State v. Lawson
| Decision Date | 30 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 44744–4–II.,44744–4–II. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Geoffrey Robert LAWSON, Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Affirmed. Jodi R. Backlund, Manek R. Mistry, Backlund & Mistry, Olympia, WA, for Appellant.
Farshad M. Talebi, Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office, Port Orchard, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 A jury found Geoffrey Lawson guilty of one count of first degree burglary, two counts of second degree burglary, two counts of attempted voyeurism, and one count of voyeurism. Lawson appeals, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support the burglary and the voyeurism convictions. Lawson contends alternatively that his burglary convictions must be reversed because voyeurism does not constitute “a crime against a person or property” that the burglary statute requires. In the published portion of the opinion, we hold that voyeurism is a crime against a person and that sufficient evidence supports the burglary and voyeurism convictions. We address Lawson's remaining claims in the unpublished portion of this opinion. We affirm his convictions.
¶ 2 In May 2012, Harrison Medical Center employee Ron Burrows entered one of the women's restrooms and began to sanitize the stall areas. As he opened the stall door, Lawson emerged and ran off despite Burrows's efforts to catch him. Harrison security manager Leon Smith identified Lawson from a security video that showed Lawson entering the hospital through the loading dock area. The video also showed Lawson entering and exiting the women's restroom over approximately four hours.
¶ 3 In June 2012, security officer J.K. was in the same women's restroom at Harrison when someone attempted to open the stall door. Startled, J.K. observed men's dress shoes underneath the door. J.K. viewed security video and determined by the man's pants and shoes that he was the same person who tried to enter the stall while she used the restroom. Meanwhile, other security officers confirmed that the suspicious man was Lawson, who had returned to Harrison a second time. Security Supervisor Charles Nace and Officer Dakota Muir contacted Lawson, but he resisted, causing Nace to fall to the floor with an injury.
¶ 4 Also in June 2012, A.S. used the women's restroom in a Barnes and Noble store. After washing her hands, A.S. saw a man peering into the main bathroom area over the stall door adjacent to the one she had used. According to A.S., the man, who she later identified as Lawson, quickly ducked, but A.S. could see him through a gap in the stall doors. A.S. reported the incident to Barnes and Noble employees. Assistant store manager Amy King reviewed a store security video. The video showed Lawson surreptitiously entering the clearly marked women's restroom.
¶ 5 The State charged Lawson by second amended information with one count of first degree burglary, two counts of second degree burglary, one count of second degree assault, one count of voyeurism, and two counts of attempted voyeurism. The jury returned guilty verdicts on each charge except for second degree assault.
¶ 6 Lawson asserts that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove the Barnes and Noble voyeurism charge and each of the burglary charges. We hold that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Lawson viewed another person in a place where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that a rational jury could have found that he committed assault while in or in immediate flight from a building in which he was not lawfully entitled to remain. Thus, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Lawson's voyeurism and burglary convictions.
¶ 7 To determine whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Homan, 181 Wash.2d 102, 105, 330 P.3d 182 (2014) (citing State v. Engel, 166 Wash.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009)). The relevant question is “ ‘whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Drum, 168 Wash.2d 23, 34–35, 225 P.3d 237 (2010) (quoting State v. Wentz, 149 Wash.2d 342, 347, 68 P.3d 282 (2003)). In claiming insufficient evidence, the defendant necessarily admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. Drum, 168 Wash.2d at 35, 225 P.3d 237 (citing State v. Salinas, 119 Wash.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)). We interpret the evidence “ ‘most strongly against the defendant.’ ” Homan, 181 Wash.2d at 106, 330 P.3d 182 (quoting Salinas, 119 Wash.2d at 201, 829 P.2d 1068). We consider both circumstantial and direct evidence as equally reliable and defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Thomas, 150 Wash.2d 821, 874–75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
¶ 8 Lawson contends that the State presented insufficient evidence that at Barnes and Noble he viewed another person in a place where she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy because he viewed A.S. when she stood by the sink in the restroom. Lawson attempts to draw a distinction between the private toilet stall and the other areas of the restroom where there would be no expectation of privacy. We hold that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy inside a restroom.
¶ 9 Under RCW 9A.44.115(2)(a), a person commits the crime of voyeurism if he knowingly views another person in a place where that person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For purposes of the crime of voyeurism, RCW 9A.44.115(1) states,
(c) “Place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy” means:
(i) A place where a reasonable person would believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that his or her undressing was being photographed or filmed by another; or
(ii) A place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance;
(d) “Surveillance” means secret observation of the activities of another person for the purpose of spying upon and invading the privacy of the person.
Lawson's argument is inconsistent with this statutory definition as our courts have construed it.
¶ 10 In State v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410, 415, 54 P.3d 147 (2002), our Supreme Court considered which places a person would “ ‘reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance.’ ” (Quoting RCW 9A.44.115(1)(b)(ii).) The Glas court provided examples of locations where subsection RCW 9A.44.115(1)(c)(ii) would apply. 147 Wash.2d at 416, 54 P.3d 147. These locations include places where a person may not normally disrobe, but if he or she did, he or she would expect a certain level of privacy as they would in a person's bedroom, bathroom, or a locker room where someone may undress in front of others. Glas, 147 Wash.2d at 416, 54 P.3d 147. It would also apply to places where someone may not normally disrobe, but would nonetheless expect another not to intrude, either casually or hostilely. Glas, 147 Wash.2d at 416, 54 P.3d 147. Our Supreme Court distinguished these kinds of places from purely public locations, such as the shopping mall or the Seattle Center. Glas, 147 Wash.2d at 414, 54 P.3d 147.
¶ 11 Here, it is undisputed that A.S. viewed Lawson by peeking over the restroom stall door in a place that was clearly delineated for use by women only. Although the women's restroom was inside an otherwise public building and while a person might not usually disrobe inside the common area, one expects privacy in a restroom. Glas, 147 Wash.2d at 416, 54 P.3d 147. Specifically, a woman using a women's restroom expects a certain degree of privacy from surveillance or from intrusions, either casual or hostile, by members of the opposite sex. Accordingly, we hold that the State presented evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found that Lawson committed voyeurism by viewing A.S. in a place where she reasonably expected to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance and, therefore , where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy.1 THEREFORE, WE AFFIrm lawson's voyeurisM conviction.
¶ 12 Lawson next argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the second degree burglary convictions because voyeurism is not “a crime against a person or property,” which is a prerequisite to a burglary conviction.2 This argument fails. Lawson relies on State v. Devitt, 152 Wash.App. 907, 912–13, 218 P.3d 647 (2009), where Division Three of this court held that obstructing the police was not a crime against persons or property for the purpose of a conviction for second degree burglary. There, the court reached its conclusion in part because the crime at issue was not listed among several others as a crime against a person under RCW 9.94A.411, a provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, that governs prosecutorial standards. But our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Snedden, 149 Wash.2d 914, 73 P.3d 995 (2003), offers a more apt comparison.
¶ 13 In Snedden, our Supreme Court held that indecent exposure was a crime against a person and therefore could serve as the predicate crime for second degree burglary. 149 Wash.2d at 919. There, the court considered the same argument Lawson advances now, that the subject crime was not one “against a person” because it did not appear among the list of such crimes within RCW 9.94A.411. Snedden, 149 Wash.2d at 922, 73 P.3d 995. The Snedden court found this unpersuasive. The court found that RCW 9.94A.411 lists crimes for the purpose of establishing a list of prosecuting standards and, as such, serves...
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