State v. Lonkoski
| Decision Date | 09 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010AP2809–CR.,2010AP2809–CR. |
| Citation | 346 Wis.2d 523,2013 WI 30,828 N.W.2d 552 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Matthew A. LONKOSKI, Defendant–Appellant–Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs by Andrew Hinkel, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by Andrew Hinkel.
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, assistantattorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
[346 Wis.2d 526]¶ 1 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals that affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court for Oneida County, the Honorable Mark Mangerson presiding.1
¶ 2 At issue in this case is the admissibility of statements made to detectives in an interrogation. The threshold question is whether Matthew A. Lonkoski was in police custody for purposes of Miranda2 when he stated that he wanted an attorney. Within moments of stating he wanted a lawyer, Lonkoski clearly retracted his statement and thereafter repeatedly and emphatically stated that he wanted to talk to the officers without a lawyer. However, if he was already in custody for Miranda purposes at the time he stated, “I want a lawyer,” he would receive the benefit of the Miranda rule requiring interrogation to cease, and his subsequent statements would be subject to the exclusionary rule if other exceptions to Miranda did not apply. Where a person is not in custody, there is no such requirement to cease interrogation.
¶ 3 The circuit court first granted Lonkoski's motion to suppress all statements he made after he stated that he wanted an attorney on the grounds that an Edwards3 violation had occurred. On reconsideration, the circuit court denied the motion to suppress, focusing its analysis on the fact that Lonkoski was not in custody when he stated he wanted an attorney and therefore found that no Edwards violation had occurred. The court of appeals affirmed.
¶ 4 After the circuit court denied Lonkoski's motion to suppress, he pleaded guilty and was convicted of child abuse—recklessly causing great bodily harm in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.03(3)(a)4 and neglecting a child resulting in the child's death in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.21(1)(d).
¶ 5 We hold that the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress because Lonkoski was not in custody when he asked for an attorney, and therefore, Miranda did not bar further interrogation by the officers.
¶ 6 A person is in “custody” if under the totality of the circumstances “a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.” State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶ 33, 343 Wis.2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270. “[A] court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Several factors have been considered relevant in the totality of the circumstances such as “the defendant's freedom to leave; the purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and the degree of restraint.” Martin, 343 Wis.2d 278, ¶ 35, 816 N.W.2d 270.
¶ 7 Lonkoski came to the sheriff's department without being asked and voluntarily submitted to questioning by law enforcement officers. Although he was questioned in a small room within a jail by two officers with the door closed, the circuit court found that it was a typical interrogation setting locked to ingress by individuals but not for egress; he was never restrained in any way; and the door was opened more than once by people entering or exiting. In fact, on one occasion when the officers left the room, one of the officers asked Lonkoski whether he preferred the door to the interrogation room to be open or shut. Furthermore, Lonkoski was told that he was not under arrest and that the officers were not accusing him. In the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Lonkoski's position at the time he stated he wanted an attorney would believe that he or she was “free to terminate the interview and leave the scene.” We decline to adopt Lonkoski's argument that Miranda applies when custody is “imminent.” 5 Accordingly, although our analysis differs from that of the court of appeals, we affirm its decision.
¶ 8 Lonkoski's ten-month-old daughter, Peyton, was found unresponsive by her parents, Lonkoski and Amanda Bodoh. The medical personnel and law enforcement officers who responded to a 911 call declared her dead at the scene. An autopsy showed that Peyton's blood and urine contained deadly amounts of morphine and hydromorphone.
¶ 9 After receiving the autopsy results, a detective from the Oneida County Sheriff's Department requested that Bodoh come in for an interview. Lonkoski drove her to the sheriff's department for the interview. Officers spoke with Bodoh while Lonkoski waited in the lobby. After some time, Bodoh was escorted to a different part of the sheriff's department. Lieutenant Jim Wood went to the lobby. Subsequently, Lonkoski came to the interview room that Bodoh had recently vacated. To get to the room, someone at the front desk would have needed to push a button to release the door, and the room was located down a hallway from the lobby. The door did not prevent a person from exiting into the lobby from the interview area.
¶ 10 Detective Sara Gardner and Lieutenant Wood conducted the interview of Lonkoski. The interview room was small, and Lonkoski was seated furthest from the door. The entire interrogation was video-recorded.
¶ 11 At the beginning of the interview, the following occurred:
Wood: You want to have a seat over there? Do you know Sara?
Lonkoski: Yes.
Gardner: Yeah very well. How are you?
Lonkoski: Very good. How have you been?
Gardner: Well, better than you from what I hear's been going on.
Wood: Matt I'll, I'll close the door. You're not under arrest. You understand that you guys came here by yourself and we want to talk to you about Peyton and Peyton's death and, um, let you know about some of the, ah, findings from the autopsy and everything. I mean you're, you're the father, right?
Lonkoski: Mm hmm. (Affirmative).
Wood: Are you okay talking to us?
Lonkoski: Yeah.
Wood: Okay, I've got the door closed just cause I don't want other people to hear and stuff okay? Um, what what has gone on since Peyton's death with you? How are you doin'?
[346 Wis.2d 531]¶ 12 The next 20 minutes or so of the interview consisted of Lonkoski recounting the events in the days leading up to Peyton's death. The tenor of the conversation changed when Lieutenant Wood revealed the results of the autopsy to Lonkoski. It was during this portion of the interrogation that Lonkoski made the statement—“I want a lawyer”—that is at the center of our analysis.
Wood: No, no. The autopsy shows that Peyton died of an overdose.
Lonkoski: An overdose? Of what?
Wood: Now that's—I'd like for you to try and help me out a little bit.
Lonkoski: All I know is when I got back to the apartment, Amanda told me she gave, um, Peyton, baby Tylenol. The bottle of baby Tylenol you guys seen when you guys went into the apartment was on top of the ...
Wood: Not the baby Tylenol, I know. It's morphine.
Wood: Morphine.
Wood: Morphine.
Lonkoski: Oh my god.
Wood: What did you say to Peyton when you said goodbye to her that day out when I was out there and you went to the truck before they took her away ... what'd you say to her?
Lonkoski: I said that I love her and I would be by her soon.
Wood: And that you were sorry?
Lonkoski: Sorry for her passing away.
Wood: There's, there's more to it. And that's, and again Matt, it this is a very hard thing. A hard thing for you as a, as a pop, and, and, this is your baby, but you gotta, you got to dig deep inside yourself now. The autopsy knows what happened. We know what happened. What I need from you is I need you to look up and look in your heart and look up at Peyton and say, say okay, I can deal with it, I can, I can talk open....
Lonkoski: Are you accusing me of giving my daughter morphine?
Gardner: Matt, Matt, look at me. Every time you and I have talked, okay, and we go back a long way, all right, there's been some rough stuff that you and I have dealt with....
Lonkoski: I want a lawyer. I want a lawyer now. This is bullshit.
Wood: Okay.
Lonkoski: I would never do that to my kid, ever. I wasn't even at the apartment at all except at night. Why are you guys accusing me?
Wood: I didn't accuse you.
Gardner: We were asking.
Lonkoski: There is this is is is is is is is is insane.
Wood: I have to stop talking to you though ‘cause you said you wanted a lawyer.
Lonkoski: Am I under arrest?
Wood: You are now.
Lonkoski: Then I'll talk to you without a lawyer ... I, I don't want to go to jail, I didn't do anything to my daughter, I would not lie to you guys—this is in fact life or death.
Wood: Well, now you, now you complicate things.
Lonkoski: I just, I just want to leave here and go by my mom now because this is in—this is, this is insane.
Gardner: Matt we can't, we can't talk to you just because you don't want to go to jail okay some things that we wanted to talk to you about were like Jim said—we know what happened to Peyton—we need to know a couple of the gaps to fill the gaps.
Lonkoski: All right....
Gardner: (Unintelligible).
Lonkoski: Ask those gaps.
Gardner: That's what we want you to talk to us about.
Lonkoski: Ask those gaps.
Gardner: But I don't want you to feel like we're accusing you.
Lonkoski: All right. I will calm down.
Gardner: I don't—you don't have to talk to us—okay.
Lonkoski: Can can I can we go smoke a can I smoke a cigarette when we do this?
...
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