State v. Maharras
| Decision Date | 05 April 1929 |
| Docket Number | 38700 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. MARIE MAHARRAS, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Black Hawk District Court.--GEORGE W. WOOD, Judge.
Trial on indictment accusing the defendant of the crime of murder. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. The special defense upon the trial was insanity. The defendant, upon the close of plaintiff's case, and also upon the conclusion of all the evidence, moved for a directed verdict. Both motions were overruled. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. Thereafter, defendant moved for a new trial, which was overruled. The trial court entered judgment upon the verdict, and by the terms thereof, the defendant was committed to the Women's Reformatory at Rockwell City for a period of 25 years. The defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
J. C Murtagh and Sullivan & Sullivan, for appellant.
John Fletcher, Attorney-general, Neill Garrett, Assistant Attorney-general, and Frank W. Edwards, County Attorney, for appellee.
DE GRAFF, J.
On the morning of August 7, 1924, the defendant, Marie Maharras, threw, or caused to be thrown, her six-year-old stepson into the Cedar River, resulting in the death of the boy by drowning. There can be no question about this. The facts prove it, and the defendant admitted the commission of the act, although, at the particular moment after committing the act, she did not stop to learn whether the boy was drowned or not. She immediately went to her sister's home, and told her sister what she had done. The sister immediately notified the police officers, who went to the scene; and at that time defendant stated to the officers that she intended to push the boy into the water, and that she intended to drown him. She also took the officers to the place where the act was committed. She said she realized what she was doing, and knew that it was a crime and a violation of the law, and expected the officers to come to get her, and expected that the State would hang her for committing the act. The evidence also shows that she had a motive for committing the act, as she disliked the boy and considered that he was a source of trouble to her and always in the way.
Upon the trial of this case, there were called on behalf of the defendant certain psychiatrists and psychologists, in an attempt to prove the fact of her insanity. One expert said, upon his first examination, that he thought she was a feeble-minded person; but upon a later examination, he admitted his mistake, and said she was not feeble-minded, for the reason that, "Once feeble-minded, always feeble-minded." These experts classified her as a high-grade moron, a middle-grade moron; and another, that she was a type known as a maniac depressive psychosis. There was evidence offered on behalf of the State that she was a sane person. This presented a fact question, and the jury decided that she was sane; and we are not inclined to disturb this finding, under the evidence. The psychologists and sociologists may study the underlying causes of crime; the psychiatrists may offer their theories in penology, and attempt to answer the question, "How can society be better protected from antisocial and criminal persons who disturb the peace and harmony of society?" What they offer is mere theory, based, of course, upon their experience and study of the subject of mental abnormality; but when any one of them is called as a witness, he usually makes answer to a hypothetical question. We have not reached the point in the administration of the criminal law that we can adopt the theory of the eminent Clarence Darrow, wherein he denies the right to punish, and asserts the utter futility of punishment of the criminal. Under his philosophy, a criminal is a mere "chip on the wave"--the impotent victim of economic determinism. Under such doctrine, the State is subordinated to the individual, which is not the fundamental principle of criminal law, or of its administration.
We are not to be understood that we disregard the dictates of humanity and its merciful tendencies to protect the "insane." The result of the forces and of the facts offered in support thereof, as in the instant case, is simply that great care must be taken to maintain and preserve law and order, to the end that human life shall be made safe. This court, speaking through Kindig, Justice, said, in State v. Buck, 205 Iowa 1028, 1, 219 N.W. 17. c. 1039:
That rule simply means that the jury should be told, in substance, that, if the defendant's act in taking the life of a person was caused by mental disease or unsoundness which would dethrone his reason and judgment with respect to that act, thereby destroying his power rationally to comprehend the nature and consequences of that act,--that is, his ability to know and distinguish right from wrong,--then he is not amenable to punishment. On the other hand, if the jury believe, from all the evidence and circumstances, that the defendant was in possession of a rational intellect and sound mind, but allowed his passions to escape control, then he cannot claim for such act protection on a plea of insanity.
It is elementary that, when insanity is urged as a defense, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to establish, by preponderance of evidence, his or her insanity at the time of the killing. State v. Thiele, 119 Iowa 659, 94 N.W 256. It is also fundamental that insanity is a question of fact, to be determined by the jury, under the rules of law, and as found in the precedents of the particular jurisdiction. As bearing on this proposition, see State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67; State v. Wegener, 180 Iowa 102, 162 N.W. 1040; State v. Cooper, 195 Iowa 258, 191 N.W. 891; State v. Murphy, 205 Iowa 1130, 217 N.W....
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