State v. JONES EX REL. COUNTY OF MARICORA

• Decision Date: 13 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-SA 00-0039.,1 CA-SA 00-0039.
• Citation: 198 Ariz. 18,6 P.3d 323
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, and Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Michael D. JONES, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, John William Roche, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

6 P.3d 323

198 Ariz. 18

STATE of Arizona, and Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Attorney, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Michael D. JONES, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, John William Roche, Real Party in Interest.

No. -0039.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department C.

June 13, 2000.

Reconsideration Denied June 27, 2000.

Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Attorney by Gerald R. Grant, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Petitioner.

George M. Sterling, Jr., Phoenix, Attorney for Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

EHRLICH, Judge.

¶ 1 We accepted jurisdiction of this special action to decide whether the rule of corpus delicti applies to a preliminary hearing. We conclude that it does not, and we therefore grant the relief requested by the State.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 On the evening of October 15, 1999, Phoenix Police Officer Dave Szenyes positioned himself in the alley behind the residence of John Roche to assist in an arrest not involving Roche. After approximately thirty minutes, Officer Szenyes peered through the fence separating the alley from this house and observed a man standing on the patio yelling unintelligible words. The man later was identified as Roche.

¶ 3 After Officer Szenyes saw Roche come out to the back patio several times, he heard an explosion that sounded like a gunshot or fireworks, but his view was obscured such that he never saw Roche carry or fire a weapon, nor did he see a characteristic flash. The officer did see Roche reappear on the patio, but the officer was unable to inquire about the explosion because he still was involved with the arrest for which he originally was called.

¶ 4 By the time that arrest was complete, Roche was standing in the driveway of his house. Officer Szenyes approached him, identifying himself as a police officer, and asked Roche if he could speak with him. Roche agreed. Officer Szenyes then asked Roche if he could smell Roche's hands, and Roche cooperated. Being unable to detect an odor of sulfur or gunpowder residue on Roche's hands, the officer requested Roche's identification. Roche indicated that the information was in his house, at which time both men went inside the residence.

¶ 5 Indoors, Officer Szenyes plainly saw a handgun on a table. After unloading the gun for his safety, he advised Roche of Roche's Miranda rights.¹ Officer Szenyes then explained that he had heard an explosion in the alley earlier in the evening, whereupon Roche confessed to discharging a handgun, and he gave the officer a .38 caliber shell. Officer Szenyes asked Roche where he had pointed the gun when he fired it, and Roche responded, "Down at the ground by that stump," referring to a tree stump in Roche's backyard near the alley. Roche also gave Officer Szenyes a .38 caliber weapon, which Roche said was the weapon that he had fired.

¶ 6 On October 19, 1999, the State filed a complaint, charging Roche with disorderly conduct, a class 6 dangerous felony. It alleged that Roche had intentionally or knowingly disturbed the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or person by recklessly handling, displaying or discharging a firearm. Based on Officer Szenyes' testimony at the preliminary hearing, the justice of the peace found probable cause to hold Roche to answer for the crime with which he was charged.

¶ 7 Roche filed a motion in superior court to remand the matter for a new finding of probable cause, arguing the insufficiency of the evidence against him. The State responded that the evidence was sufficient and that, in the alternative, the rule of corpus delicti did not apply to a preliminary hearing.² The court remanded the case for a new determination of probable cause "where proper foundation for Defendant's statements shall be made." The State then petitioned for special action, raising two issues:

1. Whether the rule of corpus delicti pertains to preliminary hearings; and,

2. If so, was there a reasonable inference that sufficient evidence existed to admit Roche's statements.

JURISDICTION

¶ 8 Review by special action is discretionary, see State ex rel. Neely v. Rodriguez, 165 Ariz. 74, 76 n. 4, 796 P.2d 876, 878 n. 4 (1990),

and, therefore, the decision to accept jurisdiction encompasses a variety of determinants. See Piner v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 182, 184-85, 962 P.2d 909, 911-12 (1998). This petition presents an issue of first impression and one that is of statewide significance, two persuasive factors. See Fiveash v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. 422, 423, 752 P.2d 511, 512 (App.1988). Additionally, the State has no remedy by appeal. Ariz. R.P. SPEC. ACTIONS 1; see State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 378, 380, 891 P.2d 246, 248 (App.1995). We therefore accept jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

1. Development and Rationale of the Rule of Corpus Delicti

¶ 9 Despite the absence of any clear mandate in English law, early doubts as to the evidentiary value of confessions compelled American courts and legislative bodies to examine whether the confession of the accused person alone would suffice for a conviction. See John W. Strong, 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 555 (4th ed.1992); Simon Greanleaf, 1 LAW OF EVIDENCE § 217 (Lewis ed. 1899). Both courts and legal scholars early favored the opinion that it would not. Comment, California's Corpus Delicti Rule: The Case for Review and Clarification, 20 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 1055, 1065 (1973). In fact, Francis Wharton observed that, by the mid-19th century, within the United States, there was "a growing unwillingness to rest convictions on confessions alone." Francis Wharton, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES 313 (3rd ed. 1855). American jurisprudence eventually insisted that, in order to sustain a conviction based on a confession, the confession must be corroborated by other evidence introduced at trial. See Strong, supra at 555-56; Greanleaf, supra at § 217. Termed the rule of corpus delicti ("body of the crime"), this condition is widely recognized and consistently applied in the federal and state courts, including those of Arizona. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152-53, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954)

; State v. Villa, 179 Ariz. 486, 487, 880 P.2d 706, 707 (App.1994).

¶ 10 The rule of corpus delicti is that "[a]n accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confessions." State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 506, 662 P.2d 1007, 1013 (1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1775, 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985); see Smith, 348 U.S. at 152-53,

75 S.Ct. 194; Villa, 179 Ariz. at 487,

880 P.2d at 707. Although courts have seldom articulated a precise rationale, they usually cite the regrettable historical experience with false confessions and the concern that convictions lacking in fundamental fairness could too-readily result from these statements. See Smith, 348 U.S. at 153,

75 S.Ct. 194; 7 John H. Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2070, p. 510 (Chadbourn rev. 1978)("The danger lies wholly in a false confession of guilt"); Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde The Defendant's Confession, 103 U. Pa. L.Rev. 638, 642 (1955).³

¶ 11 Additionally, the rule serves to combat the inherently coercive nature of law-enforcement investigations or otherwise-improper techniques that may be used in securing confessions that then may affect the overall reliability of a defendant's statements. See Smith, 348 U.S. at 153,

75 S.Ct. 194; Strong, supra at 556. Touching upon the due process implications of the rule, the Supreme Court stated: "Confessions may be unreliable because they are coerced or induced, and although separate doctrines exclude involuntary confessions from consideration by the jury, further caution is warranted because the accused may be unable to establish the involuntary nature of his statements." Smith, 348 U.S. at 153,

75 S.Ct. 194 (citations omitted);⁴

but see Developments in the Law—Confessions, 79 Harv. L.Rev. 938, 1084 (1966) (because there are other safeguards, "serious consideration should be given to elimination of the corpus delicti requirement"); Comment, California's Corpus Delicti Rule, supra at 1092 (rule is ineffective in preventing convictions on false testimony, and "pragmatic scrutiny" indicates it should be abolished); Note, Confession Corroboration in New York: A Replacement For The Corpus Delicti Rule, 46 Fordham L.Rev. 1205, 1235 (1978) (rule duplicates other doctrines regarding the admissibility of confessions). While other legal principles and rules of evidence protect the defendant from involuntary confessions, proof may be difficult to obtain, making this protection inadequate in certain cases. Thecorpus delicti rule thus continues to play an essential part in assuring accuracy and preventing errors in convictions based on confessions. See Smith, 348 U.S. at 153,

75 S.Ct. 194.⁵

2. Definition and Quantum of Proof to Establish the Corpus Delicti

¶ 12 As said above, "corpus delicti" literally means the "body of the crime." The rule demands that, before a defendant's statements are admissible as evidence of a crime, the State must establish the corpus delicti by showing proof of a crime and that someone is responsible for that crime. See Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506,

662 P.2d at 1013; State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 170, 654 P.2d 800, 806 (1982); State v. Janise, 116 Ariz. 557, 559, 570 P.2d 499, 501 (1977); State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 281, 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958).⁶ In other words, there must be a basic injury and a showing that this injury was the result of a criminal, rather than a natural or accidental, cause. 1 F. Wharton, WHAARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 349 (12th ed.1932). The evidence need not be of the quantum of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. at 170,

654 P.2d at 806. Rather, all that is required is that a reasonable inference of the corpus delicti exists before the statement may be considered. See Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506,

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