State v. Lahmon

• Citation: 1 N.W.2d 629,231 Iowa 448
• Decision Date: 13 January 1942
• Docket Number: 45232.
• Parties: STATE v. LAHMON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

1 N.W.2d 629

231 Iowa 448

STATE v. LAHMON.

No. 45232.

Supreme Court of Iowa

January 13, 1942

Carl E. Patterson, of Des Moines, for appellant.

John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen. of Iowa, Jens Grothe, Asst. Atty. Gen of Iowa, and Francis J. Kuble, Co. Atty., of Des Moines, for appellee.

BLISS, Chief Justice.

On December 10, 1940, this court, by an opinion of that date, reversed the judgment of the trial court. A rehearing was granted on the petition of the State, and on resubmission this opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court is substituted for the aforesaid opinion, appearing in 229 Iowa 871, 295 N.W 148.

Section 13900 of the Iowa Code provides that in a prosecution of this kind, the defendant "cannot be convicted upon the testimony of the person injured, unless she be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense." In the trial court, the defendant contended by motion to direct a verdict in his behalf, submitted at the close of the State's case, and also at the close of all the evidence and by motion for new trial, that there was no such corroboration as required by the statute. Each motion was rightly overruled, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The defendant in this appeal reasserts the contention made below as ground for reversal.

Because the members of the court have not been in entire accord in this appeal, a fuller statement of the facts and the law as they bear upon the question of corroboration seems necessary. The legislative enactment involved is salutary and wise. Men and women are so closely and extensively associated in so many necessary and proper relations in business, social, and other varied activities, that if one accused might be convicted upon the testimony of the complainant alone, injustice might often result. It is true, that it may allow a guilty one to escape, but the scales of justice tip strongly in favor of the rule. But courts, in so far as possible, must direct their earnest efforts that this rule of procedure designed as a protecting shield, shall not be used to camouflage an attack.

The language of the Code section, itself, is the authoritative measure of the required corroboration. Attempted elaboration or clarification of its meaning serves no purpose. It is clear and definite. The "other evidence" need not certainly connect the defendant, nor conclusively point him out as the assailant. It need only "tend" to connect him with the commission of the offense, to the end that the jury may say that they have no reasonable doubt of his guilt. State v. French, 96 Iowa 255, 257, 65 N.W. 156. Its tendency must be "such as, when considered with the complainant's testimony," establishes the defendant's guilt. "The statute does not fix the quantum or kind of evidence required, nor is its sufficiency to be determined by excluding the evidence of the injured party. State v. McLaughlin, 44 Iowa [82] 85. If, considered in connection therewith, the other evidence tends to identify and single out the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, it is of that character contemplated by the statute, and its sufficiency is to be passed upon by the jury." State v. Baker, 106 Iowa 99, 100, 76 N.W. 509, 510. See also State v. Norris, 122 Iowa 154, 155, 97 N.W. 999; State v. Hetland, 141 Iowa 524 526, 119 N.W. 961, 18 Ann.Cas. 899, State v. Norris, 127 Iowa 683, 684, 104 N.W. 282.

"Evidence is in its nature corroborating, if it tends to strengthen and confirm the testimony of the prosecutrix or accomplice in connecting the accused with the commission of the offense charged." State v. O'Meara, 190 Iowa 613, 621, 177 N.W. 563, 568.

In State v. McGhuey, 153 Iowa 308, 314, 133 N.W. 678, 681, this court found no fault with an instruction on corroboration which stated: "This does not mean that the state is required to prove the act by direct testimony other than that of the prosecutrix, or by eyewitnesses of the transaction." As stated in State v. Greiner, 203 Iowa 248, 250, 212 N.W. 465, and quoted with approval in State v. Teager, 222 Iowa 391, 394, 269 N.W. 348, 349: "It is the rule in this state that if there is any testimony, independent of that of the prosecuting witness, tending to single out and designate the defendant as the guilty one, its sufficiency is a question of fact for the jury." (Italics ours.) Speaking through Justice Stiger in State v. Diggins, 227 Iowa 632, 637, 288 N.W. 640, 642, we said: "It was sufficient if she was corroborated as to some material fact tending to designate the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense." Likewise, in State v. Powers, 181 Iowa 452, 465, 164 N.W. 856, 860, is this language: "The law prescribes no standard for the strength of corroborating evidence, and there is a failure to corroborate only if there be no evidence legitimately having that effect."

Whether any item of evidence is corroboration, or whether the statutory corroboration, as a whole, is sufficient, is a question of law for the court, but the weight and the probative force of this testimony, as of all other testimony, is a question for the determination of the jury. State v. O'Meara, supra, 190 Iowa 613, 621, 177 N.W. 563; State v. Teager, supra, 222 Iowa 391, 394, 269 N.W. 348; State v. Crouch, 130 Iowa 478, 486, 107 N.W. 173; State v. Bricker, 135 Iowa 343, 345, 112 N.W. 645; State v. Norris, supra, 127 Iowa 683, 684, 104 N.W. 282; State v. Baker, supra, 106 Iowa 99, 100, 76 N.W. 509; State v. Norris, supra, 122 Iowa 154, 155, 97 N.W. 999.

Bruises and other physical evidences of an assault upon the person of the victim cannot ordinarily be of any aid in identifying the one who made them, although they confirm and corroborate her statement that the crime was committed. Her prompt complaint of the attack is also not statutory corroboration, but it does corroborate and add to the credibility of her charge that she was ravished. Especially is this true when the complaints are in fact a part of the res gestae. State v. Wheeler, 116 Iowa 212, 213, 89 N.W. 978, 93 Am.St.Rep. 236.

The fact of the commission of the offense may be established solely by the testimony of the one attacked. State v. Beltz, 225 Iowa 155, 279 N.W. 386; State v. Ralston, 139 Iowa 44, 116 N.W. 1058; State v. Speck, 202 Iowa 732, 735, 210 N.W. 913; State v. Mueller, 202 Iowa 1067, 208 N.W. 360; State v. Robinson, 170 Iowa 267, 152 N.W. 590; State v. Wheeler, supra, 116 Iowa 212, 89 N.W. 978, 93 Am.St.Rep. 236; State v. McLaughlin, supra, 44 Iowa 82, 86; State v. Geier, 184 Iowa 874, 877, 167 N.W. 186; State v. Grimm, 212 Iowa 1193, 237 N.W. 451; State v. Christopher, 167 Iowa 109, 111, 149 N.W. 40.

We have many times said that mere opportunity, alone, is not, in itself, sufficient statutory corroboration. See State v. Wheeler, 116 Iowa 212, 89 N.W. 978, 93 Am.St.Rep. 236; State v. Chapman, 88 Iowa 254, 55 N.W. 489; State v. Stowell, 60 Iowa 535, 15 N.W. 417; State v. Lamberti, 200 Iowa 1241, 1243, 206 N.W. 128; State v. Ashurst, 210 Iowa 719, 231 N.W. 319; State v. Brundidge, 204 Iowa 111, 214 N.W. 569; State v. Smith, 194 Iowa 639, 644, 190 N.W. 27. But evidence of opportunity is always admissible, and whether it furnishes the corroboration required by the statute depends upon the occasion of the opportunity, and all of the preceding and attending circumstances. There are, of course, many occasions and situations in ordinary business and social relations where a man and a woman are together and opportunity for the crime is available, but there is nothing to indicate that the circumstances are other than proper and innocent, or that the opportunity was made for the unlawful purpose. In such situations, we have uniformly held that the opportunity did not furnish the required corroboration. But it is an entirely different matter when the occasion and the facts are other than as just stated, and instead, it appears from the record that the defendant made or brought about the occasion, and himself furnished and created the opportunity which made the commission of the crime possible. Under such circumstances, we have consistently held that it was a question for the jury whether the corroboration required by the statute had been established. Of such holdings we said in State v. Smith, supra, 194 Iowa 639, 645, 190 N.W. 27, 29: "An examination of our cases recognizing this rule will disclose that in each of them there has been something about the creation of an opportunity and the circumstances attending it that in and of itself was suggestive and sufficient, with other circumstances to take the case to the jury on the question of corroboration." In the last-cited case, the corroboration was held to be insufficient. This was true also in State v. Powers, 181 Iowa 452, 468, 164 N.W. 856, 861, where the court said: "If, for instance, there were evidence that the opportunity was manufactured under suggestive circumstances, a different case would be present." See the following cases in support of this rule. State v. Kessler, 189 Iowa 567, 569, 571, 178 N.W. 513; State v. Crouch, 130 Iowa 478, 487, 107 N.W. 173; State v. Lindsay, 161 Iowa 39, 44, 140 N.W. 903; State v. McGhuey, 153 Iowa 308, 133 N.W. 678; State v. Waters, 132 Iowa 481, 109 N.W. 1013; State v. Norris, supra, 127 Iowa 683, 685, 104 N.W. 282; State v. Watson, 81 Iowa 380, 388, 46 N.W. 868; State v. West, 197 Iowa 789, 797, 798, 198 N.W. 103; State v. O'Meara, supra, 190 Iowa 613, 622, 177 N.W. 563. There was the additional circumstance of defendant's flight in the latter case. This was also true in State v. Hetland, 141 Iowa 524, 526, 119 N.W. 961, 18 Ann.Cas. 899, but in that case the alleged offense was in the home of defendant and the complainant was a maid in the home.

But whether the opportunity...