State v. Koon

Decision Date20 May 1997
Citation704 So.2d 756
Parties96-1208 La
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

John Wilson Reed, New Orleans, for Applicant.

Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Douglas P. Moreau, District Atty., Louis Richard Daniel, Donald J. Wall, Jr., Kay Freet Howell, R. Christopher Nevils, Baton Rouge, for Respondent.

[96-1208 La. 2] VICTORY, Associate Justice.

Walter J. Koon was indicted by an East Baton Rouge grand jury on three counts of first degree murder for killing his estranged wife, Michelle Guidry Koon, and her parents, Felicie and Richard Guidry, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30. At trial, defendant was found guilty as charged and given the death penalty on each count. This is the direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. 1

On appeal, defendant relies on eleven assignments of error. We find no merit in any of the assignments and affirm both the convictions and sentences.

FACTS

At noon on March 5, 1993, defendant and a passenger, Sarah Robinson, drove to the Baton Rouge home of his in-laws where his estranged wife was staying. Armed with a semi-automatic pistol, he parked in the driveway, walked through the carport to the backyard, pulled the gun from the waistband of his pants, and shot his wife twice, killing her. Robinson jumped out of the truck and ran into the Guidry home, yelling that defendant had shot Michelle. As Mrs. Guidry began to call 911 for help, defendant entered the home and shot Mrs. Guidry at close range. She died shorty thereafter. Robinson, who had heard defendant enter the house and shoot Mrs. Guidry, hid in the bathroom. Defendant then shot Mr. Guidry twice in the chest and then after he had fallen, moved closer to Mr. Guidry and shot him twice more at close range, killing him.

Defendant left the Guidry home and drove directly to his trailer in Livingston Parish, where he called the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office and told Detective Kearney Foster he had just killed three people in Baton Rouge. The Livingston Parish [96-1208 La. 3] police officers arrested him at him home without incident and recovered the murder weapon inside the trailer.

DISCUSSION

GUILT PHASE ISSUES

Admissibility of Statement Made to Baton Rouge Detectives

Defendant contends that it was error to admit defendant's statement to a Baton Rouge police officer, and that the error was not harmless, especially in the penalty phase of the trial.

Defendant made several statements to police regarding his commission of the killings. In addition to his phone call from his trailer to Detective Foster immediately following the shootings wherein he told Detective Foster that he had just killed three people in Baton Rouge and wanted to turn himself in, he talked to Detective Foster by cellular phone while Detective Foster was in route to defendant's trailer and told him there was "one other son-of-a-bitch" who he would have liked to kill. Defendant told Detective Foster he was drinking a beer and Detective Foster said that when he got there, they could all have a beer together.

When the Livingston Parish sheriff deputies arrived at defendant's trailer, defendant emerged from the trailer with three beers and surrendered without incident. Detective Darryl Curtis advised defendant of his rights and defendant signed a consent to search form. The detectives entered the trailer and found the murder weapon. Again, defendant told the detectives that he had killed three people in Baton Rouge.

On the way to the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office, Detective Norris Hull testified that defendant "just started talking ... and said something to the effect that she'd had pushed him too far and--uh--he said, I went over there and shot her, knocked her down--shot her. I run up again closer and shot her in the back of the head. I shot the lady--the mother-in-law on the phone and at that time the man started running and [96-1208 La. 4] I shot him." Defendant also said he thought Mr. Guidry might have been going to get a gun.

Detective Haley, who was riding with Detective Hull, testified that defendant said "she had bugged him too much and pushed him too far and he said--uh--I shot her in the back. She fell and I shot her in the head and then he said he shot the lady on the phone and he shot the old man because he thought he was going after a gun." He also testified that defendant had tears in his eyes during the drive.

When they arrived at the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office, defendant was read his Miranda rights and was not questioned. He asked Detective Haley if he could use the telephone and Detective Haley explained that he could, but Detective Haley would have to accompany him to the booking room where the telephone was located and could not leave him alone. Defendant then called his mother and Detective Haley heard him tell her "Mother, I killed Michelle and her parents and I want you to hear it from me before you hear it from somebody else" and "No, it wasn't an accident. I went there to do it" or words to that effect. All of the above statements made in Livingston Parish were deemed admissible after a motion to suppress and defendant does not contend that the admission of these statements was erroneous.

After defendant arrived in Baton Rouge at around 4:00 p.m., Detectives Larkin and Stelly placed him in an interview room, advised him that he was under arrest for three counts of first degree murder and read him his rights. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights, refused to sign a waiver form and indicated that he did not want to talk to the detectives but wanted a lawyer. After defendant refused to sign the waiver form, the detectives presented a second form, consisting of a page of questions followed by blanks for written answers and purporting to assess an arrestee's level of understanding regarding the just-issued Miranda rights. At some point, defendant and Detective Stelly allegedly became angry at each other and Detective Stelly left the [96-1208 La. 5] room. Detective Larkin testified that defendant's anger toward Stelly resulted from the tone of voice in which Stelly had read defendant his rights and Stelly was angry because he had just come from the crime scene. At the motion to suppress, Detective Larkin testified that he "proceeded to talk to him ... attempt to help him regain his composure, and calm him down ... explaining to him [how] the young guys are, they don't understand things and they can't deal with older people sometimes ... it seemed to have a calming effect that I could relate to the situation easier than Stelly." Detective Larkin testified that in the process of calming him down, he read defendant the questions from the second form, which the defendant answered. The questions and answers were as follows:

When can you have an attorney? Anytime.

Can you have an attorney any time you want to, including right now? Yes.

Can you use my telephone free of charge to call an attorney any time you want to? Yes.

What will happen if you cannot afford an attorney and you want one? Court appoint.

Do you have to answer even one of my questions or say anything to me? No.

What if you start to answer my questions and then you want to stop? Can you stop any time you want to? Yes.

Do you realize that if I am called into court to testify about what both you and I said in here today, I will be placed under oath to tell the complete truth? Yes.

Would you want me to tell the truth or would you want me to lie? Truth.

I will tell the complete truth regardless if it helps or hurts the prosecutor or helps or hurts your side; do you realize that? Yes.

Now that you know all of these rights that you have, do you wish me to continue? No. (Emphasis added.)

[96-1208 La. 6] However, Larkin testified that defendant's anger had subsided and "he agreed to talk to me. He said I'll tell you, but I'm not going to tell it to you on tape." Larkin went to get Stelly to tell him defendant was going to make a statement. Defendant then proceeded to tell the detectives how he shot his wife from a distance and then walked up to her and shot her in the head, and then that he shot her parents. Detective Larkin then asked him why he killed them and he said "he killed his wife because she wanted--uh--his business--part of the divorce settlement and that was unacceptable" and that "he killed Mrs. Guidry because she was putting Michele up to trying to take his business away from him" and that he killed Mr. Guidry "because he knew he was going for a weapon." Larkin then testified that after defendant calmed down "his emotions changed completely and he was--uh--cold and--uh--not--maybe not proud that he'd done it, but he was satisfied in that he had done it." Defendant denied making any of these statements to Larkin and Stelly.

Defendant argues that the statements made to Detectives Larkin and Stelly were inadmissible under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and prejudicial in the guilt phase in that the statements seriously undermined defendant's defense that he was undergoing withdrawal from drugs and alcohol at the time of the crime and thus did not appreciate what he was doing. He further claims this was prejudicial in the penalty phase in that it destroyed all defense attempts to mitigate the offense as an impulsive act.

Once a suspect in custody expresses a desire, at any stage in the process, to deal with the police only through counsel, all questioning must cease and the accused is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless he initiates further communication, exchanges or conversation with the police and validly waives his earlier request for counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 484-485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, [96-1208 La. 7] 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Abadie, 612 So.2d 1 (La.19...

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