State v. MacMaster
| Decision Date | 14 September 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 55195-2,55195-2 |
| Citation | 113 Wn.2d 226,778 P.2d 1037 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael S. MacMASTER, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Paul Klasen, Grant County Prosecutor, Ephrata, for respondent.
Defendant seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals decision affirming his conviction for vehicular homicide, contending the jury instruction failed to require a causal connection between his drinking and the fatal accident. In order to support a conviction under the vehicular homicide statute, we are asked whether there must be a causal link between a defendant's drinking and a victim's death and, if so, whether the jury instruction in this case was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. We adhere to our consistent application of the rule that a causal connection is required and, accordingly, reverse the Court of Appeals.
It is undisputed that on April 22, 1985, at approximately 7:50 in the evening, while traveling eastbound on State Route ("SR") 170, defendant's vehicle struck and killed Rhonda Raber. Immediately prior to the accident, Eli Raber's 1974 Datsun sat disabled and parked on the eastbound side of SR 170, facing east. Rhonda Raber, his wife, was standing at the left rear corner of the Datsun retrieving articles from the rear of the vehicle. Also parked on the eastbound shoulder was a 1979 Oldsmobile driven by Irene Daggy. She, however, had parked 17 feet east of the Raber vehicle facing west, with her headlights illuminating the Raber vehicle and facing oncoming traffic.
Disputed in this case is (1) the speed of defendant's automobile at the time of the accident; (2) the extent to which, if at all, the parked vehicles protruded into the lane of travel; (3) the angle at which the Oldsmobile's headlights confronted oncoming traffic; (4) whether the Raber vehicle was displaying any lights while it sat disabled; (5) the amount of alcoholic beverages consumed by the defendant; and (6) the accuracy of the gas chromatography reading of defendant's blood/alcohol level. In essence, the factual dispute is: what was the proximate cause of the accident that resulted in Mrs. Raber's death?
State evidence placed defendant's blood/alcohol level at .13. Expert testimony, based upon the extent of damage to the vehicles, placed defendant's speed immediately prior to the accident at anywhere from 65 to 80 m.p.h. in a maximum 55-m.p.h. zone. The State also contended there was no evidence supporting a conclusion that the parked vehicles protruded over the fog line.
Expert evidence offered by the defendant, based upon mathematical computation, placed his vehicle's speed at a maximum of 56.7 m.p.h. and a minimum speed of 40 m.p.h. immediately preceding the accident. In addition, numerous witnesses established that between 4 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. on that day, defendant had consumed one can of low alcohol beer, a burrito, two and one-third 10-ounce glasses of beer and two tuna Defendant testified that as he traveled east along SR 170 that evening, it was dark and had just started to rain. He saw what was actually the front right headlight of the Daggy vehicle appear in his lane of travel, and he assumed that the vehicle was a "one-eyed bandit" displaying only its front left headlight while passing another automobile. Defendant testified that he down-shifted and pulled onto the right hand shoulder so as to allow the passing vehicle more room to pass. He next remembers waking in the hospital the following morning. Defendant contends that as a result of the blinding effect of the Daggy headlight, and the lack of light on the Rabers' Datsun, he never saw Rhonda Raber nor the Raber vehicle.
fish sandwiches, and that immediately preceding the accident he exhibited no indication of being affected by alcohol. Both expert and eyewitness evidence offered by defendant placed the Raber and Daggy vehicles over the fog line and parked in the lane of oncoming traffic by as much as 1 foot
Defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide by a jury that was instructed as follows:
To convict the defendant of the crime of vehicular homicide, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1985, the defendant operated a motor vehicle (2) That at the time, the defendant:
(a) operated the motor vehicle and was under the influence of, or affected by intoxicating liquor, and thereby proximately caused injury to Rhonda Raber, or
(b) operated the motor vehicle in a reckless manner and thereby proximately caused injury to Rhonda Raber, or
(c) operated the motor vehicle with disregard for the safety of others and thereby proximately caused injury to Rhonda Raber;
(3) That Rhonda Raber died as a proximate result of the injuries; and
(4) That the injury occurred in Grant County, Washington.
Instruction 5. Defendant took timely exception to this instruction. In its place, defendant proposed an instruction which stated in part:
(2) That at that time the defendant
(a) was under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor and that condition caused the Defendant to operate his vehicle in such a manner as to proximately cause injury to another person ...
(Italics ours.) In denying the giving of this instruction, the trial court stated:
The fact that the legislature has said, in my view, that if you drive over, with a blood alcohol of over .10, there is an accident and as a result of that driving an accident the death ensues as a proximate cause thereof, then the Defendant is guilty of the crime. That's a change in what the history of the legislature and legislation has been and a change in the interpretation of the cases. It changed at the time that we went to the rule that over .10 you're guilty of driving while under the influence. It doesn't matter about the nature of the driving. That's what has been taken out. We don't have the question of negligent driving or reckless driving; it's assumed by the law, the legislature, that you are affected and contributed to the accident, I guess. I don't like this law, by the way, but I think it is the law.
(Italics ours.) Following this improper ruling, defendant took timely exception to the court's failure to give his proposed instruction regarding causation. Nevertheless, as defense counsel stated at oral argument, he knew exactly where the trial court stood following this ruling.
The vehicular homicide statute, standing alone, understandably creates confusion:
(1) When the death of any person ensues within three years as a proximate result of injury proximately caused by the driving of any vehicle by any person while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502, or by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner or with disregard for the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle is guilty of vehicular homicide.
(Italics ours.) RCW 46.61.520. The statute was in this form at the time of the accident, having been last amended in 1983. 1 A literal reading of the statute would not require that the influence of intoxicating liquor on the defendant be a proximate cause of the ensuing death. Nevertheless, to avoid a "strict liability" result, this court and the Court of Appeals have engrafted on the statute, and have consistently held, that impairment due to alcohol must be a proximate cause of the fatal accident. State v. Engstrom, 79 Wash.2d 469, 475, 487 P.2d 205 (1971); State v. Giedd, 43 Wash.App. 787, 719 P.2d 946 (1986); State v. Gantt, 38 Wash.App. 357, 684 P.2d 1385 (1984); State v. Orsborn, 28 Wash.App. 111, 626 P.2d 980 (1980), review denied, 97 Wash.2d 1012 (1982); State v. Fateley, 18 Wash.App. 99, 566 P.2d 959 (1977); State v. Mearns, 7 Wash.App. 818, 502 P.2d 1228 (1972), review denied, 81 Wash.2d 1011 (1973).
In Mearns, the court reversed the conviction based on the following jury instruction that required no causal connection between impairment due to alcohol and the fatal accident:
To convict the defendant of the crime of negligent homicide ... the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
. . . . .
(2) That the defendant then operated this motor vehicle while under the influence of, or affected by intoxicating liquor; and
(3) That the operation of the motor vehicle by defendant was the proximate cause of the injury ...
Mearns, 7 Wash.App. at 819, 502 P.2d 1228. In contrast, an instruction in Orsborn stating, "at that time, the defendant (a) was under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor and that condition was a proximate cause of injury to another person" was upheld as properly stating the law. Orsborn, 28 Wash.App. at 115 n. 2, 626 P.2d 980. Unfortunately, the jury instruction in this case ambiguously defines the offense and falls somewhere in between these two examples, because it does not specifically require a causal connection between the defendant's alcohol consumption and the victim's death.
The ambiguity in this instruction was made crystal clear, at least to counsel, when the trial court erroneously ruled that the Legislature intended to abolish the judicially engrafted causation requirement when it enacted the 1983 amendments to the vehicular homicide statute. Absolutely nothing in the amendment supports such a conclusion, however. A comparison of the pre-1983 and post-1983 statutes evinces no intention on the Legislature's part to alter the causation requirement. In fact, cases after the 1983 amendment have continued to require such a causal connection. See State v. Brobak, 47 Wash.App. 488, 736 P.2d 288, review denied, 108 Wash.2d 1034 (1987); State v. Knowles, 46 Wash.App. 426, 730 P.2d 738 (1986). In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals recognized the trial court error and held that such a causal requirement still exists under the amended version of the statute. State...
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