State v. Keenan, 21796
Decision Date | 07 October 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 21796,21796 |
Citation | 296 S.E.2d 676,278 S.C. 361 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. David KEENAN, Appellant. |
Appellate Defender John L. Sweeny and Asst. Appellate Defender William Isaac Diggs, both of S.C. Commission of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Lindy P. Funkhouser and Preston F. McDaniel, Columbia, for respondent.
This appeal arises from appellant's conviction for armed robbery at the March, 1981 term of the Court of General Sessions for Cherokee County. He was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.
Appellant has asserted that the combined effect of S.C.Code Ann. § 22-5-320 (Supp.1981), and the recently enacted statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 17-23-160 (Supp.1981), was to deprive the Court of General Sessions of jurisdiction to try him. See State v. Funderburk, 259 S.C. 256, 191 S.E.2d 520 (1972).
Section 22-5-320 provides:
Any magistrate who issues a warrant charging a crime beyond his jurisdiction shall grant and hold a preliminary hearing of it upon the demand in writing of the defendant made within twenty days of the hearing to set bond for such charge; provided, however, that if such twenty-day period expires on a date prior to the convening of the next term of General Sessions Court having jurisdiction then the defendant may wait to make such request until a date at least ten days before the next term of General Sessions Court convenes. At the preliminary hearing, the defendant may cross-examine the state's witnesses in person or by counsel, have the reply in argument if there be counsel for the State, and be heard in argument in person or by counsel as to whether a probable case has been made out and as to whether the case ought to be dismissed by the magistrate and the defendant discharged without delay. When such a hearing has been so demanded the case shall not be transmitted to the court of general sessions or submitted to the grand jury until the preliminary hearing shall have been had, the magistrate to retain jurisdiction and the court of general sessions not to acquire jurisdiction until after such preliminary hearing. Provided, however, that the defendant shall not be required to appear in person at the appointed time, date and place set for the hearing if he is represented by his attorney. (Emphasis added).
Section 17-23-160 provides:
When any person charged with a crime who is entitled to a preliminary hearing on such charges appears in person or by counsel in a hearing to set bond, he shall be notified by a magistrate orally and in writing of his right to such preliminary hearing. When a person is notified of his right to a preliminary hearing, he shall be furnished a simple form providing him an opportunity to request a preliminary hearing by signing and returning this form to the advising magistrate then and there or thereafter. Any person so notified who fails to timely request a preliminary hearing shall lose his right to such hearing.
Appellant argues that receipt of notice of the right to a preliminary hearing in the manner prescribed by § 17-23-160 is a condition precedent to the court of general sessions obtaining jurisdiction over the matter under § 22-5-320. This is so, appellant contends, even though he never requested a preliminary hearing, because the purported effect of § 17-23-160 is to require notice of the right to a preliminary hearing before it can be knowingly waived. We agree with appellant that §§ 22-5-320 and 17-23-160 require this result. However, we hold the jurisdictional language of § 22-5-320, emphasized above, offends the State Constitution, and therefore hold that the Court of General Sessions had jurisdiction to try the matter. Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.
The question of the constitutionality of § 22-5-320 has not been raised by the parties. While it is fundamental that the Court will not ordinarily inquire into the constitutionality of a statute on its own motion, a recognized exception to this rule is that such a matter may be considered sua sponte where the statute encroaches upon the jurisdiction of the Court. See, e.g., State v. Huber, 129 W.Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946); State v. Gatlin, 241 La. 321, 129 So.2d 4 (1961); 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 174, p. 564 (1979); 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, § 96, p. 331, n. 21 (1956). This exception springs from the principle that every court has the power and duty to decide all issues necessary to the determination of its own jurisdiction. Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Company, 243 S.C. 1, 132 S.E.2d 18 (1963).
Our decisional process is also guided by the familiar maxim that constitutional issues will not be passed upon unless necessary to a decision. Thorne v. Seabrook, 264 S.C. 503, 216 S.E.2d 177 (1975). In the cases decided under the present Constitution where a jurisdictional defect had been asserted because of alleged noncompliance with § 22-5-320, the jurisdictional effect of that statute was inapposite since all the defendants either waived their rights to a preliminary hearing or were otherwise not entitled to a hearing. In those cases, it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. If § 17-23-160 were not now in force, this case would be decided on the ground of waiver. Cf. State v. McClure, S.C., 289 S.E.2d 158, n. 2 (1982). But because §§ 17-23-160 and 22-5-320 operate together to restrict the mode of waiving the right to a preliminary hearing, it now becomes necessary to determine whether the restraint of § 22-5-320 on the jurisdiction of the courts of general sessions is an excessive exercise of constitutionally circumscribed legislative power.
Section 22-5-320 was in harmony with the Constitution of 1895. State v. Flintroy, 178 S.C. 89, 182 S.E. 311 (1935). But Article V of the present Constitution, ratified in 1973, differs drastically from Article V of the 1895 Constitution. The most significant change for the purposes here is the clause in Section 21 of Article V of the 1895 Constitution, which provided that "[i]n criminal matters beyond their jurisdiction to try, [the magistrates] shall sit as Examining Courts, and commit, discharge, or ... recognize, persons charged with such offenses, subject to such regulations as the General Assembly may provide." The present Constitution contains no such mandate that magistrates conduct preliminary hearings. That authority is now derived solely from statute. There no longer exists a State (nor has there ever existed a Federal) constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. McClure. We also note that an act, even though previously valid, is effectively repealed by the subsequent adoption of conflicting constitutional provisions. Dill v. Durham, 56 S.C. 423, 35 S.E. 3 (1900).
The provisions of the Constitution bearing upon the question are Sections 7 and 23 of Article V, the pertinent parts of which are: "Section 7: The Circuit Court shall be a general trial court with original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, except those cases in which the exclusive jurisdiction shall be given to inferior courts..." "Section 23: The General Assembly shall provide for [the magistrate's] .... criminal jurisdiction."
By these provisions, the Constitution specifically allows the Legislature to grant "exclusive jurisdiction" to the magistrates' courts over whatever "criminal cases" it chooses to designate. 1 However, where the Legislature fails to grant the magistrates' courts "exclusive jurisdiction" over designated "cases," Article V, Section 7 requires by clear implication that the Court of General Sessions retain its original concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. If the Court of General Sessions does not retain this jurisdiction, the act infringes on the constitutionally granted power of the circuit court, which the Legislature cannot take away. Thus, if § 22-5-320 acts to deprive the Court of General Sessions of its original concurrent jurisdiction over "criminal cases" without also granting "exclusive jurisdiction" of the same "cases" to the magistrates' courts, it is repugnant to Article V, Section 7.
The appointment of the magistrates' court as the singular...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Washington v. Whitaker
...S.C. 157, 153 S.E.2d 326 (1967) (this Court held it may reach any issue affecting the rights of minors ex mero motu ); State v. Keenan, 278 S.C. 361, 296 S.E.2d 676 (1982) (every court has the power and duty to decide all issues necessary to the determination of its own jurisdiction). In my......
-
Eldridge v. Greenwood
...based on a failure of proof, because the facts could be such that this court would lack jurisdiction. Cf. generally State v. Keenan, 278 S.C. 361, 296 S.E.2d 676 (1982) (stating that "every court has the power and duty to decide all issues necessary to the determination of its own jurisdict......
-
State v. Langford
...declaration. Unless a statute infringes upon our jurisdiction, we may not sua sponte declare it unconstitutional. See State v. Keenan, 278 S.C. 361, 296 S.E.2d 676 (1982). We should not decide the constitutionality of § 1–7–330 on this record. Even if the constitutionality of § 1–7–330 were......
-
Quiroz v. Baldwin
...prior to an extended restraint of liberty following arrest. See United States v. Kabat, 586 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.1978); State v. Keenan, 296 S.E.2d 676, 678 (S.C.1982). In South Carolina, a preliminary hearing is not held if the defendant is indicted by the grand jury or waives presentment bef......