State v. Jolly
Decision Date | 02 December 2020 |
Docket Number | Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-327,Appellate Case No. 2018-000259 |
Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Samuel Jolly, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Dorchester County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of Columbia, and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of Orangeburg, all for Respondent.
Samuel Jolly married the mother of a nine-year-old girl (Victim) in 1996 and moved in with them. Over the course of the next year, Jolly sexually abused Victim. When Victim reported the abuse to a teacher, an investigation began, leading to arrest warrants for Jolly. Jolly, however, had moved to Florida, and the warrants were not served until he was apprehended in 2013. In 2013, he was indicted for one count of Criminal Sexual Conduct (CSC) with a Minor, and in 2014, he was indicted for one count of Lewd Act upon a Child. Both indictments listed the time frame of the crime as "August 1, 1996 to August 22, 1997." The indictment for Lewd Act upon a Child did not list the type of lewd act alleged to have been committed; however, before his trial, Jolly received discovery, including two statements of the Victim alleging Jolly committed up to sixteen discreet instances of lewd acts during the time period stated in the indictment.
At his 2018 trial, Jolly moved to quash his indictments; the motion was denied. Jolly also moved to exclude evidence of any lewd acts that occurred outside the scope of his indictment, asserting that, unless the Lewd Act indictment listed the specific act the State was prosecuting him for, the State was circumventing the rules regarding propensity evidence. The trial court ruled no evidence of lewd acts occurring before the indictment's timeframe could be entered into evidence at trial, but it refused to exclude evidence of lewd acts occurring within the timeframe of Jolly's indictment as prior bad acts.
Jolly also moved to exclude testimony from the forensic pediatrician who physically examined Victim in 1997 and found Victim's hymen was torn. She documented the exam with photographs and video, but by the time Jolly's trial occurred in 2018, only the notes from the exam still existed. Jolly asserted the photographs and video of the exam were the "underlying facts or data" upon which the pediatrician had relied in forming her expert opinion Victim's hymen was torn. Jolly argued that allowing the pediatrician to testify to this expert opinion without disclosing the photographs and video violated both Rule 705, SCRE,1 and his confrontation clause rights. The trial court disagreed, and, after taking in camera testimony from the pediatrician, it ruled: 1) the pediatrician's testimony was reliable; 2) the pediatrician's testimony did not improperly bolster Victim's testimony; 3) the probative value of the pediatrician's testimony was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; 4) the subject matter of the testimony was "beyond the ordinary knowledge of the juror and [did] require expert training in the sense that [the pediatrician] is a doctor"; and 5) thepediatrician had the requisite knowledge and skill to testify on the subject of her testimony. The trial court then allowed the pediatrician to testify as to her physical exam finding of a torn hymen but ruled she could not testify to any opinion as to what caused the tear in the hymen.2
After hearing testimony from Victim, the investigators, and the pediatrician, as well as Jolly's testimony in defense, the jury convicted Jolly on both indictments. Jolly now appeals, contending the trial court erred in: 1) finding Jolly's indictments were not vague or overbroad; 2) failing to exclude evidence of his prior bad acts against Victim; 3) admitting opinion evidence from the pediatrician without properly qualifying her as an expert; and 4) admitting expert testimony from the pediatrician regarding the exam she completed on Victim when the photographs and video taken during the exam were lost. We affirm.
The trial court did not err in denying Jolly's motion to quash his indictments, as they were not vague or overbroad. See State v. Baker, 411 S.C. 583, 588, 769 S.E.2d 860, 863 (2015) . The timeframe of Jolly's indictments was not overly broad. Compare State v. Wade, 306 S.C. 79, 80, 409 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1991) ( ), and State v. Tumbleston, 376 S.C. 90, 101-02, 654 S.E.2d 849, 855 (Ct. App. 2007) ( ), with Baker, 411 S.C. at 590-91, 769 S.E.2d at 864 ( ).
Further, we find the effect of the loss of the documents from 1997 implicates a sufficiency of the evidence argument but does not bear on whether Jolly's indictmentgave him sufficient notice of the charges against him. See State v. Massey, 430 S.C. 349, 358, 844 S.E.2d 667, 671 (2020) ().
Next, we find Jolly's indictment for Lewd Act upon a Child enabled the trial court to know what judgment to pronounce and apprised Jolly of the elements of the offense. See State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 102-03, 610 S.E.2d 494, 500 (2005) (); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (2014). However, it is a closer question whether Jolly's indictment on its face gave Jolly enough specificity to know what lewd act he would be called upon to answer at his trial. See State v. Gunn, 313 S.C. 124, 128-30, 437 S.E.2d 75, 77-78 (1993) ( ).
We do not, however, believe this potential facial deficiency required quashing the indictment. See Baker, 411 S.C. at 589, 769 S.E.2d at 864 . Looking at the surrounding circumstances before Jolly's trial, Jolly had access to Victim's statements describing the lewd acts alleged to have occurred in time to prepare a defense. Compare Baker, 411 S.C. at 590-92, 769 S.E.2d at 864-65 ( ), with Gunn, 313 S.C. at 129-30, 437 S.E.2d at 78 ( ); see also LaFave et al., 5 Criminal Procedure § 19.3(c) (4th ed. 2019) ( ). Therefore, we find no error in the denial of Jolly's motion to quash his indictment for Lewd Act upon a Child.
Further, even if the indictment was insufficient on its face and was not saved by the pretrial surrounding circumstances and discovery, Jolly has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced. Cf. State v. Samuels, 403 S.C. 551, 556-57, 743 S.E.2d 773, 776 (2013) ( ) failed the Gentry sufficiency test; and 2) actually prejudiced the defendant by implicating a defendant's rights "to notice of the charge against him, to a unanimous verdict, to appropriate sentencing[,] and to protection against double jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution"). First, through discovery, Jolly had actual notice of the alleged acts leading to his charges. Second, the lack of specificity as to which act could give rise to a conviction of Lewd Act upon a...
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