State v. Lee

• Decision Date: 16 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-1954-CR,92-1954-CR
• Citation: 175 Wis.2d 348,499 N.W.2d 250
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Scott M. LEE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 250

499 N.W.2d 250

175 Wis.2d 348

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Scott M. LEE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-1954-CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 2, 1993.

Opinion Released March 16, 1993.

Opinion Filed March 16, 1993.

Before CANE, P.J., and LaROCQUE and MYSE, JJ.

CANE, Presiding Judge.

Scott Lee appeals a judgment convicting him of sexual assault, contrary to sec. 948.02(1), Stats. The sole issue is whether his confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Although the trial court concluded the state had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee's waiver of his Miranda ¹ rights was knowing and intelligent, it held that the statement in any event was admissible because there was no police coercion. We conclude that although there was no police coercion, Lee's waiver of his Miranda rights must still be made knowingly and intelligently to be admissible. However, because the state's burden of proof as to whether Lee knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights is by the greater weight of the credible evidence as established by the United States Supreme Court in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), and the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis.2d 1, 16 n. 7, 464 N.W.2d 401, 407 n. 7 (1990), we remand for a determination of this issue under the lesser burden of proof.

After receiving a complaint that Lee had sexually assaulted two children, detective Jacqueline Albers of the Marshfield Police Department contacted and questioned Lee in a custodial setting. Prior to eliciting responses from Lee, Albers read the Miranda rights to Lee. After Lee indicated an understanding of each of the rights, he agreed to waive them and be questioned. Lee concedes the police never used any coercive tactics either to obtain his waiver or during the ensuing questioning. Lee confessed to the sexual assaults, both orally to Albers and in written form by signature to a typewritten synopsis of his statements compiled by Albers.

Lee moved to suppress his statements because their admission violated his constitutional rights under the federal due process clause and Wis. Const., art. I, sec. 8(1). He contended that because of his limited mental capacity, his statements were not voluntary, and he did not validly waive his Miranda rights. The trial court concluded that the state had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee's confession was the result of a knowing waiver. However, relying upon Connelly and State v. Clappes, 136 Wis.2d 222, 236-37, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987), the trial court ruled that it was precluded from considering Lee's personal characteristics relative to a knowing and intelligent waiver absent coercive activity by the interrogating authorities. Thus, the court denied Lee's motion to suppress his statement. Lee then pleaded guilty and was convicted.

This appeal involves the application of facts to federal and state constitutional principles, which we review independently of the trial court. Clappes, 136 Wis.2d at 235, 401 N.W.2d at 765. However, historical factual determinations made by the trial court will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Section 805.17(2), Stats.; see also State v. Esser, 166 Wis.2d 897, 903, 480 N.W.2d 541, 543 (Ct.App.1992).

The state argues that Connelly and its Wisconsin progeny limit the analysis of the validity of a Miranda waiver and subsequent confession to the existence of government coercion. ² Lee argues that to be valid, a waiver must be knowing and intelligent as well as voluntary, and that even if the lack of police coercion mandated that his Miranda waiver was voluntary, the waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Because of Connelly's fundamental effect on custodial confessions taken after Miranda waivers, we first analyze Connelly ³ before turning to Wisconsin state law, which follows Connelly's dictates.

I. CONNELLY

ANALYSIS

Connelly involved a chronic schizophrenic who approached a uniformed but off-duty police officer and stated that he had murdered someone and wanted to talk about it. Connelly was not in custody when he made his initial statements, but eventually was taken into custody and read his Miranda rights. Connelly sought to suppress both his pre-custodial and custodial statements because of his limited mental capacity. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 161-62, 107 S.Ct. at 518-19.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that because there was evidence that Connelly had been suffering from a serious mental disorder, the trial court correctly suppressed the statements after finding that he lacked a rational intellect and free will sufficient to make either his pre-custodial confession or his custodial waiver of Miranda rights voluntarily. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728-29 (Colo.1985).

The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that in order to satisfy the fourteenth amendment's due process requirements as to voluntariness, it is sufficient that a confession not be caused by coercive police conduct. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. at 521. The Court rejected any conclusion that, "by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, a defendant's mental condition might determine constitutional voluntariness." Id. at 164, 107 S.Ct. at 520. Accordingly, any voluntariness inquiries into a confessing defendant's state of mind, "inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State," should be left for resolution by state evidence rules pertaining to reliability. Id. at 166-67, 107 S.Ct. at 521.

The Connelly Court reversed the underlying Colorado judgment in its entirety because the Court believed the Colorado Supreme Court's judgment had been influenced by an erroneous view of constitutional voluntariness requirements. Id. at 171 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. at 524 n. 4. However, the majority specifically noted that the Colorado Court may have found Connelly's waiver invalid on other grounds and stated that reconsideration of other issues, not inconsistent with its opinion, was open to the Colorado Supreme Court on remand. Id. The Connelly majority's reference to the Colorado Court finding the Miranda waiver invalid "on other grounds" was a recognition that the Miranda waiver needs to be knowing and intelligent as well as voluntary.

Miranda itself provides that "[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After Connelly, the United States Supreme Court in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), reiterated that Connelly did not abolish the knowing and intelligent requirements. Regarding Miranda waivers, the Spring Court provided:

First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.

Id. at 573, 107 S.Ct. at 857 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), and Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)).

The Spring decision demonstrates that Connelly did not abrogate the requirement that a Miranda waiver be knowing and intelligent. Rather, Connelly merely means that, in general, issues of intelligent knowledge are distinct from issues of voluntariness. See People v. Bernasco, 138 Ill.2d 349, 150 Ill.Dec. 155, 158, 562 N.E.2d 958, 961 (1990). The Connelly opinion addressed (1) an initial confession given under circumstances requiring no Miranda warning, the voluntariness of the confession being at issue, and (2) subsequent confessions given after Miranda warnings, the voluntariness of the Miranda waivers being at issue. See Bernasco, 150 Ill.Dec. at 158, 562 N.E.2d at 961.

At no point did Connelly overrule the Burbine, Fare and Miranda requirement that a Miranda waiver be intelligent and knowing as well as voluntary. ⁴ The Connelly opinion analyzed merely the constitutional voluntariness component of a confession's admissibility and of a waiver's validity. Bernasco, 150 Ill.Dec. at 158, 562 N.E.2d at 961 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 170, 107 S.Ct. at 521, 523).

The court in United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295 (D.C.Cir.1991), agreed with this analysis. It wrote "[w]e read Connelly ... as holding only that police coercion is a necessary prerequisite to a determination that a waiver was involuntary and not as bearing on the separate question whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent." Id. at 299.

We agree with the D.C. Circuit's remark that some of the Connelly majority's reasoning with regard to voluntariness may also apply to knowing intelligence. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d at 299. For example, Connelly observed that evidence should not be excluded unless suppression would deter future constitutional violations. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d at 299 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, 107 S.Ct. at 521). Here, where the evidence shows that there was no police coercion, it is difficult to envision what constitutional violation this suppression would deter. However, the law of the land, as enunciated in Spring, 479 U.S. at 573, 107 S.Ct. at 856, requires a particular showing of knowing intelligence in order for a valid Miranda waiver to take place.

II. WISCONSIN CASE LAW

In State v. Hanson, 136 Wis.2d 195, 217, 401 N.W.2d 771, 780 (1987), the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: "If and when the United States Supreme Court...