State v. Landera
| Decision Date | 22 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. S–11–940.,S–11–940. |
| Citation | 826 N.W.2d 570,285 Neb. 243 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Angel R. LANDERA, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
[285 Neb. 243]1. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When issues on appeal present questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision of the court below.
2. Courts: Plea Bargains. In Nebraska, a court is never bound by the plea agreement made between a defendant and the government.
3. Plea Bargains. A party to a plea agreement should not be given the benefit of implied terms when the party failed to negotiate such terms.
4. Courts: Contracts. Courts are not to rewrite contracts to include what the parties did not.
5. Courts: Plea Bargains. Courts implementing plea agreements should enforce only those terms and conditions actually agreed upon by the parties.
6. Plea Bargains: Sentences. A sentencing recommendation need not be enthusiastic in order to fulfill a promise made in a plea agreement.
Nathan J. Sohriakoff, Deputy Platte County Public Defender, for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Erin E. Tangeman, for appellee.
The Nebraska Court of Appeals concluded that the State, having promised to recommend probation as part of its plea agreement with Angel R. Landera, violated the agreement when it recommended a term of incarceration as a condition of probation.1 We granted the State's petition for further review in order to consider how courts should treat matters not explicitly addressed in a plea agreement and now hold that courts should enforce only those terms and conditions actually agreed upon by the parties. However, because the State effectively undermined its recommendation of probation and thereby violated its plea agreement with Landera, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Landera entered into a plea agreement with the State after having previously pled not guilty to 2 counts of distribution of child pornography and 20 counts of possession of child pornography. The plea agreement was not reduced to writing, but was orally described to the district court as follows:
[Public defender]: Your Honor, [Landera] is going to plead to Counts III, IV, VI, VII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII and XX.
....
[Public defender]: ... The State will dismiss the balance of the charges and agree to recommend probation provided [that Landera] obtain a psychiatric evaluation and a sex offender evaluation from a reputable individual and follow through with all recommendations.
THE COURT: [County attorney], does that accurately represent the plea agreement?
[County attorney]: It does, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.... Landera, your attorney has recited into the record a plea agreement reached in this case, which has been agreed to today by [the county attorney] on behalf of the State. Does that accurately represent the plea agreement as you understand it?
[Landera]: Yes.
THE COURT: Are there any other terms or conditions of the plea agreement that you believe exist that were not just now fully recited into the record?
[Landera]: No.
Following acceptance by the court of the plea agreement, Landera withdrew his previous pleas of not guilty and entered guilty pleas to the 10 counts identified in the plea agreement (all for possession of child pornography). The court found him guilty on all counts. The 10 remaining counts were dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the plea agreement.
Prior to sentencing, the court ordered Landera committed to the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services at its Diagnostic and Evaluation Center (D & E) for a 90–day evaluation, because “the [c]ourt [was] of the opinion that imprisonment [might] be appropriate in this case but desire[d] more detailed information as a basis for determining the sentence to be imposed than has been provided by the presentence [report].”
Following completion of the 90–day evaluation, a sentencing hearing was held. At this hearing, the State made the following statement:
Prior to reviewing the evaluation from D & E, the State was prepared to recommend probation, extensive probation, with challenging treatment. [Landera] is bright and that is evidenced by the fact he obtained a full ride pre-med scholarship. You know, he's [sic] obviously possesses a talent that a lot of people before the [c]ourt don't have....
In reviewing the presentence, again, for today's sentencing, along with the D & E evaluation, I'm struck and I can't recommend probation—
The State was interrupted at this point by Landera's attorney, who reminded the court that the State was bound by the plea agreement to recommend probation.
In the discussion that followed, the State claimed that it intended to stand by the plea agreement. However, the State also expressed grave concerns about Landera's ability to refrain from the use of child pornography and argued for the imposition of “punishment” because of the results of the 90–day evaluation.
In response, Landera's attorney argued that Landera was expecting “an unqualified recommendation of probation from the county attorney,” but that the State had instead offered “an extremely qualified recommendation of probation.” Landera's attorney concluded by asking the court to “honor the plea agreement” and “order probation.”
Following allocution by both sides, the court sentenced Landera to 30 months' to 4 years' imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. The court specifically noted both at the sentencing hearing and in its written order that it determined Landera was not “a fit and proper person to be sentenced to a term of probation.”
Landera appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging, among other things, that the district court erred in failing to grant specific performance of the plea bargain after the State “explicitly indicated that it did not intend to follow through with the agreement.” 2 Although the Court of Appeals focused considerable attention on the remedies dictated in State v. Birge3 for breach of a plea agreement, it cited no authority for its conclusion that the State had in fact violated the plea agreement by recommending a term of incarceration as a condition of probation. Having reached that conclusion, the Court of Appeals vacated Landera's sentences and remanded the cause for resentencing by a different judge.4
The State filed a petition for further review, which we granted in order to provide further guidance on the interpretation of plea agreements.
The State argues on further review that the Court of Appeals erred by determining that the State violated the plea agreement with Landera.
When issues on appeal present questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision of the court below.5
There are two widely accepted ways that courts treat terms and conditions not explicitly included in a plea agreement. One of these views, which the Court of Appeals effectively adopted, holds that terms and conditions not expressly included in a plea agreement were intentionally omitted. The alternative view is that courts should not enforce implied terms and conditions of a plea agreement, but enforce only those terms and conditions about which the parties did in fact agree. While we find that this latter approach is more consistent with existing Nebraska case law on the interpretation of plea bargains, we begin by providing a brief overview of both views.
We digress to note that some of the federal court decisions arose from alleged violations of a federal procedural rule6 permitting courts to accept plea agreements setting forth the penalties to be imposed and to become bound by the specified disposition. In Nebraska, a court is never bound by the plea agreement made between a defendant and the government.7 Nevertheless, the federal cases are illustrative of the respective approaches employed to determine a party's obligations under a plea agreement. For our purposes, it does not matter whether the breaching party was the sentencing court or the prosecuting attorney. We are concerned only with the proper analytical approach.
The expansive interpretation of plea agreements embodied in the Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with early decisions from several of the federal circuit courts. One of the leading cases adopting an expansive interpretation of a plea agreement is United States v. Runck.8 In that case, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation violated a plea agreement that provided for a maximum sentence of 3 years' imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. While recognizing that “it would be unmanageable and impractical to require every possible condition of probation to be included in a plea bargain,” the court held that the imposition of a large amount of restitution “created a material change in the plea bargain.” 9 Relying on the precedent of Runck, the First, 10 Second,11 and Ninth 12 Circuits similarly held that when a plea agreement was silent on the matter of restitution, the imposition of restitution—even as a condition of probation—was precluded by such silence. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit explained that the failure to expressly provide in a plea agreement for restitution as a term of probation was “an intentional omission designed to preclude its imposition.” 13 In contexts other than restitution, the Third 14 and Fifth 15 Circuits also interpreted silence in plea agreements as precluding prosecutors from recommending terms or conditions not expressly mentioned in the plea agreement.
In practice, interpreting silence in a plea agreement as an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Smith, S-16-199.
...State v. Sanders, 269 Neb. 895, 697 N.W.2d 657 (2005).11 State v. Gonzalez-Faguaga, supra note 7.12 See State v. Landera, 285 Neb. 243, 253, 826 N.W.2d 570, 577 (2013).13 State v. Schrein, 247 Neb. 256, 526 N.W.2d 420 (1995).14 Berumen v. Casady, 245 Neb. 936, 515 N.W.2d 816 (1994).15 State......
-
State v. Lopez, 14–0284.
...the plea agreement and to convince the sentencing court that a plea bargained sentence should not be accepted."); State v. Landera, 285 Neb. 243, 826 N.W.2d 570, 576 (2013) (holding a party breaches a plea agreement by "acting in a manner not specifically prohibited by the agreement but sti......
-
State v. Iddings
...provision of a plea agreement, we have explained that the State must not "effectively undermine the promised recommendation."11 Thus, in State v. Landera ,12 we held that the State had breached a plea agreement to recommend probation when it stated at sentencing that it could not recommend ......
-
State v. Patton
...N.W.2d 175 (2012). See, also, State v. Sorensen, 283 Neb. 932, 814 N.W.2d 371 (2012). 2.State v. Watson, 285 Neb. 497, 827 N.W.2d 507 (2013). 3.State v. Landera, 285 Neb. 243, 826 N.W.2d 570 (2013). 4.State v. Taylor, 282 Neb. 297, 803 N.W.2d 746 (2011). 5.State v. Collins, 281 Neb. 927, 79......