State v. Tracy

Decision Date21 June 1935
Docket Number42952.
Citation261 N.W. 527,219 Iowa 1412
PartiesSTATE v. TRACY.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from District Court, Delaware County; A. B. Lovejoy, Judge.

The defendant was charged with the crime of murder. To this charge he entered a plea of guilty, and, after hearing the evidence, the court determined that he was guilty of murder in the first degree, and sentenced him to be hanged as provided by law. From the judgment so entered, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Imposition of death sentence on plea of guilty of murder after hearing evidence, revealing cool, calculated, and premeditated killing of defendant's wife, with malice aforethought pursuant to deliberate plan of defendant and his paramour held not abuse of trial court's discretion. Code 1931, § 12913.

Bronson & Ellis, of Manchester, and Don Barnes, of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Edward L. O'Connor, Atty. Gen., Walter F. Maley, Asst. Atty Gen., Harlan J. Williamson, Co. Atty., and Melvin J. Yoran, Sp. Asst. Co. Atty., both of Manchester, for the State.

KINTZINGER, Justice.

The defendant, a married man, 53 years of age, was charged with the murder of his wife on the 3d day of October, 1934.

On the 18th day of October, 1934, the defendant, after having been duly arraigned and being present in court and represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty as charged. Thereupon the court, in compliance with section 12913 of the Code, fixed Tuesday, October 23, 1934, as the time for the hearing of evidence before imposing sentence. After hearing the evidence, the court, on October 25, 1934, determined that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree, entered judgment upon his plea of guilt, and sentenced him to death as provided by law. From the judgment defendant appeals. The evidence submitted to the court disclosed substantially the following facts:

Defendant and the deceased were man and wife, and had been married and lived together a number of years until Mrs. Tracy was shot to death on October 3, 1934. About 2 years prior to the shooting, defendant met and became enamored with a Mrs. Flossie Fear, a married woman of loose character. For about a year prior to the shooting he and Mrs. Fear had frequent meetings, and during that time planned the death of Mrs. Tracy. In January, 1934, they had arranged to kill her by means of a faked automobile accident, which failed. Soon afterwards another attempt to kill her was made by pushing an automobile in which she was riding over a bluff. This also failed, because the car caught on the edge of a bluff and failed to go over. Later they again planned her death, but this plan also failed. Finally in September, 1934, the defendant and Mrs. Fear completed arrangements to hire a man to fake a holdup and kill Mrs. Tracy while Mr. and Mrs. Tracy were returning to Manchester in their automobile. The man hired to do the killing was to receive $1,000, $200 of which was to be paid in advance. Tracy gave Mrs. Fear $200 to make the advance payment. Pursuant to the plan agreed on, this party held up the Tracy car on October 3, 1934, shot Mrs. Tracy in the back, and struck Mr. Tracy over the head with a revolver to give the appearance of a holdup. Mrs. Tracy died within an hour as a result of the shooting.

The evidence also shows that up until the time Mr. Tracy became involved with Mrs. Fear he had been a man of good moral character. One of his character witnesses was Dr. B. H. Byers, a physician, of Manchester, Iowa. He testified that he had known the defendant for over 20 years, and that during all of that time he had been a man of good moral character. Other witnesses testified to the same effect, but not one of them, including the doctor, said they ever noticed that defendant was afflicted with any mental disturbances. Mrs. Flossie Fear, with whom the defendant planned the death of his wife, was also charged with the crime of murder, and also entered a plea of guilty. After hearing the evidence, the court determined and found that the defendant and Flossie Fear were each guilty of murder in the first degree.

Thereafter, on October 25, 1934, the court entered judgment in the case against the defendant, Tracy, sentencing him to be hanged according to law. The judgment entered against Mrs. Fear was that she be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for life.

On October 25, 1934, the defendant Tracy appeared in court with his counsel, and at that time the court entered the judgment imposing sentence of death. Thereafter, on October 27, 1934, the defendant filed exceptions to the sentence, filed a motion to set it aside, and filed an application to produce additional and newly discovered evidence in mitigation and reduction of the sentence imposed.

As grounds for these applications, defendant offered to show that, before pleading guilty, his attorney had consulted one or more doctors with reference to the defendant's mental and physical condition, and was advised by such doctors that they could not help the defendant, and that he ought to plead guilty; that after the sentence was imposed, they expressed surprise at the extreme penalty imposed, and told defendant's counsel he should not have received more than a life sentence because of his mental condition resulting from prostatic trouble; that, because of the severe penalty imposed, they would testify that he was suffering from prostatic trouble, which affected him mentally to such an extent as to make him irresponsible for the crime committed. The defendant's counsel offered to make this showing by affidavit of medical experts. The court accepted the professional statement of defendant's attorney in lieu of affidavits, and gave it the same consideration and effect as if so made.

The state resisted these applications by a countershowing that the defendant and his attorney, prior to the arraignment and plea of guilty, had knowledge of the prostatic trouble complained of; that a few days prior to the arraignment there was a conference between counsel on both sides with reference to defendant's entering a plea; that at that time defendant's counsel expressed a desire to have defendant examined before entering his plea, and the case was then postponed until October 18, 1934, to enable defendant to make any arrangements he saw fit. The State's resistance also shows that before the plea was entered, Dr. Stewart, of Independence, and Dr. Jones, of Manchester, made an examination of defendant at his counsel's request. On October 18, 1934, and after the examination was made, defendant appeared in court with his counsel, and pleaded guilty to the crime charged.

I. Appellant claims the court erred in not granting a new trial for the purpose of receiving evidence of defendant's mental condition. Section 13905 of the Code provides that: " If a defendant appears in any stage of the trial of a criminal prosecution, and a reasonable doubt arises as to his sanity, further proceeding must be suspended and a trial had upon that question."

The question of defendant's insanity was never raised during the trial. It is now claimed that, if a new trial is granted, the defendant would be able to show that he was mentally incompetent to commit the crime charged. This request was not made until after the trial was finished and judgment had been entered. The statute permitting a suspension of the trial for an examination of a defendant's sanity contain no provisions for a suspension of proceeding after conviction, except in prosecution for misdemeanors. Code, § 13909. It is our conclusion that, in order to suspend proceedings in a criminal prosecution for murder, the question of insanity must be raised before the end of the trial. State v. Cooper, 169 Iowa, 571, 151 N.W. 835.

If the motion to set aside the judgment be considered in the nature of an application to withdraw the plea of guilt, it may be said that the rule is well settled that a plea of guilty cannot be withdrawn after judgment has been entered. State v. Harper (Iowa) 258 N.W. 886, 887, loc. cit. 891. Nor do we find the offer of any newly discovered evidence that was not available to the defendant before the judgment on the plea of guilty was entered. Under such circumstances it is not a ground for a new trial. State v. King 97 Iowa, 440, 66 N.W. 735.It is also the well-settled rule of law in this state that newly discovered evidence is not a statutory ground for a new trial in a criminal case. State v. Dimmitt, 88 Iowa, 551, 55 N.W. 531; State v. Harris, 97 Iowa, 407, 66 N.W. 728; State v. King, 97 Iowa, 440, 66 N.W. 735; State v. Cater, 100 Iowa, 501, 69 N.W. 880; State v. Watson, 102 Iowa, 651, 72 N.W. 283; State v. Pell, 140 Iowa, 655, 119 N.W. 154; State v. Pavey, 193 Iowa, 985, loc. cit. 991, 188 N.W. 593.

II. Appellant also claims that the court erred in entering the extreme penalty, instead of imposing sentence for life, and that this court should reduce the sentence to that of life imprisonment. The entering of a judgment on a plea of guilty and the imposing of a sentence thereunder in this kind of an action are peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court. This court cannot interfere with that discretion, unless it clearly appears that it has been abused. State v. Freeman, 27 Iowa, 333; State v. Allen, 32 Iowa, 248; State v. Wilmoth, 63 Iowa, 380, 19 N.W. 249; State v. Pavey, 193 Iowa, 985, 188 N.W. 593; State v. Olander, 193 Iowa, 1379, 186 N.W. 53, 29 A.L.R. 306; State v. Griffin and Brewer (Iowa) 254 N.W. 841.

After the plea of guilty was entered, the court heard evidence for the purpose of determining the degree of guilt, and the penalty to be inflicted, as required by section 12913 of the Code. His guilt of homicide was fixed by his own plea of guilty. From the evidence it appears that,...

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