State v. Lester
Decision Date | 13 October 2011 |
Docket Number | 2010–1372.,Nos. 2010–1007,s. 2010–1007 |
Citation | 130 Ohio St.3d 303,958 N.E.2d 142,2011 -Ohio- 5204 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. LESTER, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
[Ohio St.3d 304] Syllabus of the Court
1. A judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge's signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk. (Crim.R. 32(C), explained; State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, modified.)
2. A nunc pro tunc judgment entry issued for the sole purpose of complying with Crim.R. 32(C) to correct a clerical omission in a final judgment entry is not a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken.
Edwin A. Pierce, Auglaize County Prosecuting Attorney, and Amy Otley Beckett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Tucker, Ellis & West, L.L.P., and Jon W. Oebker, Cleveland, for appellant.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and E. Kelly Mihocik, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender.Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General.Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.CUPP, J.
{¶ 1} We are asked to determine this certified question: Is a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that is issued for the sole purpose of complying with Crim.R. 32(C) to correct a clerical omission in a prior final judgment entry a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken? We conclude that no new right of appeal is created by such an entry, and we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I. Background
{¶ 2} In 2006, a jury found appellant, Steven Lester, guilty of various crimes. Appellant was sentenced to prison, and he was advised at the sentencing hearing that he would be subject to postrelease control after completing his prison term. In accordance with Crim.R. 32(C), the judgment entry of conviction stated, “The Court finds the Defendant has been convicted of [abduction, theft, attempted felonious assault, and aggravated menacing],” but the judgment entry did not set out whether the conviction was based upon a guilty or no-contest plea or upon a bench trial or jury trial. Appellant appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeals vacated part of the sentence and remanded the cause for resentencing because of an error in the sentence regarding postrelease control. 3d Dist. No. 2–06–31, 2007-Ohio-4239, 2007 WL 2350759. Appellant meanwhile filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was dismissed by the trial court. The [Ohio St.3d 305] dismissal was affirmed by the appellate court, and this court declined further discretionary review. 3d Dist. No. 2–07–23, 2007-Ohio-5627, 2007 WL 3054319; 117 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2008-Ohio-1279, 883 N.E.2d 457.
{¶ 3} On remand, the trial court resentenced appellant to the same prison term to which it had originally sentenced him, and it corrected the postrelease-control portion of the sentence. Again, the sentencing entry stated, “The Court finds the Defendant has been convicted of [abduction, theft, attempted felonious assault, and aggravated menacing],” but the judgment entry did not set out how appellant's original convictions were effected, that is, whether they were based upon a guilty or no-contest plea, or findings after a bench trial, or a verdict after a jury trial.
{¶ 4} Appellant again appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's sentence. 3d Dist. No. 2–07–34, 2008-Ohio-1148, 2008 WL 696901. This court declined to accept a discretionary appeal. 119 Ohio St.3d 1413, 2008-Ohio-3880, 891 N.E.2d 771. Appellant then filed a second motion for postconviction relief, which the trial court also denied. The denial was affirmed by the appellate court, and this court declined further review. (May 11, 2009), 3d Dist. No. 2–08–24; 122 Ohio St.3d 1524, 2009-Ohio-4776, 913 N.E.2d 459.
{¶ 5} On April 5, 2010, the trial court sua sponte filed a nunc pro tunc judgment entry. The nunc pro tunc entry supplemented the wording of the original resentencing judgment entry by adding the following sentence to the existing text: “The Court finds the Defendant has been convicted, pursuant to a verdict at Jury Trial returned May 16, 2006, of [abduction, theft, attempted felonious assault, and aggravated menacing].” (Emphasis sic.) Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this nunc pro tunc entry in the Third District Court of Appeals. Before the matter was set for briefing, the appellate court sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (May 12, 2010), 3d Dist. No. 2–10–20. The court concluded that the nunc pro tunc entry had been issued The court held that the April 5, 2010 nunc pro tunc entry, consequently, was not a final order subject to appeal.
{¶ 6} Thereafter, appellant obtained a certification of a conflict of the decision in this case with that of State v. Lampkin, Lucas App. No. L–09–1270, 2010-Ohio-1971, 2010 WL 1781496. We recognized the conflict and accepted appellant's [Ohio St.3d 306] discretionary appeal. 126 Ohio St.3d 1579 and 1581, 2010-Ohio-4542, 934 N.E.2d 353 and 354.
II. Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Baker
{¶ 7} As a threshold matter to the question presented in this appeal, we must address a separate issue: whether a judgment entry of conviction that states the fact of defendant's conviction but does not state how the conviction was effected is nevertheless a final order from which an appeal may be taken. This issue arises because the judgment entry of conviction prior to the nunc pro tunc entry in the case now before us stated the fact of defendant's conviction but did not state whether the defendant was convicted through a guilty plea, a no-contest plea upon which the court made a finding of guilt, a finding of guilt based upon a bench trial, or a guilty verdict resulting from a jury trial. Resolution of this foregoing issue requires a discussion of Crim.R. 32(C) and our decision in State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163.
{¶ 8} Crim.R. 32(C) specifies what a judgment entry of conviction must contain: “A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict, or findings, upon which each conviction is based, and the sentence.” 1 In State v. Baker, we confirmed that a judgment entry of conviction must contain the Crim.R. 32(C) elements to be final and subject to appeal: “A judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court.” 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, syllabus.
{¶ 9} In Baker, we also stated that Crim.R. 32 only requires a trial court “to sign and journalize a document memorializing the sentence and the manner of the conviction : a guilty plea, a no contest plea upon which the court has made a finding of guilt, a finding of guilt based upon a bench trial, or a guilty verdict resulting from a jury trial.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 14. However, this foregoing sentence appears to have created confusion and generated litigation regarding whether a trial court's inadvertent omission of a defendant's “manner of conviction” affects the finality of a judgment entry of conviction. See, e.g., State v. Lampkin, Lucas App. No. L–09–1270, 2010-Ohio-5988, 2010 WL 4971075, certified conflict and discretionary appeal accepted, 127 Ohio St.3d 1544 and 1546, 2011-Ohio-647, 941 N.E.2d 802 and 803 ( ); State v. Tuggle, Lucas App. No. L–09–1317, 2010-Ohio-4162, 2010 WL 3449245, ¶ 4, discretionary appeal and cross-appeal not accepted, 128 Ohio St.3d 1411, 2011-Ohio-828, 942 N.E.2d 384 ( ); State v. Hooper, Montgomery App. No. 22883, 2010-Ohio-4041, 2010 WL 3365939, discretionary appeal accepted, 128 Ohio St.3d 1499, 2011-Ohio-2420, 947 N.E.2d 683 ( ); State v. Heft (June 4, 2010), Logan App. No. 8–10–05, discretionary appeal accepted, 127 Ohio St.3d 1449, 2010-Ohio-5762, 937 N.E.2d 1038 ( ); State v. Mitchell, 187 Ohio App.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1766, 931 N.E.2d 1157 ( ).
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we begin by observing that the purpose of Crim.R. 32(C) is to ensure that a defendant is on notice concerning when a final judgment has been entered and the time for filing an appeal has begun to run. State v. Tripodo (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 124, 127, 4 O.O.3d 280, 363 N.E.2d...
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