State v. Macelman
| Decision Date | 02 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002-617.,2002-617. |
| Citation | 834 A.2d 322,149 N.H. 795 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Cory MACELMAN. |
Peter W. Heed, attorney general (Wynn E. Arnold, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
DesMeules, Olmstead & Ostler, of Norwich, Vermont (George H. Ostler on the brief and orally), for the defendant.
The defendant, Cory MacElman, appeals his conviction in the Lebanon District Court (Cirone , J.) for possession of controlled drugs, RSA 318-B:2 (Supp.2002). He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress based upon the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. We affirm.
The following facts were found by the trial court or are evident from the record. On October 4, 2001, at around 8:00 p.m., the Lebanon police department received an anonymous call reporting that "there was a vehicle behind [the defendant's] residence, potentially looking like he was about to go over the embankment" and fall onto Interstate Highway 89. After receiving this report from a dispatcher, Officer Steven St. Louis, along with an officer in training, drove to the defendant's residence to investigate. As they pulled into the driveway of the residence, Officer St. Louis saw the exterior brake or tail lights, and interior dome light, of a car parked in the back yard behind the house, close to a small fence that marked the boundary between the property and the embankment. The officer noted that somebody appeared to be inside the car. The officer's view, however, was obstructed by a tree in front of the car and by darkness.
The officers first tried to alert any residents inside the house by "knocking on the [side] door loudly" and yelling inside the open front door. After receiving no response, the officers approached the car in the backyard. Officer St. Louis testified that his motive was to "find out if there was anybody in the vehicle that needed some assistance, if they were ... about to go over the embankment or not," and "[t]o make sure that [the car's occupants] were safe and didn't need any assistance." He testified that when he reached the back bumper of the car:
At that point, based upon his observation that the occupants were "obviously ... using something that was illegal," the officer approached the car and subsequently arrested the defendant, who was one of the car's occupants.
The State charged the defendant with possession of marijuana and underage possession of cigarettes. The defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized by the officer, arguing that the discovery of the drug evidence was the fruit of an illegal search of the defendant's property. The court, relying upon the "exigent circumstances exception" in State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 409 A.2d 1134 (1979), denied the motion, finding that the officer's entry onto the property was warranted because the situation was "sufficiently urgent and potentially dangerous that he had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand." On appeal, the defendant argues that the totality of the circumstances did not justify the intrusion. State v. Plch, 149 N.H. 608, ----, 826 A.2d 534 (2003).
We first address the defendant's claim under the State Constitution. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). We have held that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a narrowly-drawn exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 234, 471 A.2d 347. The State must prove that the search was validly executed under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Seavey, 147 N.H. 304, 306, 789 A.2d 621 (2001). Throughout their briefs, the parties refer to the "exigent circumstances," the "emergency," the "emergency aid," and the "community caretaking" exceptions as possible justifications for the police intrusion in this case. Before beginning our analysis, we review the meaning of these terms.
The "exigent circumstances" or "emergency" exception requires two elements: probable cause and exigent circumstances. See id. at 307, 789 A.2d 621.
"Exigent circumstances" exist where the police face "a compelling need for immediate official action and a risk that the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant will present a substantial threat of imminent danger to life or public safety." Id. In State v. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 409 A.2d 1134, for example, we held that the police could enter an apartment without a warrant when they believed a sniper was inside. Likewise, in State v. Slade, 116 N.H. 436, 437-38, 362 A.2d 194 (1976), the police were justified in entering the defendant's home following a standoff during which a gunshot was fired, when the police believed "that there might be a victim [inside] in need of immediate assistance." This exception, thus, allows the police to conduct warrantless searches in the course of their law enforcement duties.
The "emergency aid" exception, on the other hand, applies when police officers are performing duties " ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.’ " People v. Ray, 21 Cal.4th 464, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (1999) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S.Ct. 1240, 146 L.Ed.2d 99 (2000) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) ). The exception is part of the "community caretaking" function of the police, involving duties such as "helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and protecting citizens in need." State v. Denoncourt, 149 N.H. 308, 310, 821 A.2d 997 (2003) (quotation omitted).
Other courts have adopted the following standard for applying the emergency aid exception. The State must show: (1) the police have objectively "reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property"; (2) there is an objectively "reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched"; and (3) the search is not "primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence." People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 3178, 49 L.Ed.2d 1191 (1976) ; see also State v. Mountford, 171 Vt. 487, 769 A.2d 639, 643-44 (2000) (adopting Mitchell standard); Com. v. Snell, 428 Mass. 766, 705 N.E.2d 236, 242-43 (1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010, 119 S.Ct. 2351, 144 L.Ed.2d 247 (1999) (same).
Although the trial court found that the "exigent circumstances" exception applied to this case, we conclude that the "emergency aid" exception is a better fit. The intrusion of the police in this case had nothing to do with a suspected violation of any criminal statute. Rather, it stemmed solely from their responsibility to respond to a potentially life-threatening emergency. For this reason, we analyze the police conduct under the three-part Mitchell standard which we adopt today.
The State must first prove that the police had "reasonable grounds" to believe that an emergency existed and that immediate assistance was necessary. Mitchell, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d at 609. " Reasonable grounds" is a lower standard than the probable cause required for an ordinary search or seizure. See State v. McMinn, 144 N.H. 34, 38, 737 A.2d 1093 (1999). The defendant argues that the officers' observations prior to their intrusion did not meet this standard, as they only confirmed that the car was "not in danger of driving over the embankment." Indeed, the defendant states that the police should have left the property after making their observations from the driveway.
While the car may never have been in any actual danger, we cannot agree that it was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances for Officer St. Louis to believe otherwise. An anonymous tip reported that a car was poised to fall over an embankment. The embankment borders Interstate 89, a major highway. The officer's observation of a car poised at the edge of the defendant's property, at an unusual location right by the fence and the embankment, corroborated at least the general reliability of this tip. Both the darkness and the obscured view prevented the police from confirming other signs of distress from the driveway. Presented with these circumstances, we cannot say the officer lacked "reasonable grounds" to believe the reported emergency existed, and to enter the backyard to conduct further investigation. See, e.g. , United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir.1964) ().
The defendant also argues that the officer's failure to immediately check on the condition of the car after arriving at the property belies the claim that he had reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed. Absent any claim of pretext, we attribute no relevance to this fact. The "reasonable grounds" inquiry depends solely on the "empirical facts" available...
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