State v. Kester
Decision Date | 07 July 2021 |
Docket Number | Appellate Case 2018-001852,2021-UP-259 |
Parties | The State, Respondent, v. James Kester, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard May 3, 2021
Appeal From Richland County Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge
Dayne Phillips, of Price Benowitz, LLP, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, and Solicitor Byron E Gipson, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
James Kester appeals his convictions for eight counts of first-degree assault and battery and one count of third-degree assault and battery. We affirm.
1. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not ordering a competency evaluation after being informed Kester had been found competent to stand trial in a prior evaluation and after observing Kester in a lengthy colloquy regarding his decision to represent himself. See State v. White 364 S.C. 143, 147, 611 S.E.2d 927, 929 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]he decision of whether to order a competency examination is within the discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be overturned absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion."); State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 27, 35-36, 753 S.E.2d 545, 549-50 (2014) ( ); McLaughlin v State, 352 S.C. 476, 481, 575 S.E.2d 841, 843 (2003) ("The test for competency to stand trial or continue trial is whether the defendant has the sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as a factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.").
2. We affirm the circuit court's decision to grant Kester's motion to represent himself as Kester was aware of his right to counsel, chose to have his attorneys remain as standby counsel, and the circuit court repeatedly cautioned Kester about the dangers of self-representation. See State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602, 813 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2018) ("Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact which appellate courts review de novo."); State v. Dial, 429 S.C. 128, 133, 838 S.E.2d 501, 504 (2020) () ; id. ; Samuel, 422 S.C. at 603-04, 813 S.E.2d at 491 () (quoting Barnes, 407 S.C. at 35-36, 753 S.E.2d at 550)).
3. Because Kester does not demonstrate he was prejudiced in regards to his use of peremptory strikes, there is no reversible error. See State v. Patterson, 367 S.C. 219, 224, 625 S.E.2d 239, 242 (Ct. App. 2006) (); State v. Rayfield, 369 S.C. 106, 113-14, 631 S.E.2d 244, 248 (2006) (, )abrogated on other grounds by State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493, 787 S.E.2d 480 (2016); Wilson v. Childs, 315 S.C. 431, 439, 434 S.E.2d 286, 291 (Ct. App. 1993) (); Moore v. Jenkins, 304 S.C. 544, 547, 405 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991) .
4. We find the circuit court's Allen[2] charge was not unconstitutionally coercive as the circuit court was not made aware of the division of jurors and its charge did not impermissibly address the minority jurors. Additionally, the charge did not admonish jurors that they must reach a verdict, and the charge cautioned jurors they should not give up their opinions simply in order to arrive at a verdict. See Green v. State, 351 S.C. 184, 194, 569 S.E.2d 318, 323 (2002) (); Workman v. State, 412 S.C. 128, 130-31, 771 S.E.2d 636, 638 (2015) () ; Green, 351 S.C. at 195, 569 S.E.2d at 323-24 (2002) ( ); but see State v. Taylor, 427 S.C. 208, 214, 829 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ct. App. 2019) (); Id. at 218, 829 S.E.2d at 729 (the Tucker factors are not exclusive and the trial court's failure to emphasize jurors "should not ...
To continue reading
Request your trial