State v. Machovec

• Decision Date: 06 March 1945
• Docket Number: 46564.
• Citation: 17 N.W.2d 843,236 Iowa 377
• Parties: STATE v. MACHOVEC.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

17 N.W.2d 843

236 Iowa 377

STATE v. MACHOVEC.

No. 46564.

Supreme Court of Iowa

March 6, 1945

Rehearing Denied May 11, 1945.

Breen, Breen & McCormick, of Fort Dodge, for appellant.

John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., Charles H. Scholz, Asst. Atty. Gen and Franklin Jaqua, Co. Atty., of Humboldt, for appellees.

OLIVER Justice.

Defendant Dorn Machovec, who on January 20, 1944, became sixteen years of age, had for several years previously lived on a farm near Renwick, Iowa, with his mother and his stepfather, C. Paul Voss. He was in the tenth grade of the Renwick school.

Defendant killed his stepfather January 8, 1944. Three days later he was apprehended at the residence of his father on a farm near Shelby, Iowa. Thereafter he was charged with first degree murder in a county attorney's information.

February 5 1944, defendant appeared in court with a member of the firm of attorneys who represent him in this appeal. A plea of not guilty was entered and at the suggestion of counsel on both sides the cause was assigned for trial March 20, 1944. The trial was commenced on said date.

Defendant's written confession, in evidence at the trial, recites that he was working in the calf pen in the barn on the Voss farm that he had been hunting and had with him his .22 calibre repeating rifle; that Mr. Voss entered the barn, criticized the work, intermingling his criticism with oaths and vile epithets, and started to climb over the gate to the calf pen; that defendant seized his rifle and shot Voss twice; that Voss fell from the gate and defendant fired a third shot; that defendant then climbed over the gate, stabbed Voss in the head and body with a pitchfork and struck Voss on the side of the head with the stock of the rifle.

The confession states Voss frequently became displeased with defendant's work and on such occasions called defendant vile names but that Voss had never struck defendant or attempted to whip him. A witness testified defendant stated he had considered shooting Voss on a previous occasion but had no ammunition. At the conclusion of the state's evidence two witnesses for defendant were interrogated. One of these witnesses testified Voss treated appellant as any other father might treat a son and that their relationship always seemed to be normal.

During the forenoon of March 23 the trial was adjourned and the question of a plea of guilty was considered in an extended conference in which counsel on both sides and the presiding judge participated. The judge indicated that, upon a plea of guilty, the evidence warranted a determination that the crime was murder in the second degree. That afternoon defendant, in open court, changed his plea from not guilty to guilty and the court determined that the crime was murder in the second degree. The jury was discharged and April 15 was fixed as the date for sentence.

March 24 the court ordered that defendant be examined at the Psychopathic Hospital at the State University of Iowa. The hospital reported no significant physical or mental abnormalities and an intelligence quotient of 117 which is in the bright normal group. Counsel for appellant were advised of the substance of this report and on April 14 examined the report.

On April 15, after hearing several pleas for leniency and a statement by the county attorney, the court informed defendant of the charge, his plea and the finding that the crime was murder in the second degree, and inquired if defendant had any legal excuse why judgment should not be pronounced against him. Defendant answered, 'no'. Thereupon the court orally pronounced judgment sentencing defendant to life imprisonment in the penitentiary. Immediately thereafter, and before the judgment was entered of record, counsel for defendant announced in open court 'Defendant withdraws his plea of guilty, * * * and enters a plea of not guilty.' The court refused to permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn. Defendant has appealed.

I. Section 13905, in chapter 648, Code of Iowa 1939, provides that if at any stage of a criminal trial a reasonable doubt arises as to defendant's sanity, further proceedings must be suspended and a trial had upon that question. Section 13906 provides such trial shall be conducted, so far as may be, as the prosecution would be. Code, sections 13956 and 13957, provide defendant may show he is insane as a legal reason why judgment should not be pronounced and if the court is of the opinion that there is reasonable ground for believing him insane, that question shall be determined as provided in the Code. Appellant predicates error upon the investigation of his mental condition by the Psychopathic Hospital and asserts he was deprived of his right to trial upon the question of his sanity, in the manner provided by the foregoing statutes. State v. Murphy, 205 Iowa 1130, 217 N.W. 225; State v. Tracy, 219 Iowa 1412, 1415, 261 N.W. 527.

A defendant is not entitled to such trial unless, at some stage of the prosecution, a reasonable doubt arises as to his sanity, or the court at the time of pronouncing sentence is of the opinion that there is reasonable ground for believing him insane. Neither during the trial nor at the time judgment was pronounced was there any suggestion in open court or evidence tending to indicate that appellant was insane. It is true that at the conference between the attorneys and the court it was agreed appellant should be sent to the Psychopathic Hospital for examination and report. However, the court advised counsel he had no doubt that appellant was not insane. The examination was held at the request of counsel for appellant, that they might be fully satisfied as to his mental condition and that the court might have the benefit of professional opinion.

We do not understand the examination, findings and report were intended to constitute a trial and adjudication upon the question of sanity, as a substitute for the procedure provided by chapter 648 of the Code. The report did not purport to be an adjudication. It did corroborate the opinion of the court that there was no reasonable doubt of appellant's sanity. Nor is there anything in the record to justify a contrary conclusion. Hence appellant was not entitled to a trial upon the question of his sanity. State v. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479; State v. Neubauer, 145 Iowa 337, 341, 124 N.W. 312.

II. Appellant contends the court erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty and substitute a plea of not guilty. It will be remembered he sought to do this after judgment had been pronounced but before the same had been entered in the record book. Section 13803, Code of 1939, provides:

'Withdrawal of plea of guilty. At any time before judgment, the court may permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and other plea or pleas substituted.'

We have heretofore held this statute and identical provisions of former statutes give to a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty at any time before judgment is entered in the record book. State v. Kraft, 10 Iowa 330; State v. Oehlshlager, 38 Iowa 297; State v. Hale, 44 Iowa 96; State v. Farlee, 74 Iowa 451, 38 N.W. 155; State v. Hortman, 122 Iowa 104, 106, 97 N.W. 981; State v. Henderson, 197 Iowa 782, 787, 198 N.W. 33; State v. Wieland, 217 Iowa 887, 251 N.W. 757; State v. Kellison, 232 Iowa 9, 4 N.W.2d 239.

State v. Kraft, supra, refers to the statute, and, without discussion, holds it secures to the defendant the right to withdraw a plea of guilty. The subsequent decisions have, in general, followed the Kraft case without making reference to the question of statutory construction necessarily involved in such cases. In State v. Farlee, supra, it appears that the court felt obliged to follow the prior decisions 'whatever our views may be if this were an original question.' [74 Iowa 451, 38 N.W. 156] State v. Hortman, supra, is the only case in which the interpretation of the statute is discussed. It is there stated that in order to construe the statute as granting a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty 'it is necessary, of course, to give the word 'may,' as it appears in the statute a meaning equivalent to the meaning of the word 'must,' in its ordinary acceptation. * * * Whatever might be the view taken by the court, as now constituted, if the question were one of first impression, we think we are fully committed to the construction [of section 5337 (now sec. 13803)] as contended for by appellant, and that the doctrine of stare decisis must be held to apply.' [122 Iowa 104, 97 N.W. 982]

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