State v. Lynch
Decision Date | 27 November 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 4317.,4317. |
Citation | 654 S.E.2d 292,375 S.C. 628 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Jacob LYNCH, Appellant. |
of the Attorney General, of Columbia; and Solicitor C. Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for Respondent.
In this criminal case, we affirm the trial court's holding that an inmate was not entitled to be advised of his Miranda1 rights when he spoke to a television reporter.
Prisoners rioted at the Lee Correctional Institution located in Bishopville, South Carolina. Correctional Officers Marcus Cotton (Cotton) and Kenneth Dozier (Dozier) were working in the Chesterfield Housing Unit at the time of the riot. Prior to the incident, Cotton was providing meals to inmates located in the south side of the Chesterfield Unit, while Dozier provided meals to inmates located in the north side of the Chesterfield Unit.
Cotton opened inmate Jacob Lynch's (Lynch) cell door to furnish Lynch a meal. While the door of his cell was open, Lynch escaped. Cotton ordered Lynch to return to his cell, but Lynch refused. Rather than attempting to force Lynch back into his cell, Cotton continued with the feeding duties.2 Cotton then opened inmate Tyrone Singletary's (Singletary) cell to provide him with a meal. Singletary absconded from his cell and refused to return.
Lynch and Singletary released other prisoners in the Chesterfield Unit and took Cotton hostage. Cotton testified that during the struggle to capture him, Lynch and Singletary stabbed him with a shank.3
Shortly after Cotton's capture, Dozier, who was delivering meals to the inmates on the north side, noticed Lynch and Singletary. Lynch and Singletary attempted to capture Dozier, but Dozier managed to barricade himself in a room. Lynch and Singletary sought to seize Dozier by breaking the door. Lynch and Singletary threatened to kill Dozier and tried to stab Dozier. However, neither apprehended Dozier.
Cotton described Lynch as the leader of the riot. During the subsequent hours of negotiations with law enforcement, Lynch controlled Cotton. During the confrontation with law enforcement officials, Lynch would repeatedly come to the door of the Chesterfield Unit with Cotton handcuffed to him and demand access to the media. Lynch and Singletary threatened to kill Cotton and Dozier if their demands were not met.
Craig Melvin4 (Melvin), along with other members of the media, covered the riot at Lee Correctional Institution. The media requested an interview with the head of the Corrections Department, John Ozmint (Ozmint). In response, Ozmint obtained the names and cell phone numbers of the members of the media who were present at the riot. Ozmint called Melvin, and as a result of that call, Melvin entered the prison.
Shortly before being interviewed by Melvin, Lynch released Cotton and surrendered. Lynch was charged with two counts of taking a hostage, rioting, assaulting a correctional officer, carrying a weapon by an inmate, and inciting a riot. The jury convicted Lynch on each count. Consequently, Lynch was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the hostage counts, ten years for rioting, five years for assaulting a correctional officer, ten years for carrying a weapon by an inmate, and ten years for inciting a riot. This appeal follows.
In criminal cases, this Court reviews errors of law only. State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001). An appellate court is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Banda, 371 S.C. 245, 251, 639 S.E.2d 36, 39 (2006). Therefore, the trial court's determination of whether a defendant was deprived of his Miranda rights will be upheld unless unsupported by the record. State v. Navy, 370 S.C. 398, 405, 635 S.E.2d 549, 553 (Ct.App.2006) (); see State v. Easler, 322 S.C. 333, 342, 471 S.E.2d 745, 751 (Ct.App.1996) ( ).
Lynch puts forth two arguments on appeal. Shortly after Lynch released Cotton, Melvin interviewed Lynch. During this interview, Lynch made several incriminating statements. Lynch asked the trial court to suppress these statements, arguing Melvin became an agent of the State at the time of the interview. Lynch contended statements made to Melvin were obtained through custodial interrogation initiated by law enforcement officials without Miranda warnings. The trial court denied this motion.
Lynch also objected to the introduction of videos obtained by the Department of Corrections. The videos were taken during and subsequent to the riot. They show, among other things, the negotiations between the inmates and law enforcement officials and the condition of the Chesterfield Unit after the riot. Lynch argued the videos would inflame the passion of the jury and their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. The trial court overruled this objection. We address each argument in turn.
A. The trial court correctly held that Miranda warnings were not required.
The Fifth Amendment provides, "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself".... U.S. Const. amend. V. Based on the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court announced, "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards" .... Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Miranda rights5 attach only if the suspect is subject to custodial interrogation. State v. Kennedy, 325 S.C. 295, 303, 479 S.E.2d 838, 842 (Ct.App.1996).
Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Specifically, interrogation is either express questioning or its functional equivalent. Kennedy, 325 S.C. at 303, 479 S.E.2d at 842. The functional equivalent of an interrogation includes words or action on the part of the police, other than those that normally follow an arrest or custody, that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. State v. Binney, 362 S.C. 353, 359, 608 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2005).
In the present case, Lynch was not subject to custodial interrogation when he spoke with Melvin. Law enforcement officials at the site of the riot did not question Lynch. Rather Lynch demanded, as a condition to release Cotton and as a condition of surrender, access to the media. Melvin was provided to accommodate Lynchs demands. During the interview, Melvin was acting as a private citizen, namely a reporter, and not as an agent of the State. Melvins testimony supports this conclusion.
...
...
(emphasis added).
Melvins testimony demonstrates he was at Lee Correctional Institution covering the riot as a news reporter and not as an agent of the police. Thus, Lynchs statements to Melvin were not the result of a custodial interrogation.
Even if we assumed Melvin acted as an agent of the State at the time he interviewed Lynch, the Miranda warnings would be inapplicable. The Miranda decision is meant to preserve the privilege against self-incrimination during interrogation of a suspect in a police dominated atmosphere. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990). The police dominated atmosphere generates inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. Id. (internal quotations omitted). When an individual speaks to an undercover law enforcement official, Miranda warnings are not required. Id.
Assuming Melvin acted as an agent of the police, Lynch would not have known this. (Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect.). Id. Rather, Lynch would have perceived Melvin as a reporter covering the prison riot. During Lynchs interview, Melvins questions were of the same nature that any reasonable reporter covering a riot would ask. For example, Melvin asked Lynch what occurred inside the Chesterfield Unit, why the riot occurred, and what Lynchs grievances were. If Melvin was operating as a government agent during the interview, he was doing so in an...
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