State v. Leticia T.

• Decision Date: 09 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 33,566.,33,566.
• Citation: 329 P.3d 636
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. LETICIA T., a child, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

329 P.3d 636

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner,

v.LETICIA T., a child, Defendant–Respondent.

No. 33,566.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

June 9, 2014.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner and Respondent.

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent and Petitioner.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} This case presents the issue of warrantless vehicle searches after reported use of a weapon from said vehicle. Here, officers were dispatched in response to reports of an armed subject pointing a rifle at several people from the window of a light beige or tan vehicle. After Defendant Leticia T. (Child) and children passengers were removed and detained, the officers conducted a warrantless search of the interior and trunk of the vehicle. The district court held that the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, ruling that the possibility of a person hiding in the trunk of a vehicle does not constitute exigency. State v. Leticia T., 2012–NMCA–050, ¶ 14, 278 P.3d 553.

{2} We reverse the Court of Appeals. We hold that when police officers have probable cause and exigent circumstances to believe that an armed subject pointed a rifle at other individuals from a vehicle, officers may search the cab and the trunk of that same vehicle for the rifle.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{3} Farmington police officers were dispatched to a Sonic Drive–In in response to reports of an armed subject pointing a “long gun” at several people from the window of a light beige or tan vehicle. At the suppression hearing, one of the responding officers, Officer Coate, testified that a felony stop procedure was conducted. Before any commands were given, Child exited the vehicle from the passenger side. Officer Coate testified that Child was placed into custody, slipped out of her handcuffs, and struck Officer Swenk in the mouth. Officer Swenk was bleeding from his nose and upper lip but ultimately restrained Child with handcuffs and into the back of the squad car.

{4} Two other juveniles also exited the vehicle. Officer Coate testified that once the cab of the vehicle was clear, the officers had a duty to check the trunk of the vehicle for any subjects that may be hiding. Officer Coate testified that on numerous occasions he had discovered a subject hiding in the trunk of a vehicle attempting to avoid detection by police. Officer Rahn testified that officers are trained to check the trunk during a felony stop because it can easily conceal a person. Officer Coate believed it was possible that a person was hiding in the trunk because there were reports of a person pointing a rifle from the window of the vehicle, however, a rifle was not found in the cab of the vehicle. Officer Coate also testified that he observed the vehicle moving back and forth prior to Child exiting the vehicle, which was consistent with people moving around in a vehicle. The dark tint on the windows prevented Officer Coate from seeing what was happening inside the vehicle. The officers “made sure there were no other subjects in [the] vehicle” before they “went in close and confirmed it was empty.” Officer Coate was concerned that the armed individual was still inside the vehicle, and the only place left to hide was the trunk.

{5} Sergeant Simmons and Officer Smith were also at the scene. Officer Smith testified that she was the canine officer on scene and she had sent her dog to see if anyone else was inside the vehicle. Officer Smith testified that her dog is trained in all patrol activities including finding people and apprehending combative suspects. The dog failed to make a complete check of the vehicle due to the presence of onlookers so the officers instituted a secondary check. Sergeant Simmons testified that officers are trained to check the trunk of a vehicle in order to prevent a possible ambush. Sergeant Simmons opened the trunk, saw that the trunk was clear of any person and then observed the weapon used for the aggravated assault lying in the trunk in plain view.

{6} Child was charged by criminal information with aggravated battery upon a peace officer with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on March 16, 2010. Child filed a motion to suppress evidence from the search of the trunk, arguing that none of the recognized exceptions justified the warrantless search. In response, the State argued that the search was valid as a protective sweep and exigent circumstances did exist. The district court denied Child's motion on grounds the that exigent circumstances validated the search. The district court denied the motion to suppress in two orders. In its amended order, the court stated:

Based upon analysis of the following, State v. Garcia, 2005–[NMSC]–017, 138 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72, and State v. Duffy, 1998–NMSC–014, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807, among others, the [c]ourt finds that exigent circumstances justified the search of the trunk for the firearm that had not yet been located in the vehicle but had been seen by witnesses just prior to the stop.

{7} Child entered into a conditional plea and disposition agreement and reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress the evidence. Child agreed to a commitment to the Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD) for a period not to exceed two years.

{8} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, holding that there was an absence of “a particularized showing of exigent circumstances” as required by the New Mexico Constitution. Leticia T., 2012–NMCA–050, ¶ 13, 278 P.3d 553 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court also ruled that the State's protective sweep exception argument failed because the evidence presented did not establish specific and articulable facts necessary to justify such a search. Id. ¶ 15.

{9} The State appealed to this Court pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution; NMSA 1978, Section 34–5–14 (1972); and Rule 12–502 NMRA. On appeal the State argues that (1) exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of the entire vehicle and (2) the protective sweep exception also justified a warrantless search of the trunk because it was possible that an armed subject was hiding therein. Because we hold that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the vehicle, we do not address the State's protective sweep argument.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{10} This Court's review of a motion to suppress involves questions of law and fact. State v. Urioste, 2002–NMSC–023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. The application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. State v. Nieto, 2000–NMSC–031, ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442. However, a reviewing court does “not sit as a trier of fact; the district court is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Urioste, 2002–NMSC–023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. “We review the factual basis of the court's ruling for substantial evidence, deferring to the district court's view of the evidence.” State v. Williams, 2011–NMSC–026, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 729, 255 P.3d 307.

III. DISCUSSION

{11} New Mexico's Constitution provides more protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment in automobile cases. State v. Cardenas–Alvarez, 2001–NMSC–017, ¶ 15, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225. Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution states, in relevant part, “no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.” We established in State v. Gomez that New Mexico has consistently “expressed a strong preference for warrants.” 1997–NMSC–006, ¶ 36, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. “[O]ur courts have historically recognized that it is not always reasonable to require a warrant and have developed a number of well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Rowell, 2008–NMSC–041, ¶ 11, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95. Among the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement are exigent circumstances, consent, searches incident to arrest, plain view, inventory searches, open field, and hot pursuit. See State v. Weidner, 2007–NMCA–063, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d 1025. “[T]he State bears the burden of proving reasonableness.” Rowell, 2008–NMSC–041, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{12} A warrantless entry into a vehicle under the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances. See State v. Ruffino, 1980–NMSC–072, ¶ 3, 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311. Probable cause exists when “seizable evidence exists at a particular location before a search warrant may issue.” State v. Williamson, 2009–NMSC–039, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.3d 376. Probable cause is determined on a case-by-case basis. See State v. Aull, 1967–NMSC–233, ¶ 19, 78 N.M. 607, 435 P.2d 437. We have defined exigent circumstances as “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Gomez, 1997–NMSC–006, ¶ 39, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine if exigent circumstances exist, the court must decide “whether, on the basis of the facts known to a prudent, cautious, trained officer, the officer could reasonably conclude that swift action was necessary.” State v. Valdez, 1990–NMCA–134, ¶ 14, 111 N.M. 438, 806 P.2d 578 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Exigencies must be known to an officer prior to or at the time of entry. State v. Attaway, 1994–NMSC–011, ¶ 28, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103. This inquiry is...