State v. Land
| Decision Date | 01 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. COA19-1060,COA19-1060 |
| Citation | 848 S.E.2d 564 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Billy Russell LAND |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Wendy J. Lindberg, for the State.
Dylan J.C. Buffum, for defendant-appellant.
Billy Russell Land (Defendant) appeals from two Orders entered on 29 July 2019, finding him in criminal contempt. The Record reflects the following:
Following a trial in Forsyth County District Court, Defendant was found guilty of: (I) operating a motor vehicle on a street or highway while displaying an expired registration plate on the vehicle knowing the same to be expired; (II) operating a motor vehicle on a street or highway without having a current electronic inspection authorization for the vehicle, such vehicle requiring inspection in North Carolina; and (III) operating a motor vehicle on a street or highway with no liability insurance. Defendant appealed these convictions to Superior Court.
Defendant appeared for a calendar call in Forsyth County Superior Court on 29 July 2019. Defendant, found indigent by the trial court, waived his right to counsel for the appeal of his traffic violations and appeared pro se. After a contentious calendar call—during which the trial court determined Defendant was continuously interrupting the court and Defendant was warned to stop doing so or face direct criminal contempt proceedings—and as Defendant was leaving the courtroom, he again interrupted the trial court.
At this point, the trial court ordered Defendant be brought back before it, saying, The trial court informed Defendant it was beginning a summary direct criminal contempt proceeding against him. The trial court provided Defendant the opportunity to respond to the allegations of criminal contempt, asking Defendant if there was anything he wished to say. Defendant argued, The trial court explained Defendant was not being tried for the traffic citations at the moment but rather for direct criminal contempt. Defendant continued speaking over the trial court as it tried to ask if there was anything else he wished to say in his defense. After Defendant concluded, the trial court found Defendant in direct criminal contempt, sentencing him to twenty-four hours in the Forsyth County jail. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
Defendant then asked, "How you gonna to [sic] place me under arrest, man? Y'all doing some illegal shit, man. I'm under the Constitution.
The Haile -- the Haile is my law." The trial court warned Defendant if he interrupted the trial court again, it would hold him in contempt for a second time. Ignoring the trial court, Defendant went on, As the bailiff tried to escort Defendant from the courtroom, he continued, "Y'all doing some illegal shit in here." At this point, the trial court called Defendant before it once more to commence a second criminal contempt proceeding. As the trial court moved through the proceeding, Defendant continued interrupting and speaking over the trial court. He again expressed wanting to file a notice of appeal, saying, "My lawyer's Yahweh Yahweh Yahweh[.]" To the trial court, Defendant said:
I don't know who you think you are, ma'am, but you supposed to follow the Constitution. Under Bryant [sic] versus United States, it says that the Court must be watchful for the constitutional rights of the people and the citizen. Now, you're not doing that ma'am -- you're up here being arrogant -- because I had a question to ask you about whether my court date was going to be today.
Defendant continued speaking as the trial court concluded the proceeding and again found Defendant in contempt of court. This time, Defendant was sentenced to thirty days in the Forsyth County jail. As the bailiff took him away, Defendant repeatedly gave notice of appeal in open court.
On 29 June 2019, the trial court entered two Orders finding Defendant in criminal contempt. In the first Order (19 CRS 1781 Order), the trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty days’ imprisonment. In the second Order (19 CRS 1789 Order), the trial court also sentenced Defendant to thirty days’ imprisonment, which was to run consecutively to Defendant's sentence in the 19 CRS 1781 Order.
On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the underlying bases of the Orders finding him in criminal contempt; rather, he focuses his arguments on whether he was deprived of the right to counsel in those proceedings and on errors in the entry of the Orders themselves. Thus, the dispositive issues are whether (I) the right to counsel granted under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(a)(1) applies in a summary direct criminal contempt proceeding and (II) the trial court erred or committed clerical errors in entering its sentences in both the 19 CRS 1781 and 19 CRS 1789 Orders.
Defendant first argues the trial court deprived him of his statutory right to counsel. "[A]lleged statutory errors are questions of law and as such, are reviewed de novo. " State v. Johnson , 253 N.C. App. 337, 345, 801 S.E.2d 123, 128 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." State v. Williams , 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The trial court held Defendant in direct criminal contempt. Pursuant to Section 5A-13(a), direct criminal contempt occurs when the act:
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-13(a)(1)-(3) (2019). In addition, "[t]he presiding judicial official may punish summarily for direct criminal contempt according to the requirements of [ N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-14.]" Id. § 5A-13(a). The requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-14 for imposing contempt in a summary proceeding are:
Defendant contends he was entitled to counsel pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-451(a)(1), which provides: Id. § 7A-451(a)(1) (2019). The issue of whether Section 7A-451(a)(1) ’s right to counsel applies in a summary direct criminal contempt proceeding is a question of first impression for our courts. In answering this question, we do, however, begin to find guidance for our analysis in our Supreme Court's decision in Jolly v. Wright . See 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E.2d 135 (1980), overruled on other grounds by McBride v. McBride , 334 N.C. 124, 431 S.E.2d 14 (1993).
In Jolly , the sole question before the Court was "whether an indigent defendant has a statutory or constitutional right to be represented by appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings[.]" Id. at 85, 265 S.E.2d at 138 (emphasis added). The defendant in Jolly contended Section 7A-451(a)(1), the subsection at issue in the present case, granted him a right to counsel in civil contempt proceedings because in such a proceeding, defendant argued, he was subject to imprisonment. Id. Accordingly, our Supreme Court, although not discussing direct criminal contempt, analyzed Section 7A-451(a)(1) in answering the question before it.
The Court first noted, "[t]he intent of the Legislature controls the interpretation of a statute." Id. at 86, 265 S.E.2d at 139 (citation omitted). The Jolly Court then described its holding in State v. Morris , which was decided in the wake of Gideon v. Wainwright ,1 —"the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel was applicable to all felony and misdemeanor cases where the authorized punishment exceeded six months in prison and a $500 fine." Jolly , 300 N.C. at 87, 265 S.E.2d at 139 (citing State v. Morris , 275 N.C. 50, 59, 165 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1969) ). Morris ’s holding was codified by our General Assembly in the original version of Section 7A-451(a)(1). Id.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin , however, the Supreme Court of the United States expanded on Gideon , holding the Sixth Amendment required: "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense , whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 538 (1972) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). As recognized by the Jolly Court, our General Assembly amended Section 7A-451(a)(1) into its current form in a direct response to Argersinger . Jolly , 300 N.C. at 87, 265 S.E.2d at 139 (citation omitted).
The Jolly Court stated: "It is clear, then, that the purpose of [ Section] 7A-451(a)(1), as presently written, is to state the scope of...
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