State v. Jones, No. COA08-1582 (N.C. App. 9/15/2009)
| Decision Date | 15 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. COA08-1582,COA08-1582 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DARRON JERMAINE JONES |
McCotter, Ashton & Smith, P.A., by Rudolph A. Ashton, III, and Kirby H. Smith, III, for Defendant.
Defendant appeals from judgments entered on his convictions of robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, felonious breaking or entering, two counts of felony larceny, two counts of possession of stolen goods, obtaining property by false pretenses, misdemeanor larceny, and habitual felon status. We find no error in part and reverse and remand in part.
Defendant was tried beginning 31 March 2008 before a Wayne County jury, upon indictments charging the following offenses:
Felony larceny of an automobile belonging to Tarra Chestnut and felonious possession of the stolen vehicle;
Felonious breaking or entering, felonious larceny, and possession of stolen goods, committed against George Foss Auto Sales;
Misdemeanor larceny from Lowes Hardware, and obtaining property by false pretenses by selling the stolen items to Quality Pawn;
Armed robbery and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury committed against Sherry Beasley;
First degree burglary and common law robbery committed against Carole Charles;
Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and;
Habitual felon status.
Evidence presented by the State will be discussed as relevant to appellate issues. The Defendant did not offer any evidence.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court dismissed the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury found Defendant not guilty of first-degree burglary and common law robbery, and returned verdicts of guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, felonious breaking or entering, felony larceny, and possession of stolen property, felony larceny of a motor vehicle and possession of stolen property, misdemeanor larceny, and obtaining property by false pretenses.
After these verdicts were returned, Defendant pled guilty to habitual felon status. He received three consecutive sentences: 116 to 149 months for robbery with a dangerous weapon and habitual felon status, 116 to 149 months for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and habitual felon status, and 93 to 121 months for the remaining offenses and for habitual felon status. From these convictions and judgments Defendant has appealed.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State's motion to join all offenses for trial. We disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-926(a) (2007) allows joinder of offenses "when the offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan." G.S. § 15A-926(a).
Pursuant to this rule, a two-step analysis is required for all joinder inquiries. First, the two offenses must have some sort of transactional connection. Whether such a connection exists is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. If such a connection exists, consideration then must be given as to "whether the accused can receive a fair hearing on more than one charge at the same trial," i.e., whether consolidation "hinders or deprives the accused of his ability to present his defense." This second part is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and is not reviewable on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.
State v. Montford, 137 N.C. App. 495, 498, 529 S.E.2d 247, 250 (2000) (quoting State v. Silva, 304 N.C. 122, 126, 282 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1981)) (other citations omitted).
"With respect to the transactional connection inquiry, . . . consideration must be given to several factors, no one of which is dispositive[, including] . . . (1) the nature of the offenses charged; (2) any commonality of facts between the offenses; (3) the lapse of time between the offenses; and (4) the unique circumstances of each case. Montford, 137 N.C. App. at 498-99, 529 S.E.2d at 250 (citation omitted). "`The test is whether the offenses are so separate in time and place and so distinct in circumstances as to render a consolidation unjust and prejudicial to defendant.'" State v. Breeze, 130 N.C. App. 344, 354, 503 S.E.2d 141, 148 (1998) (citing State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 423, 241 S.E.2d 662, 665 (1978)).
In the instant case, Defendant was charged with twelve criminal offenses that arose from five incidents and involved theft from five victims, all occurring within a six day period. Defendant concedes that offenses arising from the same incident may be joined for trial, but argues that the court committed reversible error by joining charges arising out of different incidents. We disagree.
There are several transactional connections among the charged offenses. The offenses were committed within the same week and in the same town. The offenses essentially comprised a series of property crimes, notwithstanding the violence alleged in connection with two of the charged thefts. See, e.g., State v. Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 24, 326 S.E.2d 881, 898 (1985) (). Further, several witnesses offered testimony pertinent to more than one charge. Accordingly, had the charges not been joined, these witnesses would have been required to testify at multiple trials.
The stolen white Grand Am used in the commission of each offense was another thread connecting the offenses. When Defendant was arrested, the keys to the white Grand Am were in his pocket. Items stolen from Foss's Auto Sales were found in the car. The charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon arose from the theft of a gun from Foss's. After Defendant was arrested for larceny of the vehicle, he confessed to stealing items from Lowes and selling them to a pawn shop. Two witnesses testified to seeing a white car during the two separate incidents in which they were involved. Defendant drove a white Grand Am to his girlfriend's house shortly after one of the victims was robbed. Defendant's girlfriend's testimony linked Defendant to both the stolen car and use of the victim's cell phone.
We conclude that the transactional connections among these offenses were legally sufficient for joinder. We further conclude that joinder did not unduly prejudice Defendant. At the pretrial hearing on the State's motion for joinder, defense counsel argued that if the cases were joined, the jury would not be able to determine which evidence applied to a given charge. However, the jury found Defendant not guilty of the offenses against one of the victims, indicating the jury's ability to give separate consideration to evidence of the various charges. This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Evidence 404(b). We disagree.
Under Rule 404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.
Rule 404(b) evidence "must be offered for a proper purpose, must be relevant, [and] must have probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant[.]" State v. Haskins, 104 N.C. App. 675, 679, 411 S.E.2d 376, 380 (1991). But, if the evidence has only slight probative value and "is so prejudicial that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury will consider the evidence only for the purpose of determining the defendant's propensity to commit the crimes with which he has been charged, the evidence must be excluded[.]" State v. White, 331 N.C. 604, 615-16, 419 S.E.2d 557, 564 (1992).
Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) "is constrained by the requirements of similarity and temporal proximity." State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154, 567 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2002) (citations omitted). As to the requirement of similarity:
Under Rule 404(b) a prior act or crime is `similar' if there are "some unusual facts present in both crimes or particularly similar acts which would indicate that the same person committed both." However, it is not necessary that the similarities between the two situations "rise to the level of the unique and bizarre." Rather, the similarities simply must tend to support a reasonable inference that the same person committed both the earlier and later acts.
State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 304, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890-91 (1991) (quoting State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 603, 604, 365 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1988)).
We review a trial court's determination to admit evidence under N.C. R. Evid. 404(b) . . . for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial judge's ruling is "`manifestly unsupported by reason.'" State v. Summers, 177 N.C. App. 691, 697, 629 S.E.2d 902, 907 (2006) (quoting State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 756, 340 S.E.2d 55, 59 (1986)) (internal citations omitted).
In the instant case, Detective Rick Farfour of the Wayne County Sheriff's Department testified about Defendant's involvement in the break-in of an auto supply business several years prior to trial. Defendant argued at trial that Farfour's testimony was inadmissible because the 2003 incident was insufficiently...
To continue reading
Request your trial