Fowler v. Vista Care & Am. Home Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 33,993.,33,993.
• Citation: 329 P.3d 630
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Parties: Sherrie FOWLER, Worker–Petitioner, v. VISTA CARE and American Home Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer–Respondents.

329 P.3d 630

Sherrie FOWLER, Worker–Petitioner,

v.VISTA CARE and American Home Insurance Company, Employer/Insurer–Respondents.

No. 33,993.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

June 5, 2014.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 2014.

Ralph Rodney O. Dunn III, Rio Rancho, NM, for Petitioner.

Butt Thornton & Baehr, P.C., Emily A. Franke, David N. Whitham, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

DANIELS, Justice.

{1} The New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 52–1–1 to –70 (1929, as amended through 2013), provides for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for injured workers. The Court of Appeals held that the Act limits Appellant Sherrie Fowler's eligibility for TTD benefits to 700 weeks of benefits and reversed a contrary decision of the Workers' Compensation Administration judge. See Fowler v. Vista Care, 2013–NMCA–036, ¶ 23, 298 P.3d 491. We conclude that the Act imposes no such limitation; TTD benefits are payable during any period of total disability for the remainder of a worker's life.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{2} While working for Vista Care (Employer), Fowler suffered a back injury on April 7, 2003. Fowler began receiving TTD benefits pursuant to Section 52–1–41, and subsequently underwent back surgery later in 2003. On January 11, 2006, a physician determined that Fowler reached maximum medical improvement (MMI). See § 52–1–24.1 (defining MMI as “the date after which further recovery from or lasting improvement to an injury can no longer be reasonably anticipated”); Rael v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 1994–NMCA–017, ¶ 14, 117 N.M. 237, 871 P.2d 1 (“[A] determination of MMI ... is merely a determination that [a w]orker has reached a plateau of medical stability for the foreseeable future.”). Following the MMI determination, Fowler's TTD benefits were terminated. See § 52–1–25.1 (stating reasons why a worker may become ineligible for TTD benefits prior to reaching MMI); Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996–NMSC–064, ¶ 7, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250 (“Eligibility for the various temporary benefits provided under the Act ends at the date of MMI,” after which a worker must establish a permanent disability status in order to receive further benefits.). In March 2006 Fowler requested a lump sum payment of permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, seeNMSA 1978, § 52–5–12 (2003, amended 2009), which the Workers' Compensation Administration (WCA) judge granted on April 27, 2006. Fowler continued receiving medical treatment for her back injury, and on March 14, 2007, her physician determined that her condition had deteriorated and recommended that she undergo another surgery.

{3} This case began when Fowler filed a complaint with the WCA on March 16, 2010, for reinstatement of her TTD benefits and for an increase in her PPD rating. See § 52–1–26(D) (discussing “PPD rating” in terms of “impairment”); § 52–1–24(A) (defining “impairment”); see also§ 52–5–12(B) (discussing “compensation benefits” in terms of “impairment rating”). Fowler underwent the additional surgery on July 13, 2010, the date on which Employer's reinstatement of Fowler's TTD benefits took effect. Employer authorized payment for the July 13, 2010, surgery prior to the surgery. But because Employer and Employer's insurer disputed whether the July 13, 2010, surgery was related to Fowler's April 2003 injury, the case was set for trial before a WCA judge. The trial proceeded on two issues: (1) whether Fowler was entitled to reinstatement of TTD benefits prior to the July 13, 2010, surgery and (2) whether her continued entitlement to TTD benefits was subject to any duration limit.

{4} The WCA judge issued an order finding that Fowler was entitled to receive TTD benefits as of March 14, 2007, when the physician determined that Fowler was no longer at MMI. In a memorandum opinion, the WCA judge concluded that TTD benefits are not limited by the 500–week or 700–week periods applicable to PPD benefits under Section 52–1–42(A) because the statutory language “clearly establishes that it does not exclude ‘temporary’ total disability benefits from the potential payment of disability benefits ‘for life.’ ”

{5} The Court of Appeals affirmed the WCA judge's order on the issue of Fowler's entitlement to reinstatement of TTD benefits because it concluded that Fowler was no longer at MMI as of March 14, 2007, see Fowler, 2013–NMCA–036, ¶ 27, 298 P.3d 491, but reversed the conclusion of the WCA judge's memorandum opinion that no time limit applies to TTD benefits, id. ¶ 23. The Court of Appeals held that Section 52–1–47 of the Act imposes a 700–week limit on TTD benefits, see id. ¶ 22, and directed the WCA judge to consider how the duration limit would affect the application of any potential credit for lump sum advances, see id. ¶ 31. We granted certiorari, see Fowler v. Vista Care, 2013–NMCERT–003, to review de novo the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Act. See Romero Excavation & Trucking, Inc. v. Bradley Constr., Inc., 1996–NMSC–010, ¶ 5, 121 N.M. 471, 913 P.2d 659 (“The meaning of statutory language is a matter of law.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

II. DISCUSSION

{6} The Act provides injured workers with a minimum level of financial security while they are receiving medical care for their work-related injuries and are otherwise unable to work. SeeNMSA 1978, § 52–5–1 (1990) (“It is the intent of the legislature in creating the [WCA] that the laws administered by it to provide a workers' benefit system be interpreted to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers at a reasonable cost to the employers who are subject to the provisions of the [Act].”). The Act provides benefits for total disability, see§ 52–1–41, and PPD, see § 52–1–42.

{7} The Court's guiding principle when construing statutes “is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 2007–NMSC–053, ¶ 20, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105. To discern the Legislature's intent, we rely on the classic canons of statutory interpretation and “look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 2009–NMSC–013, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We will not read the plain language of the statute in a way that is “absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute,” State v. Smith, 2004–NMSC–032, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022, and will not read any provision of the statute in a way that would render another provision of the statute “null or superfluous,” State v. Rivera, 2004–NMSC–001, ¶ 18, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. “ ‘Statutory language that is clear and unambiguous must be given effect.’ ” Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util. Auth. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 2010–NMSC–013, ¶ 52, 148 N.M. 21, 229 P.3d 494 (citation omitted).

{8} There are two types of total disability: permanent total disability, see § 52–1–25(A) (stating that a permanent total disability includes a “total loss or loss of use of” any two limbs), and TTD, see § 52–1–25.1(A) (stating that a TTD is the “inability of a worker, by reason of accidental injury arising out of and in the course of the worker's employment, to perform the duties of that employment prior to the date of the worker's [MMI].”). Fowler presents a question concerning her eligibility for TTD benefits. At issue in this case is whether the payment of TTD benefits to a worker is subject to any of the duration limits found in Section 52–1–42 for PPD and in Section 52–1–47 for combinations of disabilities.

{9} Section 52–1–41(A) of the Act provides for total disability benefits, stating that “the worker shall receive, during the period of that disability,” an amount of benefits determined by a specified formula and that “the worker shall receive compensation benefits for the remainder of his life.” Section 52–1–41(A) explicitly states that total disability benefits are available only during a period of total disability. Id. It also states that a worker's eligibility for total disability benefits extends “for the remainder of [the worker's] life.” Id. The statutory language does not indicate that the compensation benefits for total disability are to be administered differently depending on whether the total disability is “temporary” or “permanent.” See, e.g., Breen, 2005–NMSC–028, ¶¶ 1, 10, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413 (discussing the lifetime compensation benefit under Section 52–1–41(A) as applicable to workers whose injuries resulted in “temporary total ... impairments”).

{10} We know from other provisions in the Act that a worker is entitled to TTD benefits only until the worker reaches MMI, see § 52–1–25.1(A), and will not be entitled to TTD benefits prior to reaching MMI if a worker's physician releases the worker to return to work and either the employer offers work at the preinjury wage, see § 52–1–25.1(B)(1), or the worker accepts work from another employer at the preinjury wage, see § 52–1–25.1(B)(2). This scheme acknowledges the realistic possibility that some workers may become totally disabled for a period of time, reach MMI or be released for work by their physicians before MMI and return to work, and later face subsequent work-related injuries or find their existing injuries exacerbated, rendering them totally disabled yet again.

{11} Fowler is an example of the workers who may become eligible for TTD benefits any number of times throughout their lives so long as they are deemed totally disabled by their healthcare providers. See § 52–1–24.1 (defining “date of [MMI]” as “the date after which further recovery from or lasting improvement to an injury can no longer be reasonably anticipated based upon reasonable medical probability as determined by a health care provider ”) (...