State v. Logan
| Decision Date | 15 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | 2005-UP-639 |
| Parties | The State, Respondent, v. James Leroy Logan, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard October 6, 2005.
Appeal From Beaufort County Curtis L. Coltrane, Special Circuit Court Judge.
Samuel Christopher Bauer, of Hilton Head Island; Scott M Merrifield, of Beaufort; for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Randolph Murdaugh, III, of Hampton; for Respondent.
James Leroy Logan, Jr., appeals his conviction in magistrate's court for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), first offense. He contends the circuit court erred in failing to reverse the decision of the magistrate denying his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
At approximately 2:25 a.m. on October 7, 2002, South Carolina Highway Patrolman R. J. Gannon was dispatched to the scene of a single-vehicle accident at Sea Pines Circle on Hilton Head Island. When he arrived, Gannon observed a vehicle at a forty-five degree angle lodged in a tree.
Once the EMS stabilized Logan, they placed him in an ambulance. At that point, Gannon asked Logan for some personal information and requested his driver's license. Gannon claimed that [w]hile talking with Mr. Logan, the smell of alcoholic beverage was even stronger” than when he spoke with Logan in the vehicle. As a result, Gannon advised Logan of his Miranda [1] rights. In response to Gannon's questions, Logan told Gannon that he was on vacation, he had been out on the town for the night, ” and had been to a couple of local clubs. Logan, however, could not identify the names of the clubs. Because he believed Logan had been driving under the influence, Gannon requested a blood sample and informed Logan of his implied consent rights. According to Gannon, Logan was unable to sign the implied consent form due to his injuries. Logan declined to submit to a blood test. Gannon further testified that Logan's physical condition prevented EMS from transporting him to a breathalyzer test site.
At the hospital, Gannon served Logan with a notice of suspension and asked him again about the accident. Logan only informed Gannon that he was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident. As a result, Gannon issued Logan a ticket for DUI and for a seatbelt violation. On the ticket for DUI Gannon noted in the B.A. Level” box that Logan had refused this test.
On October 22, 2003, a Beaufort County magistrate tried Logan's case. After Gannon testified, Logan's counsel moved for a directed verdict for the DUI charge based on two primary grounds: (1) there was no direct evidence that Logan was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident; and (2) there was no testimony regarding Logan's alleged impairment other than the fact that an accident had occurred and Gannon observed an odor of alcoholic beverage.” The magistrate denied this motion as well as Logan's renewal of the motion after the defense rested its case without presenting testimony.
In a written order, the magistrate found Logan guilty of DUI and failure to wear a seatbelt. He ordered Logan to pay a fine of $748 for DUI and $35 for the seatbelt violation. In reaching his decision as to the DUI charge, the magistrate found: (1) there was direct evidence that Logan was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident given he was still in the driver's seat at the time the officers arrived at the scene; and (2) Logan was driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that his driving was impaired based on Gannon's testimony that Logan smelled of an alcoholic beverage” and Logan told him that he had been to a couple of clubs prior to the accident.
Logan appealed his conviction for DUI to the circuit court. [2] In his notice of appeal, Logan argued the magistrate erred in declining to direct a verdict because there was no evidence that Logan was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident or that his driving was impaired.
By order dated November 16, 2004, the circuit court affirmed the magistrate's decision. Logan appeals.
Logan argues the circuit court erred in failing to reverse his DUI conviction. Specifically, he contends the State failed to provide sufficient evidence that: (1) he operated the vehicle involved in the accident; and (2) he was under the influence of alcohol while driving. As a result, Logan asserts the magistrate should have granted his motion for a directed verdict. We disagree.
An appellate court may reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict only if there is no evidence to support the court's ruling. State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 555, 564 S.E.2d 87, 92 (2002). A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense charged.” State v McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 642, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2003). A trial court should deny a motion for directed verdict if there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove an accused's guilt, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. State v. Horton, 359 S.C. 555, 563, 598 S.E.2d 279 284 (Ct. App. 2004).
Before a defendant in a criminal case can be required to present a defense, the State must present some proof of the corpus delicti of the crime. That is, the prosecution must show the actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged.” State v. Smith, 328 S.C. 622, 624-25, 493 S.E.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted).
The corpus delicti of DUI based upon alcohol is: (1) driving a motor vehicle; (2) within this state; (3) while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the person's faculties to drive are materially and appreciably impaired.” State v. Russell, 345 S.C. 128, 134, 546 S.E.2d 202, 205 (Ct. App. 2001); see State v. Salisbury, 343 S.C. 520, 524, 541 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2001) (); see also State v. Sheppard, 248 S.C. 464, 466, 150 S.E.2d 916, 917 (1966) (). [3] All that the first element requires is that the State sufficiently prove that someone drove the automobile.” City of Easley v. Portman, 327 S.C. 593, 596, 490 S.E.2d 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997). ‘Under the influence' means sufficiently under the influence as to impair the ability of such driver to operate the vehicle with reasonable care.” State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 143, 498 S.E.2d 212, 217 (Ct. App. 1998). The question is not whether the defendant is drunk or intoxicated, but whether his condition is such that he could drive with due regard for others and himself.” Id. at 144, 498 S.E.2d at 217-18.
Proof of the corpus delicti does not have to be in the form of direct evidence; it may be established by circumstantial evidence when it is the best evidence obtainable.” State v. Osborne, 335 S.C. 172, 180, 516 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1999); State v. Townsend, 321 S.C. 55, 57, 467 S.E.2d 138, 140 (Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
Turning to the instant case, we find the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of DUI. Officer Gannon found an injured Logan inside a vehicle that had just been involved in a single-vehicle accident. No one else was present in the vehicle. Gannon, who had been trained as an accident reconstructionist, opined that Logan entered the traffic circle he went straight towards the embankment, up the embankment and on a tree and he came to rest on a tree.” Gannon believed the vehicle went airborne a good six, seven feet” before it collided with the tree. He noted on the DUI traffic ticket that the weather was clear” at the time of the accident. Eyewitnesses to the accident were unavailable at the time of trial. However, Gannon testified without objection that Logan had been driving the vehicle. [4] Furthermore, Gannon stated there was a very strong smell of alcoholic beverage” in the vehicle and an even stronger” smell when he spoke directly to Logan. Logan also told Gannon that he had been out on the town for the night” [5] and had been to a couple of local clubs. In its order, the circuit court stated that Logan admitted that he had been ‘out on the town' at establishments that served alcoholic beverages.” [6] Logan's inability to recall the names of the clubs gave rise to the inference that Logan was intoxicated. Logan also refused to submit to a blood test. Although Gannon was unable, due to Logan's physical condition, to utilize field sobriety tests or a breathalyzer test, he believed Logan had been driving under the influence.
Based on the foregoing, we hold the magistrate properly denied Logan's motion for a directed verdict. See Portman, ...
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