State v. LaMay
| Decision Date | 24 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 28751. |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BENJAMIN REED LaMAY, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Darla S. Williamson, District Judge.
Order of the district court granting motion to suppress evidence, reversed and case remanded.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
James K. Ball, Boise, for respondent.
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Benjamin Reed LaMay's motion to suppress evidence discovered in the search of a backpack which was in the hotel room where he was found by police. LaMay had been removed to the hallway outside the room and was arrested in the hallway, but the backpack remained within the hotel room. The district court granted suppression of the evidence, finding that the backpack was not within LaMay's "immediate control" at the time of his arrest. We reverse and remand.
Shortly after midnight, Boise City police officers were running the license plate numbers of vehicles parked at the Plaza Suite Hotel. One of the vehicles belonged to LaMay, and a warrants check showed that he had two outstanding misdemeanor warrants. The officers spoke with employees of the hotel and determined that a Joseph LaMay had rented a room at the hotel.
Three officers went to the room and knocked after hearing voices in the room. Joseph LaMay (who was later determined to be Benjamin LaMay's brother) answered the door. The officers testified that at this point they could smell marijuana smoke. Joseph eventually allowed the officers to enter the room. Upon entry into the room they observed drug paraphernalia in plain view on a table, and a knife on the breakfast bar. Officer Holtry put the knife in a drawer. There were seven people in the room. The officers testified that no one was free to leave. The officers believed LaMay was one of the males present in the room because of the vehicle in the parking lot registered to him, and the fact that Joseph had rented a room at the hotel.
The officers asked for everyone's name and identification. All, except LaMay, gave the officers physical identification. LaMay was lying near the edge of the far bed located about fifteen feet from the hallway. LaMay had his left arm down to the side of the bed. The officers could not see what was below his left arm. LaMay told the officers that his name was Jake Tuttle. The officers believed that the individual giving the name of Tuttle was being untruthful. In order to control the situation, the officers had all occupants except Joseph go into the hallway so they could continue their investigation into the presence of controlled substances, and into the correct identification of Tuttle. The officers left the door to the hotel room open. Once Joseph was taken into the bathroom for questioning, Officer Carter looked around the room to make sure there were no other persons in the room. Carter saw a backpack on the floor about ten inches from where LaMay's hand had been hanging off the bed.
In the hallway, LaMay gave his correct name to Officer Holtry, at which time Holtry placed LaMay under arrest on the warrants, handcuffed him, and required him to remain seated in the hallway with the rest of the persons from the room. Officer Gailey guarded LaMay and the other suspects in the hallway. Gailey asked LaMay whether there was marijuana in the room. LaMay replied that there was some in a jar under the pillow of his bed. Holtry then entered the room and retrieved the jar with marijuana in it. Carter told Holtry about the backpack and, upon learning that LaMay had been arrested, Carter seized the backpack. Holtry and Gailey unzipped the backpack and found that it contained U.S. currency, cocaine, and LaMay's driver's license. Approximately one to two minutes had elapsed from the time all occupants had been removed from the room and the searching of the backpack. The location of LaMay's arrest was approximately fifteen feet from where he had been lying on the bed.
As a result of these events, LaMay was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a), felony possession of marijuana, I.C. § 37-2732(c), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. LaMay brought a motion to suppress the items discovered in the search of the backpack. The district court granted suppression of the evidence, finding that the backpack was not within LaMay's "immediate control." The state filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the area of initial contact is subject to search incident to an arrest even if the officers move the suspect to a different location, and arrest him there. The district court denied the state's motion to reconsider. The state appeals.
On review of a decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence, this Court employs a bifurcated standard of review. We defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1998). However, we exercise free review over the application of constitutional standards to those facts. Id.
The state appeals the district court's order suppressing the evidence obtained from the search of the backpack, arguing that the backpack was within LaMay's "immediate control" at the beginning of the encounter with law enforcement officers and therefore it falls within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. LaMay does not contest that the backpack was within his "immediate control" as he lay on the bed. However, LaMay argues that the "immediate control" factor applies at the time of formal arrest.
A warrantless search by law enforcement officers is presumptively unreasonable unless it comes within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Cox, 136 Idaho 858, 862, 41 P.3d 744, 748 (Ct. App. 2002). Exceptions to the warrant requirement must be "jealously and carefully drawn." State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 730, 905 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)). A search incident to arrest is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 215, 677 P.2d 522, 528 (Ct. App. 1984). A search incident to arrest may extend only to "the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control,' — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Foster, 127 Idaho at 728, 905 P.2d at 1037 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). The purpose of the exception is two-fold: (1) to prevent the arrestee from gaining access to dangerous weapons which might pose a threat to the safety of the police and other persons; and (2) to thwart any attempt by an arrestee to destroy evidence. State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 529, 661 P.2d 311, 314 (1983); State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176, 179, 997 P.2d 637, 640 (Ct. App. 2000). A search incident to arrest may include containers within the arrestee's immediate control. State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658, 759 P.2d 947, 949 (Ct. App. 1988).
The state advances New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), in support of its contention that the scope of the area to be searched is not limited by the formalities of arrest, i.e., the exact place and time of arrest. In Belton, a car was stopped for speeding. The officer smelled marijuana and saw an envelope marked "Supergold" on the floor of the car. The officer associated such an envelope with marijuana. He arrested all four men in the vehicle, and proceeded to conduct a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. On the back seat he found a jacket, and the jacket contained cocaine. The jacket belonged to Belton, who was charged with possession of a controlled substance.
Belton created a bright-line rule regarding automobile searches incident to an arrest. A principle underlying Belton is that a search incident to an arrest can encompass an area where the arrestee was not located at the time of the formal arrest, and this is not unreasonable. In Belton cases, the defendant will be arrested outside the vehicle, but a search of the vehicle's interior is still reasonable. The United States Supreme Court has held that this is not an unreasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment. This principle is persuasive. A search incident to arrest is not tied to the formalities of the arrest. Idaho courts have recognized this principle in many ways: (1) by applying the Belton rule regarding automobile searches incident to an arrest; (2) by approving searches after the passage of time following the arrest;1 (3) by approving searches of items not in the possession of the arrestee at the time of the arrest;2 (4) by approving searches which occur before the formal arrest, where probable cause existed at the time of the search;3 (5) by validating searches incident to an unlawful arrest through a finding of probable cause to arrest for another crime arising from the same set of operative facts;4 and (6) by approving searches of the interior of a vehicle pursuant to the arrest of the driver, where probable cause to arrest did not arise until the driver was outside of and far away from the vehicle.5 These cases illustrate that the formalities of an arrest do not necessarily determine the search which may be reasonably performed incident to that arrest.
However, the case before us has a unique posture. Here the officers encountered LaMay upon entry into the hotel room, moved him to the hallway, and arrested him in the hallway. Arguably, application of the Bowman factors at the place of the arrest would...
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