State v. Lee

Decision Date01 September 1988
Docket NumberNo. 70882,70882
Citation531 So.2d 133,13 Fla. L. Weekly 532
Parties13 Fla. L. Weekly 532 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Sylvester O'Neal LEE, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Gary L. Printy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for respondent.

EHRLICH, Chief Justice.

We have for review Lee v. State, 508 So.2d 1300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), wherein the district court certified the following question of great public importance:

DOES THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL CRIMES REQUIRE REVERSAL OF APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WHERE THE ERROR HAS NOT RESULTED IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE BUT THE STATE HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ERROR AFFECTED THE JURY VERDICT?

Id. at 1304. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the affirmative, and hold that reversal is mandated under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986), when the state fails to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneous admission of collateral crime evidence affected the jury verdict.

Lee was charged by an amended information with separate counts of armed kidnapping, armed sexual battery, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The testimony presented at trial established that at approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 13, 1983, the victim and two male friends were seated in an automobile in a parking lot in Panama City when Lee approached them with a handgun. A short struggle ensued, after which Lee drove the car away with the victim in it. After driving for thirty to forty minutes, Lee stopped the car in a wooded area, forced the victim to perform oral sex upon him, and then compelled the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. Lee then left the victim in the wooded area and drove away in the car. The victim was eventually able to contact law enforcement authorities. Tests performed upon the victim established the presence of semen of the blood group which was consistent with Lee's. Latent fingerprints found on the car and on a checkbook inside the car were identified as Lee's.

At the trial, the victim and the two male friends who were present during the initial confrontation, one of whom had known Lee previously, identified Lee as the person who committed the offenses. In addition, the state was permitted to present, over defense objections, testimony by three bank tellers who identified Lee as a participant in a Tallahassee bank robbery at 2:00 p.m. on the same day as the offenses in the instant case. Lee was convicted on all counts by a jury and sentenced by the trial court. The First District Court of Appeal reversed Lee's conviction and remanded for a new trial. The district court held that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the bank tellers over objection and that the state failed to demonstrate that the error was harmless. The state now seeks review of the decision of the district court.

We reject the state's argument that the district court erred in determining that the evidence of Lee's participation in an armed bank robbery in Tallahassee just hours after committing the rape and robbery at issue in the present case was not admissible under any standard of admissibility of collateral crime evidence. Evidence of collateral crimes or acts committed by the defendant is inadmissible if its sole relevancy is to establish bad character or propensity of the accused. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). Evidence of other crimes or acts is admissible, however, "if it casts light upon the character of the act under investigation by showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior offenses would have a relevant or a material bearing on some essential aspect of the offense being tried." Id. at 662. See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983). The test for admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes is relevancy. Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 213 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920, 105 S.Ct. 303, 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).

The state contends the evidence was relevant to establish the entire context out of which the criminal episode occurred, arguing first that Lee's motive for stealing the car in Panama City was to avoid using his own car as a "get away" car during the bank robbery in Tallahassee. The state also argues that the testimony that Lee robbed a bank while armed with a handgun corroborated evidence that Lee used a handgun during the offenses at issue. As this Court has previously recognized, "[a]mong the other purposes for which a collateral crime may be admitted under Williams is establishment of the entire context out of which the criminal conduct arose." Smith v. State, 365 So.2d 704, 707 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 177, 62 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979).

The stolen car was located in Tallahassee approximately one mile from the bank that was robbed. There was, however, no evidence presented at trial that the car was used during the bank robbery or that Lee was the person who drove the car to Tallahassee. It was not established that the gun used during the bank robbery was the gun used during the offenses at issue. Furthemore, the mere fact that a gun was used during the bank robbery does not establish that Lee used a gun during the charged offenses under review. Because no connection was established between the bank robbery and the instant offenses, the evidence of the bank robbery was not relevant to establish the entire context out of which the criminal conduct arose. The testimony relating to the bank robbery did not have a relevant or a material bearing on any essential aspect of the offenses being tried and did not tend to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident in regard to these charged offenses. Compare Heiney (Collateral crime evidence was relevant and admissible to establish the "entire context" of the crimes charged where evidence established that Heiney's desire to avoid apprehension for the shooting in Texas motivated him to commit robbery and murder in Florida so that he could obtain money and a car in order to continue his flight from Texas.). The district court correctly determined that the collateral crime evidence in the present case was not admissible under this theory.

The erroneous admission of collateral crime evidence is subject to harmless error analysis as set forth in DiGuilio. Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396 (Fla.1987). As this Court noted in DiGuilio:

The harmless error test, as set forth in Chapman and progeny, places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. See Chapman [v. California ], 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 [17 L.Ed.2d 705]. Application of the test requires an examination of the entire record by the appellate court including a close examination of the permissible evidence on which the jury could have legitimately relied, and in addition an even closer examination of the impermissible evidence which might have possibly influenced the jury verdict.

491 So.2d at 1135. If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful. Id. at 1139.

The state offered no argument in support of harmless error in its brief to the district court and during oral argument before the district court, counsel for the state erroneously insisted it was an obligation of the court to apply the harmless error test without argument or guidance from the state. The district court stated that after an examination of the record, it was "unable to conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneous admission of the bank tellers' testimony did not, under the DiGuilio test, affect the verdict." 508 So.2d at 1303. The district court was therefore correct in reversing the conviction and remanding for a new trial.

The district court certified the question of great public importance because of the belief that the permissible evidence of Lee's guilt was overwhelming, if not conclusive. The...

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  • State v. Richardson, 92-2400
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 2, 1993
    ...1062, 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA1986); Sias v. State, 416 So.2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 424 So.2d 763 (Fla.1982). In State v. Lee, 531 So.2d 133 (Fla.1988), the defendant was charged with, inter alia, kidnapping, sexual battery, and robbery while armed with a handgun. At trial, the s......
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    ...cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful." State v. Lee, 531 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla.1988). The credibility of Hollner and B.D. as witnesses was critical, especially considering Essex's defense theory that without B.......
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