State v. Lawley
| Citation | 591 P.2d 772,91 Wn.2d 654 |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 45782,45782 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Michael A. LAWLEY, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Norman K. Maleng, Pros. Atty Michael D. McKay, Steven S. Miller, Deputy Pros. Attys., Seattle, for petitioner.
Hunter John, Seattle, for respondent.
The sole issue in this case is whether a juvenile charged with an offense under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, RCW 13.40, is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. RCW 13.40 is part of a comprehensive revision of the juvenile justice system. RCW 13.04.021(2) provides: "Cases in the juvenile court shall be tried without a jury." We hold that there is not a constitutional right to a jury trial under our statutes and reverse the trial court which held to the contrary.
The facts are that the 16-year-old respondent was charged, by information, with second degree robbery. He demanded a jury trial; the trial court held that he was entitled to such a jury trial.
In In re Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.2d 263, 265-268, 438 P.2d 205 (1968), we held that due process did not require jury trials under the former juvenile act. The essence of the defendant's argument is that the 1977 juvenile act has altered the law's focus from concern for treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile to imposition of punishment according to the offense and the record of the juvenile. Therefore, defendant argues, the proceedings are in the nature of a criminal prosecution entitling the juvenile to a jury trial as part of due process under the fourteenth amendment coupled with the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 22 of our state constitution.
A comparison of the 1977 Juvenile Justice Act with the prior juvenile law leaves no doubt that the legislature has substantially restructured the manner in which juvenile offenders are to be treated. See New Juvenile Code (1978) (Family Law Section, Continuing Legal Education Comm'n, Washington State Bar Association.) However, the pivotal question is whether the juvenile proceedings are so akin to an adult criminal prosecution that the constitutional right to a jury trial is necessary. To determine that issue we must examine the general scheme of the new act and apply a controlling United States Supreme Court case.
It is true that the 1977 act does place a different emphasis upon the prior criminal activity of the juvenile. For example, it provides for the juvenile to be accountable for his or her criminal behavior, and it does mandate that there shall be punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender. RCW 13.40.010(2)(c) and (d).
Standing alone these legislative declarations of purpose might seem to indicate an intent to convert the juvenile procedures into traditional adult criminal proceedings. However, there are three reasons why we believe the legislature did not intend to accuse, treat and sentence juveniles the same as adult offenders.
First, the legislature may well have determined that the accountability for criminal behavior, the prior criminal activity and punishment commensurate with age, crime and criminal history does as much to rehabilitate, correct and direct an errant youth as does the prior philosophy of focusing upon the particular characteristics of the individual juvenile. Whether that approach, compared to the prior philosophy is potentially more effective is not for this court to decide. The legislature was dealing with a social problem, the solutions to which do not lie within any peculiar expertise of judges. The legislature has made a considered decision that this act is more appropriate than the one which has not succeeded heretofore.
Second, the legislature in fact has done more than merely mandate punishment for the juvenile offender. For example, in RCW 13.40.010(2)(f) it declares a purpose to provide necessary treatment, supervision and custody for juvenile offenders. Likewise in subdivision (j) there is specific reference to punishment, treatment or both in dealing with the juvenile. Counseling may be part of community supervision which is provided for in RCW 13.40.020(3)(d). Accused juveniles are provided their full range of constitutional rights such as the right to an attorney, to confront witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination and suppression of evidence illegally obtained. RCW 13.40.140.
While the act does set certain determinate disposition standards, it expressly reserves to the juvenile court judge the right to alter an otherwise mandated disposition if the court finds that such disposition would impose an excessive penalty on the juvenile. RCW 13.40.020(12) and RCW 13.40.160.
Further at the disposition hearing, the court is empowered to receive and consider all relevant and material evidence including (1) recommendations from the prosecutor and counsel for the juvenile, (2) information and arguments offered by the parties and their counsel, (3) predisposition reports and (4) statements from the juvenile and his or her parent, guardian or custodian. Additionally, the court may consider both mitigating or aggravating circumstances. RCW 13.40.150.
Commitment of a juvenile to an institution is still limited to juvenile facilities established pursuant to RCW 72.05 and 72.16 through 72.20. RCW 13.40.020(9). Looking at those referenced statutes we find again emphasis upon the interest, welfare and rehabilitation of the individual child. For example, RCW 72.05.010 refers to providing certain facilities and services which will best serve the welfare of the child and society. RCW 72.05.130 refers to programs for treatment, guidance and rehabilitation. Likewise, RCW 72.19.060 establishes a policy of reformation, training and rehabilitation.
Finally, a jury trial is not mandated by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1986, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), the court stated: "(w)e conclude that trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement." Before reaching that conclusion the court reviewed six of its prior juvenile rights cases. The court summarized its holdings in those cases and included two points at page 533, 91 S.Ct. at page 1980 which are persuasive to us:
Some of the constitutional requirements attendant upon the state criminal trial have equal application to that part of the state juvenile proceeding that is adjudicative in nature. Among these are the rights to appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Included, also, is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Those required rights are provided for in our statute. The court then made the point that:
The Court, however, has not yet said that All rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to be enforced or made available to the juvenile in his delinquency proceeding. Indeed, the Court specifically has refrained from going that far: "We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."
(Citations omitted.) See Smith, Turning Point for Juvenile Justice: Are Jury Trials Really Essential?, 2 J.Juv.L. 1, 14 (1977); Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Last Word on Juvenile Court Adjudications?, 57 Cornell L.Rev. 561, 562-566 (1972).
In summary, the legislature has changed the philosophy and methodology of addressing the personal and societal problems of juvenile offenders, but it has not converted the procedure into a criminal offense atmosphere totally comparable to an adult criminal offense scenario. We find McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, to be controlling as to the federal constitution and decline to adopt a more stringent rule under our state constitution. Because the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 measures up to the "essentials of due process," jury trials are not necessary in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings.
The holding of the trial court is reversed.
The respondent was charged by information filed in Superior Court with the crime of robbery in the second degree. At his arraignment, he moved that RCW 13.04.021(2) be declared unconstitutional and that the case be decided by a jury. The Superior Court judge correctly ruled that the section is invalid as applied to the respondent. In my opinion, that conclusion was mandated by the constitutions of the United States and of this state.
Amendment 6 of the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, By an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
(Italics mine.)
The new juvenile court act frankly recognizes the adjudication proceeding as one in which it is to be ascertained whether a crime has been committed. Punishment is to be imposed as prescribed by the statute. All of the rights enumerated in Amendment 6, save the right to trial by jury, are accorded the accused.
The Washington Constitution provides:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of record, . . .
Const. art. 1, § 21. And in section 22 (amendment 10) of the same article, the people have declared that
(i)n criminal...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re L.M.
...404 A.2d 573 (Me.1979) (concluding new juvenile code retained beneficent and rehabilitative purposes of prior code); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash.2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979) (three dissenting justices concluded changes in system shifted focus from offender to offense and so policy arguments in ......
-
State v. S.J.C.
...the procedure into a criminal offense atmosphere totally comparable to an adult criminal offense scenario.” State v. Lawley, 91 Wash.2d 654, 659, 591 P.2d 772 (1979). That remains true following further legislative refinements since the JJA was first enacted. State v. Chavez, 163 Wash.2d 26......
-
State v. Lord, 54385-2
...either article 1, section 21 or the Sixth Amendment. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d 1, 16, 743 P.2d 240 (1987); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash.2d 654, 658-59, 591 P.2d 772 (1979) (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971)). Nor does due process require......
-
State v. Weber
...S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); Monroe, 132 Wash.2d at 419-20, 939 P.2d 205; Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d 1, 743 P.2d 240; State v. Lawley, 91 Wash.2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979); In re Welfare of Estes, 73 Wash.2d 263, 265-68, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); cf. Meade, 129 Wash.App. at 925-26, ¶ 16, 120 P.3d ......
-
Table of Cases
...69.04 Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 188 L. Ed. 2d 146, 71 C.B.C.2d 1 (2014). . . . . . . . .42.04[2] Lawley; State v., 91 Wn.2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979) 77.11 Layman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1999-218, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 11 (1999) 39.09 Lear v. Lear, 29 Wn.2d 692, 189 P.2d 237......
-
§38.6 Analysis
...1976, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1971)). There is no right to trial by jury under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, Ch. 13.40 RCW State v. Lawley, 91 Wn.2d 654, 659, 591P.2d772 (1979) (citing McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528). Mining claims. Defendants were entitled to a jury trial in an action to determine c......
-
Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-mckeiver World
...speaker of adopting "a punishment model of treatment for juvenile offenders." Id. at 416 (McGraw, J., concurring). 256. State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (Wash. 1979); see, e.g., In re Myresheia v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (denial of jury trial, "while p......
-
The Denial of a State Constitutional Right to Bail in Juvenile Proceedings: the Need for Reassessment in Washington State
...at Predisposition Proceedings, 69 WASH. L. REV. 305, 307-10 (1994). See generally Becker, supra note 131, at 308. 147. 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 148. Id. at 656, 591 P.2d at 772. 149. Id. 150. Id. at 656, 591 P.2d at 773. 151. In re Trambitas, 96 Wash. 2d 329, 332-34, 635 P.2d 122, 123-......