State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 22 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09AP-1053.,09AP-1053.
• Citation: 936 N.E.2d 529,2010 -Ohio- 2854
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. JONES, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

936 N.E.2d 529 2010 -Ohio- 2854 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. JONES, Appellee. No. 09AP-1053. Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County. Decided June 22, 2010.

Richard C. Pfeiffer Jr., City Attorney, Lara N. Baker, City Prosecutor, and Melanie R. Tobias and Orly Ahroni, Assistant City Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.

Luftman, Heck & Assoc., L.L.P., and Daniel J. Sabol, for appellee.

BRYANT, Judge.

*632 {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court granting the motion of defendant-appellee, Thomas E. Jones, to suppress evidence. The state assigns a single error:

The trial court erred in granting the defendant-appellee's motion to suppress evidence.

Because the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion to suppress, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On August 17, 2009, defendant was charged with one count of carrying a concealed weapon, a knife, in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor. After pleading not guilty, defendant on September 29, 2009, filed a motion to suppress evidence, contending that police officers, lacking reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in any criminal activity, unlawfully detained him in his vehicle when they retained his driver's license to run a warrant check. Defendant claimed that all evidence that the police obtained following defendant's unlawful detention must be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure.

{¶ 3} The trial court on October 28, 2009, held a hearing on defendant's suppression motion. At the hearing, the state's evidence was uncontroverted and *633 revealed that shortly after 1:00 a.m. on August 14, 2009, Columbus police officers Jason Garner and Duane Nicholson were on routine bicycle patrol in the vicinity of Sullivant Avenue and Belvedere Avenue in the Hilltop area of Columbus. The Hilltopsection of Columbus is a purportedly high-crime area known to the officers for narcotics activity, prostitution, violent crimes, break-ins, and stolen vehicles. The officers observed a vehicle legally parked next to the curb on the right side of the road with its engine running and headlights turned off. Defendant, the sole occupant, was in the driver's seat with his head down. Wearing plainly marked police uniforms and badges, the police officers approached defendant's vehicle on their bicycles, with Officer Garner proceeding to the driver's side of the vehicle and Officer Nicholson positioning himself behind the vehicle's trunk.

{¶ 4} Officer Garner asked defendant several questions: whether everything was okay, why he was there, where he lived and worked, and whether he knew anyone in the area. Visibly nervous, shaking, and breathing heavily, defendant responded that everything was fine; he explained that he was waiting to go to work and had pulled over to text his girlfriend. Defendant told the officer he lived and worked in London, Ohio, and did not know anyone in the area where he was parked. The officers testified that defendant was not committing any traffic offense, no odor of alcohol or marijuana was about defendant's person, the officers had no indication that defendant was involved in narcotics or prostitution activity, and nothing suggested that defendant was otherwise involved in or about to commit any kind of criminal activity.

{¶ 5} Based on a belief that defendant had failed to provide a good explanation for why he was in the area, coupled with the reputation of the area and defendant's nervousness, the officers, relying on their intuition, suspected that something might be wrong. Officer Garner accordingly asked for defendant's driver's license to verify his identity and to run a records check for warrants. Defendant handed his license to the officer and remained in his vehicle. Officer Garner testified that defendant was not under arrest at that time and was free to leave had he chosen to do so.

{¶ 6} Some time after taking possession of defendant's driver's license to run the warrant check, Officer Garner asked defendant, "Is there anything on you or in your vehicle that could hurt us?" Defendant responded, "Yes, I have a knife next to me." Officer Garner testified that out of concern for the safety of the officers and defendant, he instructed defendant to put his hands out the car window so the officers could recover the knife and ensure that it could not be used as a weapon. Officer Garner then opened the driver's door and observed a knife wedged between the seat and the driver's door with the knife's handle facing the front of the vehicle. The knife was a military-style knife and was *634 enclosed in a sheath approximately 10 to 12 inches long that had a strap and button holding the knife in the sheath. Officer Garner asked defendant why he had the knife, and defendant explained he had it for fishing. Officer Garner testified that defendant was cooperative during the entire encounter, did not try to hide anything from the officers, and was not deceitful.

{¶ 7} In a written decision and entry on November 3, 2009, the trial court found that "while the investigative stop or detention of the Defendant initially was warranted, once it was determined that there was no criminal activity afoot, the officers were obligated to release the Defendant," rendering the officers' subsequent warrantless search of defendant's automobile and seizure of the knife illegal. The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress and ordered that the knife the police seized be excluded from evidence.

{¶ 8} Appealing from the suppression order, the state has certified pursuant to Crim.R. 12(J) that the suppression order rendered the state's proof so weak that any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 9} In its sole assignment of error challenging the trial court's suppression order, the state asserts that the court erred as a matter of law by finding that the police officers' initial encounter with defendant was an investigatory stop or detention that triggered Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as opposed to a consensual encounter not subject to Fourth Amendment protections. The state contends that the police officers lawfully searched defendant's vehicle and seized the knife because defendant told the officers that he had a knife located next to him in the vehicle, a statement that justified the officers' decision to conduct the protective search of defendant's vehicle and seize the knife out of concern for their safety.

{¶ 10} "[A]ppellate review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to suppress evidence involves mixed questions of law and fact." State v. Vest (May 29, 2001), 4th Dist. No. 00CA2576, 2001 WL 605217. Thus, an appellate court's standard of review of the trial court's decision granting the motion to suppress is twofold. State v. Reedy, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-501, 2006-Ohio-1212, 2006 WL 648861, ¶ 5, citing State v. Lloyd (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 95, 100-01, 709 N.E.2d 913. Because the trial court is in the best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, we must uphold the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id., citing State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 488, 597 N.E.2d 1141. We nonetheless must independently determine, as a matter of law, whether the facts meet the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. Claytor (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627, 620 N.E.2d 906. The state bears the burden of establishing the validity of a warrantless search. *635 Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218, 524 N.E.2d 889, citing State v. Kessler (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207, 7 O.O.3d 375, 373 N.E.2d 1252.

{¶ 11} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Section 14, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution, prohibits the government from conducting warrantless searches and seizures, rendering them per se unreasonable unless an exception applies. State v. Mendoza, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-645, 2009-Ohio-1182, 2009 WL 690204, ¶ 11, citing Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. Even so, "not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, fn. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; Brendlin v. California (2007), 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132.

{¶ 12} In determining whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, and thus implicates the Fourth Amendment, the question is whether, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would believe he or she was not free to leave or not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497; Florida v. Bostick (1991), 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389;Michigan v. Chesternut (1988), 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565; Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (plurality opinion). "[T]he crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.' " Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, quoting Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565. Where the encounter takes place is a factor in deciding whether it constitutes a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d...