State v. Libby
| Citation | 546 A.2d 444 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Jeffrey LIBBY. |
| Decision Date | 29 July 1988 |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
James E. Tierney, Atty. Gen., Charles Leadbetter, Wayne Moss (orally), Rae Ann French, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.
James M. LaLiberty (orally), Butler, Whittier & LaLiberty, Waterville, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, SCOLNIK and CLIFFORD, JJ.
Defendant Jeffrey Libby appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County) entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A) (1983). Defendant challenges 1) the Superior Court's denial of his motions to suppress physical objects obtained from a warrantless search and statements he made to the police after invoking his right to counsel, 2) the admission of certain evidence, 3) the court's refusal to give requested jury instructions with regard to the manner and cause of the victim's death, 4) the State's proof of the corpus delicti, and 5) the sufficiency of the evidence. Rejecting defendant's appellate contentions, we affirm the conviction.
The jury would have been warranted in finding the following facts. At about 2:15 a.m. on July 8, 1986, defendant called the Winslow police to report finding his grandfather, Percy Libby, dead, apparently from drowning in his bathtub. Defendant lived with his grandfather at the time, and he told the police that he had returned home at about 2:00 a.m. and discovered his grandfather's body. The police and the emergency response team, after arriving at Percy's house, found him lying naked and face up in the filled tub, as if he had been taking a bath. Diana York, Percy's sister-in-law, and Larry Loubier, a neighbor, were called to the scene that night. Both expressed surprise that Percy was found in the bathtub since he typically took only sponge baths.
On July 11, 1986, Libby initially waived his Miranda rights and spoke to the police for 45 minutes. Although Libby denied any involvement in Percy's death, he was arrested following his statements to the police. On July 16 the police searched Percy's home pursuant to a search warrant. The warrant did not in specific terms include the garage, however, and police obtained consent for searching the garage from Diana York. Percy's skin medication and his damp slippers and pants were found in a trash can in the garage. On August 7, 1986, defendant was indicted for Percy's murder and was convicted on July 14, 1987.
Defendant first argues on appeal that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress admission of Percy's medication and his damp slippers and pants found during the July 16 warrantless search of the garage. 1 He argued before the Superior Court that the items seized should be suppressed because Diana York had no authority to consent to the search of Percy's garage. We affirm the court's holding that in all the circumstances here present York had authority to consent to the search.
Consent to authorize a warrantless search may be given by "a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). A finding of consent under Matlock properly focuses on whether the third party giving consent has sufficient authority or control in his own right over the premises, regardless of how much control the defendant may have. Id. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7. At the suppression hearing the Superior Court found that Diana York had sufficient common authority or control over Percy's premises to authorize her consent to the search. That finding is not clearly erroneous because there is competent evidence to support it. See State v. Reeves, 499 A.2d 130, 132 (Me.1985).
Diana York's access to and physical control over Percy Libby's residence was the result of her long association with him. York was Percy's sister-in-law and they had been friends for 40 years. She lived with Percy and his wife from 1954 to 1956 following her father's death. More recently, in the late summer of 1985 Percy's longstanding dry skin problem developed into a severe skin rash that lasted until the spring of 1986. Diana often helped Percy at his home by applying lotion to his neck, back, and legs. Moreover, on December 8, 1985, Percy's wife of 39 years died. In the months that followed Percy relied especially on York's comfort and friendship. York had a copy of Percy's house key, and the factfinder could rationally conclude that Percy expected her to have complete access to the entire premises. Although York did not have a separate key to the garage, she did not need it because Percy routinely kept the overhead garage door open. Both York and Percy lived in Winslow, and York visited Percy often immediately following his wife's death and at least once a week thereafter until his death. Indeed, Percy had already signed a purchase and sale agreement to sell his house. He intended to move in with York and her husband following the sale.
Diana York's close relationship with Percy and her control over and access to his residence is confirmed by her role as both a devisee under Percy's will and the personal representative of his estate. Percy had split his estate equally between York and defendant. Immediately upon Percy's death York, as a devisee, became vested with at least a one-half interest in Percy's real estate "subject only to the right of the personal representative ... to use it to pay creditors...." Bourgeois v. Sprague, 358 A.2d 521, 522 (Me.1976). As the personal representative, York had additional power to control both the real and personal property on the premises. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 3-709 (1981) states:
Except as otherwise provided by a decedent's will, every personal representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent's property.... The personal representative shall ... take all steps reasonably necessary for the management, protection and preservation of[ ] the estate in his possession.
As the personal representative 2 York was entrusted with the primary responsibility for the settlement of Percy's estate. See, e.g., 18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 3-703(a), 3-706, 3-711 (1981 & Supp.1987). See also Estate of Baldwin, 442 A.2d 529, 532 (Me.1982). York was very aware of her status under Percy's will and of her responsibilities as personal representative. On being called to Percy's house on the night of his death, York went to his desk where she knew he kept his will and showed it to the police. She did so intending to notify the police of her authority to remove Percy's leased car from the premises. 3
Considering the totality of the circumstances, including York's access to and control over Percy's premises before his death as well as her legal status as devisee and personal representative, the Superior Court did not err in finding that York had proper authority to consent to the search of Percy's garage.
Defendant next argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to the Winslow police during a custodial interrogation on July 11, 1986. Defendant initially waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and voluntarily talked to the police, denying any responsibility for Percy's death. After 45 minutes of discussion, however defendant invoked his right to have counsel present and the police terminated the taped interview. Defendant concedes on appeal that following his demand for counsel and the termination of the interview, he initiated further discussion with the police. After the police gave him a second set of Miranda warnings, defendant proceeded to give a different version of his involvement in Percy's death. 4
Under Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), admissibility of a defendant's statements given to the police in a custodial interrogation following an invocation of the right to counsel requires two separate inquiries. First, the defendant must have himself initiated a further "generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation." Id. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. Second, the defendant, in the totality of the circumstances, must have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel present. Id. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. at 2835; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461 (1938). Here defendant concedes that he initiated the further discussion with the police. He argues, however, that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the court did not make an express finding that he had waived his right to counsel, made known to him as part of his Miranda warnings.
In its suppression order the court noted that defendant had been given a second set of Miranda warnings. The court then found that defendant
is an intelligent and fairly sophisticated young man familiar with the import and meaning of his rights as they are protected by Miranda.... [He] is a high school graduate, who, in three previous encounters with police, has received Miranda warnings.
Defendant's intelligence, sophistication, and familiarity with Miranda all relate to his waiver of his right to counsel and not to his initiation of further discussion with the police. The Superior Court's implicit finding of waiver was the result of an analysis separate from that used to determine whether defendant had initiated further discussion with police. Examination of the transcript of Libby's interview with the police clearly supports the Superior Court's implicit finding that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights a second time. There was no error.
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