State v. Karpov

• Decision Date: 27 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 95080-6,95080-6
• Citation: 458 P.3d 1182
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Mikhail G. KARPOV, Petitioner.

458 P.3d 1182

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Mikhail G. KARPOV, Petitioner.

No. 95080-6

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued January 15, 2019

Filed February 27, 2020

Dean Tze-Ming Chuang, Crary Clark & Domanico PS, 9417 E. Trent Avenue, Spokane Valley, WA 99206-4285, for Petitioner.

Patrick D. Schaff, Spokane County Prosecutor's Office, 1100 W. Mallon Avenue, Spokane, WA 99260-2043, for Respondent.

WIGGINS, J.

¶1 The district court dismissed the criminal case against Mikhail G. Karpov on the ground that the State had failed to prove jurisdiction. The question before us is whether the State could appeal that dismissal and retry Karpov upon reversal. Karpov argues that jurisdiction is an essential element of every crime and thus that the dismissal for the State’s failure to prove jurisdiction resulted in an acquittal, meaning double jeopardy barred the State’s initial appeal and prohibits retrial. The State counters that jurisdiction is not an essential element of every crime and thus that double jeopardy does not apply here. We hold that jurisdiction is not an essential element of every crime but, rather, is the power of the court to hear and determine a case. However, we reverse the superior court and remand for the reinstatement of the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice. When the trial court substantively treated jurisdiction as an essential element of the crime, the dismissal for failure to prove jurisdiction was no different than if jurisdiction were actually an essential element. The trial court therefore judicially acquitted Karpov when it dismissed the case against him, and double jeopardy barred the State’s appeal from the district court and prohibits retrial of Karpov on these charges.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Karpov was tried in the district court of Spokane County for five counts of indecent exposure. After the State rested, Karpov moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the State had provided insufficient evidence of jurisdiction. The court granted the motion because no witness had expressly stated that the alleged crimes took place in Spokane County, to which the district court’s jurisdiction is statutorily limited. See RCW 3.66.060. The district court concluded that the State had failed to prove that the court had jurisdiction over Karpov’s alleged crimes¹ and dismissed all five counts of indecent exposure.

¶3 When dismissing the case, the trial court expressly stated that its ground for dismissal was that the State had failed to prove the "essential element" of jurisdiction. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 2. Further, it ordered dismissal with prejudice.

¶4 The State appealed to superior court. The State argued that the trial court had erred in dismissing the case for failure to prove jurisdiction and that double jeopardy did not apply. Karpov argued that the State’s appeal and any retrial were barred by double jeopardy.

¶5 The superior court agreed with the State. In holding that the district court had erred in finding the evidence insufficient to establish jurisdiction, the superior court reasoned that the State presented evidence that the incidents had occurred in Spokane County. The superior court also found that double jeopardy did not bar the State’s appeal because the dismissal did not decide the question of Karpov’s factual guilt. It reversed the district court’s dismissal of the charges and remanded the case for trial.

¶6 The Court of Appeals denied Karpov’s motion for discretionary review, reasoning that double jeopardy did not bar retrial in this case. Karpov moved for discretionary review by this court, which we granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 We review double jeopardy claims de novo as questions of law. State v. S.S.Y. , 170 Wash.2d 322, 328, 241 P.3d 781 (2010) (citing State v. Freeman , 153 Wash.2d 765, 770, 108 P.3d 753 (2005) ).

ANALYSIS

¶8 Our constitution commands, "No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9. The United States Constitution similarly provides that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. States are bound by the federal double jeopardy clause via the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Benton v. Maryland , 395 U.S. 784, 787, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969). Additionally, we have long held that our "state constitutional rule against double jeopardy provides the same scope of protection as the federal constitutional rule." State v. Sutherby, 165 Wash.2d 870, 878, 204 P.3d 916 (2009) (citing State v. Gocken, 127 Wash.2d 95, 107, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995) ). Neither Karpov nor the State has argued that we should depart from federal case law and neither has performed the Gunwall² analysis necessary to do so. See Blomstrom v. Tripp, 189 Wash.2d 379, 400-01, 402 P.3d 831 (2017) (setting forth six Gunwall factors).

¶9 Double jeopardy bars appeal and retrial when the defendant has been acquitted. See State v. Hall , 162 Wash.2d 901, 906-07, 177 P.3d 680 (2008) (citing State v. Ervin , 158 Wash.2d 746, 752-53, 147 P.3d 567 (2006) ). Acquittals by the judge are known as "judicial acquittals." See Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 327, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 185 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2013). A dismissal by a trial judge is a judicial acquittal when it adjudicates the ultimate question of factual guilt or innocence. Id. at 319, 133 S. Ct. 1069. Such dismissals "encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense." Id. at 318-19, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (citing United States v. Scott , 437 U.S. 82, 98 & n. 11, 98 S. Ct. 2187, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1978) ; Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 10, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) ). Thus, when the trial court "act[s] on its view that the prosecution ha[s] failed to prove its case" and dismisses the case in the defendant’s favor, the trial court judicially acquits the defendant. Id. at 325, 133 S. Ct. 1069. A judicial acquittal triggers the protections of the double jeopardy clauses even when the judge bases the acquittal on an erroneous understanding of the elements of the crime. Id. at 318, 133 S. Ct. 1069.

I. Jurisdiction is not an essential element of every crime but instead concerns the power of a court to act

¶10 Karpov hinges his double jeopardy argument on jurisdiction. First, he asserts that jurisdiction is an essential element of every crime. Br. of Pet’r at 1. Then he concludes that "[t]he principles of double jeopardy bar reinstatement of ... [the] criminal charges [against him] ... because the State closed its case without presenting sufficient evidence of the essential element of jurisdiction, and the case was previously dismissed by the trial court due to the State’s failure to establish jurisdiction." Id. at 5-6. Karpov’s argument fails because jurisdiction is not an essential element of every crime.

¶11 Rather than being an essential element of every crime, "[j]urisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a case." State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 468, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989). Karpov in fact agrees, noting that "[j]urisdiction relates to a court’s authority to adjudicate a case before them." Mot. for Discr. Review at 7 (citing J.A. v. State, 120 Wash. App. 654, 657, 86 P.3d 202 (2004) ). Jurisdiction is therefore the court’s authority or power. It must underlie every case that is brought before a judge.

¶12 In a criminal case, a trial court must have jurisdiction to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Indeed, double jeopardy "does not come into play until a proceeding begins before a trier ‘having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused.’ " Serfass v. United States , 420 U.S. 377, 391, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 43 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1975) (quoting Kepner v. United States , 195 U.S. 100, 133, 24 S. Ct. 797, 49 L. Ed. 114 (1904) ); see also State v. Cockrell , 102 Wash.2d 561, 567, 689 P.2d 32 (1984) (double jeopardy cannot apply unless a defendant was tried before a court of " ‘competent jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits of the cause’ " (quoting State v. Ridgley, 70 Wash.2d 555, 557, 424 P.2d 632 (1967) )).

¶13 This is not to say that jurisdiction can never be an essential element. There are crimes that include jurisdictional elements. Driving under the influence is an example of such a crime. RCW 46.61.502(1) ("A person is guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, marijuana, or any drug if the person drives a vehicle within this state ." (emphasis added)). The crime here includes no such jurisdictional element.³ Many federal crimes have jurisdictional elements. See Torres v. Lynch , 578 U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1625, 194 L. Ed. 2d 737 (2016) (discussing this issue). But, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, "[f]or obvious reasons, state criminal laws do not include the jurisdictional elements common in federal statutes." Id. This "obvious reason[ ]" is that states are not limited to enumerated powers, as is Congress, and therefore do "not need ... a jurisdictional hook" like the commerce clause to exercise their authority. Id. Instead, state legislatures "exercis[e] their plenary police powers" when they create crimes. Id. ¶14 Karpov argues that jurisdiction is an "essential element" of every criminal case, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Karpov is wrong for several reasons. While we have referred to jurisdiction as an " ‘integral component’ " of the State’s case, which it must prove, that does not make it into an essential element. State v. Norman , 145 Wash.2d 578, 589, 40 P.3d 1161 (2002) (quoting State v. Squally , 132 Wash.2d 333, 340, 937 P.2d 1069 (1997) (citing State v. Svenson , 104 Wash.2d 533, 542, 707 P.2d 120 (1985) )). Rather, this court has treated the essential elements of a crime as distinct from questions of jurisdiction. E.g., Lane, 112 Wash.2d at 468, 771 P.2d 1150 ("The State of Washington may...