State v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 20 December 1990
• Citation: 584 A.2d 622
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. William LEWIS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 622

584 A.2d 622

STATE of Maine v. William LEWIS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Nov. 2, 1990.

Decided Dec. 20, 1990.

David W. Crook, Dist. Atty. and William Baghdoyan (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Skowhegan, for the State.

Seth Berner (orally), Portland, for defendant.

Before ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and BRODY, JJ.

CLIFFORD, Justice.

William Lewis appeals from judgments of conviction entered by the Superior Court (Somerset County, Chandler, J.) on charges of attempted murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 152, 201 (1983), and aggravated assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208(1)(B) (1983). On appeal, Lewis challenges the trial court's finding that he was competent to stand trial. Lewis also contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him because of lost evidence; (2) excluding from trial evidence of drugs present in his body; and (3) refusing to submit the issue of involuntary intoxication to the jury. We affirm the convictions.

On July 28, 1987, Lewis was arrested outside his home in Madison and charged with shooting his wife, Georgie Carrigan Lewis, in the chest with a .32 calibre hand gun. After he was advised of his rights, Lewis gave a tape-recorded statement to the police in which he confessed to the shooting. Prior to trial, the Superior Court ordered that Lewis be examined to determine his competency to stand trial pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 101-B(1) (Supp.1990). ¹ Psychiatric reports were prepared by a state psychiatrist and by a clinical psychologist retained by Lewis's court-appointed counsel. Both doctors agreed that Lewis suffered from a delusional disorder in which he believed that his wife and others, including his brother-in-law and employees at the Somerset County Jail and the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, were engaged in a conspiracy to poison him. Lewis's psychologist gave his opinion that the delusional disorder rendered Lewis incompetent to stand trial; the State's psychiatrist gave his opinion that Lewis was competent. After an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court (Chandler, J.) found Lewis incompetent to stand trial.

Six months later, after a second evidentiary hearing before the same justice on Lewis's competency, the Superior Court once again concluded that Lewis was incompetent to stand trial but declined Lewis's attorney's request for a finding pursuant to section 101-B(4) that he would not be competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future. A third competency hearing was held before a different Superior Court justice (Alexander, J.) three months later. Although the testimony as to Lewis's condition was not significantly different, the court found that Lewis was competent to stand trial and ordered that the case be returned to the trial calendar.

In order to find Lewis competent to stand trial, the Superior Court is required to find that Lewis is capable of understanding the nature and object of the charges against him, comprehending his own condition in reference thereto, and cooperating with counsel to conduct a defense in a rational and reasonable manner. State v. Hewett, 538 A.2d 268, 269 (Me.1988). After a finding of incompetence the court is required to continue the case until the defendant is deemed by the court, through periodic review, to be competent to stand trial or until the court enters a finding that the defendant will not be competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future. 15 M.R.S.A. § 101-B (Supp.1990). ² Pursuant to the statute, periodic review of a defendant's competence to stand trial is de novo and is accomplished through an evidentiary hearing. Id. Neither the statute nor its history supports Lewis's contention that there is a requirement that the court find evidence of changed circumstances before it may conclude that a previously declared incompetent defendant is, in fact, competent to stand trial, or that the Superior Court is bound by its prior determination of incompetency. On appeal, this court will reverse the trial court's factual determination of competency only upon a showing of clear error. State v. Perkins, 518 A.2d 715, 716 (Me.1986).

The Superior Court's primary concerns were with Lewis's ability to cooperate with his attorney and his ability to conduct his defense in a rational manner given that Lewis was extremely persistent in his desire to prove that he, rather than his wife, was the true victim. Although there were findings made at the first and second competency hearings that Lewis was unable to cooperate with his attorney and present a meaningful defense, a contrary finding at either hearing would have been equally supported by the evidence. After a third review of subsequent, albeit not significantly different evidence, the court found Lewis able to cooperate with an attorney and conduct his defense in a rational manner. That finding is not clearly erroneous.

Moreover, at the critical time of Lewis's trial, there was no indication of incompetence. Defense counsel did not raise the issue after the third competency hearing or at the time of trial which was eight months later. See Thursby v. State, 223 A.2d 61, 68 (Me.1966). Nor did the court make any inquiries concerning competency despite observing Lewis during the entire trial. We "assume from the presumption of regularity which attaches to final judgments of convictions ... that if the trial court had entertained any doubt as to [Lewis's] competence to stand trial it would have used its inherent power to probe into his mental condition for purposes of triability." Id. at 69 (citations omitted). ³

Lewis further contends that the court erred in refusing to dismiss the indictment against him because the loss of a cassette tape by the police violated his right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The tape, Lewis alleged, contained recordings of telephone conversations in which Georgie Lewis, the victim, admitted poisoning Lewis. After a hearing at which three officers who listened to the tape at the scene of the crime testified, the court (Brennan, J.) found that the tape did not contain the claimed exculpatory evidence and refused to dismiss the indictment.

A failure by the State to preserve evidence does not violate a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial unless the evidence possesses an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, the defendant would be unable to obtain evidence of comparable value by other reasonably available means, and the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the potentially useful evidence. State v. Berkley, 567 A.2d 915, 917-18 (Me.1989). The finding of the court that the tape did not contain exculpatory evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See State v. Barczak, 562 A.2d 140, 144 (Me.1989). The three officers who listened to the tape, and who the court found to be credible witnesses, testified that there was only one conversation on the tape in which the victim discussed Lewis's belief that the victim was poisoning him, but did not admit to poisoning Lewis. The officers' testimony was sufficient to support the...