State v. Maddox

• Decision Date: 16 March 2022
• Docket Number: 2020-1266
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MADDOX, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

168 Ohio St.3d 292

198 N.E.3d 797

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.MADDOX, Appellant.

No. 2020-1266

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 29, 2021

Decided March 16, 2022.

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alyssa Breyman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, Ronald J. Mayle, Fremont, and Benjamin G. Padanilam, for appellant.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Diane R. Brey, Deputy Solicitor General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Craig Jaquith, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender.

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Krista M. Gieske, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Law Office of the Hamilton County Public Defender.

Anzelmo Law and James A. Anzelmo, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae Anzelmo Law.

Stewart, J. {¶ 1} In this certified-conflict case, we are asked to decide whether a criminal defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 2967.271 —which is a part of the "Reagan Tokes Law" and allows the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("DRC") to administratively extend an incarcerated person's prison term beyond his or her minimum prison term or presumptive earned early-release date but not beyond his or her maximum prison term—is ripe for review on the defendant's direct appeal of his or her conviction and prison sentence. We hold that it is. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals and remand the matter to that court for it to consider whether the challenged provisions are constitutional.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On September 30, 2019, appellant, Edward Maddox, entered guilty pleas pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), to two counts of attempted burglary in violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) and (D), felonies of the third degree, and one count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) and (D), a felony of the second degree. The trial court sentenced Maddox pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law to 12-month definite prison terms for each of the attempted-burglary counts and an indefinite prison term of four to six years for the burglary count. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

{¶ 3} Maddox appealed his convictions to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, asserting, among other alleged errors, that it "was plain error for the trial court to impose [a] sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law because its provisions are unconstitutional nullities." 2020-Ohio-4702, 2020 WL 5834857, ¶ 4. Specifically, he argued that the sections of the statute that allow DRC to extend his prison term beyond the presumptive minimum term violate the United States and Ohio Constitutions, including the requirement of separation of powers and his rights to a trial by jury and due process of law. Id. at ¶ 5.

{¶ 4} Effective March 22, 2019, the Reagan Tokes Law established indefinite-sentencing provisions for people convicted of non-life-sentence felony offenses of the first or second degree. Under R.C. 2967.271(B) through (D), there is a presumption that the offender will be released on the expiration of his or her minimum prison term or earned early-release date, but the statute enables DRC to rebut the presumption and keep the offender incarcerated up to the expiration of his or her maximum prison term.

{¶ 5} The court of appeals did not reach the merits of Maddox's constitutional challenge, holding that the issue is not ripe for review because Maddox has not yet been subjected to a prison term exceeding his minimum prison term. 2020-Ohio-4702 at ¶ 11. Instead, the court held that the appropriate method for Maddox to challenge the constitutionality of the presumptive-release sections of the law is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus if he is not released upon the expiration of his four-year minimum term. Id. at ¶ 12.

{¶ 6} Maddox filed in the Sixth District a motion to certify a conflict regarding the ripeness issue, asserting that the court of appeals’ judgment is in conflict with the judgments in State v. Leet , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28670, 2020-Ohio-4592, 2020 WL 5743293 ; State v. Ferguson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153, 2020 WL 4919694 ; State v. Barnes , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28613, 2020-Ohio-4150, 2020 WL 4919780 ; and State v. Guyton , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-203, 2020-Ohio-3837, 2020 WL 4279793. The court of appeals granted the motion and certified a conflict on the following issue of law:

Is the constitutionality of the provisions of the Reagan Tokes [Law], which allow the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction[ ] to administratively extend a criminal defendant's prison term beyond the presumptive minimum term, ripe for review on direct appeal from sentencing, or only after the defendant has served the minimum term and been subject to extension by application of the [law]?

We determined that a conflict exists and agreed to review the certified question. 160 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2020-Ohio-6913, 159 N.E.3d 1150.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 7} "In order to be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for review." Keller v. Columbus , 100 Ohio St.3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599, 797 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 26 ; see also Pack v. Cleveland , 1 Ohio St.3d 129, 438 N.E.2d 434 (1982), paragraph one of the syllabus. Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that "[t]he courts of common pleas * * * shall have original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as provided by law," and this court has stated that "it is the duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts and to render judgments which can be carried into effect," Fortner v. Thomas , 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970). " ‘The basic principle of ripeness may be derived from the conclusion that "judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which are real or present and imminent, not squandered on problems which are abstract or hypothetical or remote." ’ " State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm. , 82 Ohio St.3d 88, 89, 694 N.E.2d 459 (1998), quoting Comment , Mootness and Ripeness: The Postman Always Rings Twice , 65 Colum.L.Rev. 867, 876 (1965), quoting Davis, Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review , 68 Harv.L.Rev. 1122, 1122 (1955).

{¶ 8} Ripeness is distinct from standing, but both doctrines require that "an injury in fact be certainly impending." Natl. Treasury Emps. Union v. United States , 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C.Cir.1996). "[I]f a threatened injury is sufficiently ‘imminent’ to establish standing, the constitutional requirements of the ripeness doctrine will necessarily be satisfied." Id. at 1428. Then, "only the prudential justiciability concerns of ripeness can act to bar consideration of the claim." Id. The prudential-justiciability concerns include (1) whether the claim is fit for judicial decision and (2) whether withholding court consideration will cause hardship to the parties. Hill v. Snyder , 878 F.3d 193, 213 (6th Cir.2017), citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 149, 153, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), abrogated in part on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). The first prong of the prudential-justiciability question is met when "[t]he issue presented in th[e] case is purely legal, and will not be clarified by further factual development." Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co. , 473 U.S. 568, 581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985).

{¶ 9} Maddox argues that his constitutional challenge is ripe on direct appeal of his convictions and prison sentence because he has been sentenced under a statute that he has claimed violates the separation-of-powers requirement of the Ohio Constitution and his rights to a trial by jury and due process of law under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their parallel Ohio provisions. He also asserts that the potential maximum punishment for an offense influences pretrial practice, plea bargaining, and the decision whether to go to trial.

{¶ 10} R.C. 2967.271 provides, in part:

(B) When an offender is sentenced to a non-life felony indefinite prison term, there shall be a presumption that the person shall be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender's minimum prison term or on the offender's presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier.

(C) The presumption established under division (B) of this section is a rebuttable presumption that the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut as provided in this division. Unless the department rebuts the presumption, the offender shall be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender's minimum prison term or on the offender's presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier. The department may rebut the presumption only if the department determines, at a hearing, that one or more of the following applies:

(1) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is classified at the time of the hearing, both of the following apply:

(a) During the offender's incarceration, the offender committed institutional rule infractions that involved compromising the security of a state correctional institution, compromising the safety of the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or physical harm or the threat of physical harm to the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or committed a violation of law that was not prosecuted, and the infractions or violations demonstrate that the offender has not been rehabilitated.

(b) The

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