State v. Long

Decision Date16 January 2014
Docket NumberNo. SD 32413.,SD 32413.
Citation417 S.W.3d 849
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Brent LONG, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Nancy G. Price of Springfield, MO, for appellant.

Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., Christopher M. Hoeman. Asst. Atty. Gen., of Springfield, MO, for respondent.

JEFFREY W. BATES, P.J.

Following a bench trial, Brent Long (Defendant) was convicted of driving while intoxicated in violation of § 577.010.1 Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence collected after an alleged “illegal stop” of Defendant's vehicle; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction. Finding no merit in either contention, we affirm.

Defendant was charged by amended information with driving while intoxicated, and his case was tried to the court. On the day of trial, Defendant filed his motion to suppress. The court ruled that the motion would be taken with the case and decided after trial.

On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict; all contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005). We defer to the fact-finder's “superior position to weigh and value the evidence, determine the witnesses' credibility and resolve any inconsistencies in their testimony.” State v. Lopez–McCurdy, 266 S.W.3d 874, 876 (Mo.App.2008). Viewed from this perspective, the following evidence was adduced at trial.

The State's first witness was Amber Blevins (Blevins), who gave the following testimony. Sometime between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. on November 14, 2011, Blevins was driving on West Bypass, in Springfield, Missouri. This particular area of West Bypass has two northbound and two southbound lanes. She noticed a blue Corvette, which was being driven by Defendant, operating erratically ahead of her. She saw that car, which was in the far right lane, swerve onto the shoulder of the road three or four times and nearly touch the grass beyond the shoulder. At the intersection of West Bypass and Sunshine, she observed the blue Corvette stop in the middle of the intersection even though the signal light was green. Blevins called 911 because she believed the driver of the blue Corvette was endangering the lives of other motorists. As the blue Corvette proceeded on West Bypass, Blevins watched it move into the inner lane of the roadway. While traveling in the left lane, the blue Corvette swerved and hit the curb approximately three times. In addition to seeing the car hit the curb, Blevins could hear the tire rubbing against the concrete. While on the phone with 911 dispatch, Blevins described what she was seeing. She provided her name, her vehicle information and the license plate number of the blue Corvette to the dispatcher. When the police arrived, the Corvette did not pull over immediately. Blevins saw the driver attempt to drive away. Blevins remained at the scene until an officer had an opportunity to talk to her.

The State then called Greene County Deputy Sheriff Justin Raynes (Deputy Raynes), who gave the following testimony. On November 14, 2011, Deputy Raynes responded to a dispatch regarding a possibly impaired driver being followed by a citizen. As Deputy Raynes responded, he was provided with a description of the vehicles involved. He was told that the suspect vehicle was a blue Corvette. He also was informed that the citizen caller had seen the blue Corvette stop in the middle of the roadway at some point and run off the roadway numerous times. As Deputy Raynes was driving behind what he thought was the citizen caller's vehicle, he asked dispatch to instruct the caller to pull over. After making this request, the vehicle in front of him pulled to the side of the road. At that point, Deputy Raynes confirmed that the license plate on the blue Corvette matched the number provided to him by dispatch. Deputy Raynes then initiated a traffic stop, and determined that Defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the blue Corvette.

Deputy Raynes detected a moderate odor of intoxicants coming from Defendant's person. Defendant was uncooperative and said he had not been drinking any alcohol that day. Deputy Raynes observed that Defendant's eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred and confused, and he had difficulty balancing when he got out of his car. All of these observations were indicators of intoxication. Deputy Raynes had Defendant perform the walk-and-turn test, during which he displayed seven out of eight possible indicators of impairment. Defendant did not appear to be taking the test seriously. Deputy Raynes then had Defendant perform the one-leg-stand test, during which he showed three out of four possible indicators of impairment by putting his foot down during the test, using his arms for balance and hopping on one foot. Once again, Defendant did not appear to be taking the test seriously and “was argumentative during the whole time.” Deputy Raynes believed Defendant was intoxicated. Defendant was placed under arrest and transported to the Greene County Jail. Once there, Defendant was advised of the Missouri Implied Consent Law and refused to submit to a breath test.

At trial, Defendant admitted that he had been drinking beer at a restaurant before he was stopped by Deputy Raynes. According to Defendant, he only had two beers and spilled some of it on himself.

At the close of all the evidence, the court took the matter under advisement. Thereafter, the trial court denied the motion to suppress and found Defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated. The court found that Blevins' testimony was “very credible” and relied upon it in making its rulings. Following sentencing, Defendant appealed. Additional facts will be included below as we address Defendant's two points of error.

Point I

Defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence that was collected as the result of an alleged unlawful search and seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment. “In reviewing a suppression ruling, we view all evidence and inferences favorable to the ruling, and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.” State v. Daniels, 221 S.W.3d 438, 440 (Mo.App.2007). This Court defers to the trial court's determination of credibility and factual findings, and will reverse only for clear error. State v. Goff, 129 S.W.3d 857, 861–62 (Mo. banc 2004). A ruling is clearly erroneous only when it leaves an appellate court with a definite and firm belief that a mistake has been made. Daniels, 221 S.W.3d at 440. While we review the facts under a clearly erroneous standard, whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated is a question of law subject to de novo review. Id.

“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution preserves the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. banc 1995). Evidence obtained in violation of this protection is inadmissible in state court. State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Mo. banc 2011). “The Fourth Amendment allows, however, a so-called Terry stop, which is a minimally intrusive form of seizure or ‘semi-arrest’ that is lawful if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that those stopped are engaged in criminal activity.” Miller, 894 S.W.2d at 651;see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Generally, [a]n anonymous tip by itself seldom, if ever, provides reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a crime warranting a Terry-stop.” State v. Weddle, 18 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Mo.App.2000). Reasonable suspicion can be established if the officer involved in the stop “independently observed sufficient corroborating information from the prior police communication.” Miller, 894 S.W.2d at 653. “At a suppression hearing the [S]tate bears both the burden of producing evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the motion to suppress should be overruled.” State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. banc 1992).

In denying Defendant's motion to suppress, the court made the following docket entry:

Defendant files written motion to suppress to be taken with case-in-chief by agreement—evidence heard—court denies Defendant's motion to suppress and finds that the State's witness, A. Blevins was not “anonymous” as argued by defense but a private person whose testimony is considered inherently reliable and that:

1. She specifically identified herself, gave specific identifying personal information and specific identifying information about her vehicle, when calling the law enforcement dispatcher on the date in question.

2. She gave specific identifying information about Defendant's vehicle to the dispatcher.

3. She gave specific information to the law enforcement dispatcher about very erratic driving on the part of Defendant's vehicle while following it for a number of miles, approximately half of which was past her planned destination.

4. The arresting officer identified and located both vehicles by the above information and further noted that the witness moved her vehicle from behind Defendant's vehicle when the arresting officer requested her to do so via communication with the dispatcher.

5. She testified at trial.

All of the above was more than enough corroborated information to give the deputy reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, to stop Defendant's vehicle at which point the officer noted the odor of alcohol emanating from the Deft and the interior of his vehicle.

On appeal, Defendant claims the trial court clearly erred in denying the motion to suppress because the stop was based solely on an anonymous tip. Based upon that premise, Defendant argues that the State failed to show Deputy Raynes had a reasonable suspicion to...

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5 cases
  • State v. Carr, WD 76623.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 9 Septiembre 2014
    ...by itself seldom, if ever, provides reasonable suspicion that a person committed a crime warranting a Terry -stop.” State v. Long, 417 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Mo.App. S.D.2014) (internal quotation omitted); see also J.L., 529 U.S. at 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375.4 Here, though, the State contends—and we ag......
  • State v. Mitchell
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 8 Diciembre 2015
    ...Marcum, was not anonymous, but his identity was known to the police and to the judge issuing the warrant. See State v. Long, 417 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (named informants are generally considered more reliable than "anonymous tipsters"). In addition, Marcum told police that he ......
  • State v. Strong
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 7 Abril 2015
    ...he shared, Fields should be considered a citizen informant whose information is presumptively reliable. See State v. Long, 417 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Mo.App.S.D.2014).However, we need not determine here whether the officers could have relied solely on the information from Fields to justify a Terr......
  • State v. Besendorfer
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 2 Septiembre 2014
    ...and value the evidence, determine the witnesses' credibility and resolve any inconsistencies in their testimony.” State v. Long, 417 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Mo.App. S.D.2014) (internal quotation omitted).5 Besendorfer asserts that the proper standard of review in this criminal case should be the s......
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