first-degree murder, even though interrogation at the time of the plea indicated the 'possibility' of defenses of intoxication, provocation or self-defense.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, John L. Tambornino, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Gerard W. Snell, Act. Sol. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., Thomas M. Quayle, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, MURPHY, ROGOSHESKE, and PETERSON, JJ.
Defendant was indicated in Ramsey County on June 1, 1966, for the crime of murder in the first degree. An information charging defendant with murder in the third degree was filed on June 30, 1966, whereupon defendant pleaded guilty to that crime and the indictment was dismissed. Sentence according to law was imposed on August 23, 1966, after presentence investigation. Defendant now appeals from that judgment of conviction.
The relevant record in this case consists of the indictment, information, and a transcript of the interrogation of defendant by court and counsel when defendant entered his plea of guilty. It is admitted that defendant shot to death one Ronald John Kemp on May 21, 1966, on the premises of a bar in St. Paul known as 'Rondale Rec.' Defendant apparently had been drinking in the afternoon, but the amount he consumed is not shown. When defendant arrived at the Rondale Rec, decedent was seated in a booth with a girl friend. Defendant asked if he could dance with the girl, whereupon an argument ensued between defendant and decedent. According to defendant, decedent drew a knife, and defendant shot him Five times. At the time, decedent was 8 or 10 feet in front of defendant, and the exit to the premises was to his rear, although the distance is not shown. After the shooting, defendant left the premises but later turned himself in to the police after leaving his gun with a sister.
Defendant asserts that the charge of third-degree murder was a 'settlement' arranged between counsel for the prosecution and the defense, and he concedes that it 'may very likely (have been) a provident one from (defendant's) point of view.' Nevertheless, defendant contends that he was denied constitutional due process because the court accepted his plea of guilty without adequate inquiry as to defendant's understanding of his rights in two respects: (1) The court erroneously accepted the plea before ascertaining that defendant was aware of his usual constitutional rights as a criminal defendant; and (2) even more important, the court, in view of the apparent 'possibility of a successful defense based on intoxication,' should have ascertained whether the reduction to manslaughter in the first degree rather than murder in the third degree would have been a more justly appropriate bargain under the circumstances. 1 A corollary contention is the concomitant claim that his defense counsel was inadequate.
1. The trial court should not accept a defendant's plea of guilty without first ascertaining on the record, that he understands the nature and the elements of the crime to which he pleads guilty and that he is informed of the fundamental rights of a defendant who elects to plead not guilty and stand trial. It is evident from the following portion of the transcript that defendant was informed concerning his fundamental rights as a defendant before pleading guilty:
'Q (By Allan R. Markert, Prosecutor)--Your lawyer is Mr. Roger Lenzmeier and he is in court with you today?
'A--Yes.
'Q--And you have counselled with him him on several occasions Before appearing in court today?
'A--Yes.
'Q--And you know you have a right to plead not guilty?
'A--Yes.
'Q--And that you have a right to be tried by a jury on this matter?
'A--Yes.
'Q--Are you satisfied with the services Mr. Lenzmeier has rendered to you?
'A--Yes.
'Q--Do you understand the nature of the crime to which you have pled guilty?
'A--Yes.
'Q--Have any threats or promises been made to you in an attempt to induce you to enter you plea?
'A--no.
'Q--And you have entered this plea of your own free will?
'A--Yes.
'Q (By The Court)--Mr. Johnson, Before you entered your plea did you understand that under our law a person who is charged with a felony or a crime is presumed to be innocent? Did you understand that?
'A--Yes sir.
'Q--Under our law when a person is charged with an offense the law presumes him to be innocent, and such presumption of innocence stays with him until that time is reached, if that time is reached, when the state has produced evidence which satisfies the minds of the people trying the person of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Did you understand, before you entered your plea, that under our law you were presumed innocent of this offense?
'A--Yes sir.
'Q--You understood that?
'A--Yes sir.
'Q--Mr. Lenzmeier discussed that with you?
'A--Yes sir.
'Q--And you understand that under our constitution you have a right to have the state prove your guilt of this particular offense beyond a reasonable doubt?
'A--Yes sir.
'Q--You understood that when you entered your plea?
'A--Yes sir.
'Q--Has anybody, either the police or the County Attorney or the Public Defender, or anybody at all, made any promises or any threats to you in order to get you to enter a plea of guilty to this offense?
'A--No sir.
'Q--Your plea of guilty, then, was entered knowingly and voluntarily?
'A--Yes sir.
'Q--You entered if of your own free will?
'A--Yes sir.' (Italics supplied.)
It is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the public defender represented the defendant competently and faithfully. It might appear from this record that the court, apparently assuming that a defendant represented by an experienced public defender would be an informed defendant, did not first establish that defendant knew his rights. But even if that were true, the error, under these circumstances, was obviously without prejudice.
2. The principal ground of defendant's appeal, relating to the right of a defendant to be protected from improvident 'plea bargaining,' raises questions of far-reaching potential. Our disposition of the case, however, does not require a complete consideration of all such questions at this time.
Plea bargaining between competent counsel and with the intelligent acquiescence of the defendant, it may be observed at the outset, is not in conflict with public policy. Both the Advisory Committee on Criminal Trial of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice have endorsed the propriety of plea discussions and plea agreements as in the interest of the public in the effective administration or criminal justice. 2
Public policy, however, requires that this prevalent practice 3 be controlled by the observance of certain essential conditions. One obvious condition is that the prosecuting attorney may engage in such discussion with the defendant only through counsel, except where defendant does not have counsel because he either is not eligible for counsel or does not desire counsel. 4 A plea of guilty must, of course, be made by the individual defendant himself and in open court. 5 Another important condition, addressed to both court and counsel, is that the criminal charge for which the plea of guilty is bargained in lieu of the more serious charge shall be reasonably related to defendant's conduct 6 in the sense that 'the reduction be to a charge which bears some categoric similarity to the original charge.' 7 Yet another condition, addressed even more specifically to the trial court and as a standard for the acceptance of Any plea of guilty is that 'the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as may satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.' 8
The ultimate judicial responsibility must be to make reasonably certain that a person innocent of Any crime has not been improperly induced to plead guilty to a crime. 9 It is likewise a judicial responsibility to protect society against a defendant's being permitted to bargain for a plea excessively lenient for the gravity of the crime apparently in fact committed. 10 Although the court should neither usurp the responsibility of counsel nor participate in the plea bargaining negotiation itself, its proper role of discreet inquiry into the propriety of the settlement submitted for judicial acceptance cannot seriously be doubted. 11
We are unable to hold, on this record, that the trial court accepted defendant's plea of...
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