State v. Kaneakua, 5853

• Decision Date: 10 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 5853,5853
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alexander KANEAKUA et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 590

597 P.2d 590

61 Haw. 136

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alexander KANEAKUA et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 5853.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

July 10, 1979.

Syllabus by the Court

1. It is a basic principle of due process that a criminal statute must state with reasonable clarity the acts it proscribes.

2. A gamecock is a living creature and therefore an animal within the cruelty to animals statute's definition of "animal" as

including "every living creature." HRS § 711-1100(5).

3. Statutory language must be read in the context of the entire statute and construed in a manner consistent with the purpose of the statute.

4. Legislature, by providing that managing or keeping a place at which cockfights are held is an act of cruelty to animals, has evinced a clear intention to treat cockfighting as a type of cruelty to animals. HRS § 711-1109(1)(b).

5. Reading provision of cruelty to animals statute prohibiting managing or keeping a place at which cockfights are held, in conjunction with provision prohibiting setting on foot, instigating or doing an act towards the furtherance of an act of cruelty to animals, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that cockfighting itself is an act of cruelty to animals. HRS § 711-1109(1)(b), HRS § 711-1109(1)(d).

6. Where defendants' conduct fell within the prohibitions of cruelty to animals statute, defendants have no standing to assert that the statute may be vague or indefinite as applied to other persons in situations not before the court.

7. The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct is included in its proscriptions.

8. Conduct which cruelty to animals statute seeks to regulate is amenable to reasonable regulation by the state and where no constitutionally protected right is involved, a claim that the statute is overbroad is without merit.

9. One who alleges that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad must be directly affected by the claimed overbroad aspects of the statute in order to have standing to challenge such statute.

Randolph R. Slaton, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu (C. William Chikasuye, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, on the briefs), for plaintiff-appellant.

Edwin Y. Sasaki, Honolulu, for defendants-appellees.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and OGATA and MENOR, JJ. ^*

RICHARDSON, Chief Justice.

This case is a consolidation of forty-seven prosecutions for violations of part of Hawaii's cruelty to animals statute, Hawaii Penal Code § 1109(1)(d). ¹ The arrest leading to these prosecutions took place in Waianae, Oahu, during the latter part of 1974 and early 1975. A motion to dismiss was filed and, for purposes of the motion, it was stipulated that each of the defendants had knowingly participated in a cockfight at the time and place charged. The district court found that the statute was unconstitutional and granted the motion. ² The state appeals.

The only issues presented by this appeal are whether § 1109(1)(d) of the Hawaii Penal Code is so vague or overbroad as to deny defendants due process of law. The statute in question provides:

Cruelty to animals. (1) A person commits the offense of cruelty to animals if he knowingly or recklessly:

(d) Sets on foot, or instigates in or does any act towards the furtherance of any act of cruelty to animals.

Hawaii Penal Code § 1100(5) ³ defines Animal as including "every living creature" while Cruelty is defined by § 1100(6) ⁴ as including "every act, omission, or neglect whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted."

I. VAGUENESS

It is a basic principle of due process that a criminal statute must state with reasonable clarity the acts it proscribes. Our system of laws assumes that a person must choose between lawful and unlawful conduct, so we require that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he or she may act accordingly. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); State v. Manzo, 58 Haw. 440, 573 P.2d 945 (1973); State v. Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 441 P.2d 333 (1968). This court has also recognized that statutes which fail to provide explicit standards are subject to arbitrary application and enforcement. Vague laws impermissibly delegate policy matters to the subjective and Ad hoc decision making of police officers on the beat, judges, and juries and may result in capricious or discriminatory action. State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

Appellees' major contention in this case is that the terms "animal" and "cruelty" are vague. These phrases, it is alleged, fail to provide sufficient notice of the limits of the statute's reach in relation to defendants' activity. We do not agree and find that the statute is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process with regard to the charge against these defendants.

As we noted above, "animal" is defined in the Hawaii Penal Code as including "every living creature." Defendants would have us believe that persons of common intelligence could differ as to the meaning of the word and cite cases to the effect that a gamecock is not an animal. State v. Stockton, 85 Ariz. 153, 333 P.2d 735 (1958); Lock v. Falkenstine, 380 P.2d 278 (Okl.Cr.1963); State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne, 211 Kan. 264, 505 P.2d 732 (1973). Whatever may be the meaning of the word in other jurisdictions, it is clear here that a gamecock is a living creature and therefore an animal within the statute's definition.

Since we have determined that gamecocks are animals, the only major question left to be resolved is whether defendants' conduct falls within the statute's prohibition. For purposes of this case, defendants have admitted to knowing participation in cockfights. ⁵ Several factors indicate to this court that cockfighting is among the acts prohibited by § 1109(1)(d).

In our opinion, it is erroneous to read § 1109(1)(d) in a vacuum. Statutory language must be read in the context of the entire statute and construed in a manner consistent with the purpose of the statute. Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co., 53 Haw. 208, 490 P.2d 899 (1973). Our cruelty to animals statute contains several sections and in examining § 1109(1)(d) other sections of that statute should be looked to as interpretive aides. Hawaii Penal Code § 1109(1)(b) ⁶ provides that a person commits the offense of cruelty to animals if he knowingly or recklessly:

(b) Keeps or uses; or in any way is connected with or interested in the management of, or receives money for the admission of any person to, any place kept or used for the purpose of fighting or baiting any bull, bear, dog, cock or other creature, and every person who encourages, aids or assists therein, or who permits or suffers any place to be so kept or used The Legislature has thus determined that managing or keeping a place at which cockfights are held is an act of cruelty to animals. Reading this section in conjunction with § 1109(1)(d), it is impossible to escape the conclusion that cockfighting itself is an act of cruelty to animals. It would indeed be absurd to hold that the Legislature did not find cockfighting an act of cruelty to animals but did find that keeping or managing a place at which cockfights are held was such an act of cruelty. We hold that the Legislature, by providing in § 1109(1)(b) that keeping or managing a place for cockfighting is an act of cruelty to animals, has evinced a clear intention to treat cockfighting as a type of cruelty to animals.

Our finding receives added strength by an examination of the history of our cruelty to animals statute. The precursor to our present statute was enacted in 1884 and contained the definitions of animal and cruelty as set out above. The substance of §§ 1109(1)(b) and (d) were also contained in that act. ⁷ Until 1972 when the Hawaii Penal Code was adopted, the original 1884 statute remained unchanged. The legislative history of the present penal code section reveals that in a draft of the Hawaii Penal Code, a single general provision on cruelty to animals had been proposed. A Joint Senate-House Interim Committee rejected the draft provision and recommended retaining the existing law on cruelty to animals with slight modifications. The Committee Report indicates that the committee felt that the single provision in the draft penal code was too vague to prevent some types of mistreatment of animals which were prohibited by existing law. Special Committee Report No. 6, 1972 Senate Journal at 682. A later Conference Committee adopted the Interim Committee's recommendations stating that they "retain the substance of provisions in our present cruelty to animals statute with some modification updating the provisions." Conference Committee Report 72-2, 1972 Senate Journal at 745. This final version was enacted by the Legislature.

Thus, Hawaii's cruelty to animals statute, as it now exists, is substantially the same as that enacted in 1884. The Legislature could have changed the statute at any time, but in 1972 did nothing more than update the language of the entire statute. As we noted above, included in the 1884 statute was a provision, very similar to what is now § 1109(1)(b), prohibiting keeping or managing a place used for cockfighting. We must assume that the 1972 Legislature was well aware of that prohibition. Yet, the Legislature explicitly retained the substance of the existing law in order to Continue the prohibition against all types of mistreatment of animals covered by the earlier statute.

Defendants claim, however, that "unjustifiable", as used in the statute's definition of cruelty, is too vague a standard. ⁸ They point to various local customs, such as...