State v. Maldonado-Arreaga, No. A08-1750.
| Decision Date | 15 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-1750. |
| Citation | 772 N.W.2d 74 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Iris Janeth MALDONADO-ARREAGA, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Boyd Beccue, Kandiyohi County Attorney, John Kallestad, Assistant County Attorney, Willmar, MN, for respondent.
Marie Wolf, Interim Chief Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, Presiding Judge; STAUBER, Judge; and MUEHLBERG, Judge.
Appellant challenges her convictions of aggravated forgery and identity theft, arguing that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress (1) biographical information she provided federal immigration and customs enforcement (ICE) agents subsequent to a warrantless raid of her home, a warrantless detention, and non-Mirandized custodial interrogation; and (2) additional evidence that a Willmar police detective acquired in an investigation following receipt of the information from ICE. Because the district court erred in concluding that the biographical evidence was not subject to the exclusionary rule, we reverse.
In April 2007, at approximately 5:30 a.m., ICE agents knocked on the door of appellant Iris Janeth Maldonado-Arreaga's home in search of persons in the country illegally. The agents entered appellant's home without permission, exigency, or a search warrant. Appellant testified that: as she opened the door, armed agents pushed their way in and began searching the residence; waking three of her children, she was handcuffed on her bed next to her nursing baby, who was sleeping; she was questioned as to the whereabouts of her twenty-year-old son; she was forced to drive the agents to her son's residence using her car; and, after returning to her residence, she was questioned as to her identity. Without being provided a Miranda warning, appellant informed the agents of her name, address, and birth date. She provided other information, including that (1) she is a citizen of Honduras; (2) she was an employee of Jennie-O; (3) she had used the alias Sonia Reyes Acosta; and (4) she paid a smuggler $6,000 to obtain entry into the United States. The agents filled out a standard ICE I-213 form containing this information.
Later, ICE provided a copy of the form to a Willmar police detective. Based solely on the information on the form, the detective contacted Jennie-O and the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) and learned that appellant used the alias on her employment application, I-9 employment-eligibility form, and her IRS W-4 form and to obtain a social security card and driver's license. Appellant was charged with a number of offenses related to using the alias.
After appellant moved to suppress the information found in the I-213 form and obtained from Jennie-O and DPS, the district court determined that the warrantless raid and detention and non-Mirandized custodial interrogation which led to the information on the form were unconstitutional for the purposes of criminal prosecution. Even so, because most of the information on the I-213 form was biographical, the district court held that it could not suppress the information under an exception to the Miranda requirement and denied appellant's motion.1 The district court's memorandum accompanying its order makes clear that the district court based its decision exclusively on Minnesota case law pertaining to the Fifth Amendment and not on cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment or other post-Miranda decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Appellant waived her jury trial rights, and the parties agreed to submit the prosecutor's evidence to the district court in a stipulated-evidence trial as provided by Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. After the district court considered the stipulated evidence, it found appellant guilty of aggravated forgery and identity theft. The district court sentenced her to 90 days in jail for the theft, stayed imposition of a sentence for the forgery charge, and placed her on probation for five years. This appeal follows.
I. Did the district court err in determining that, in a criminal case, the exclusionary rule does not apply to biographical information?
II. Should the information obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional rights be suppressed?
III. Should the evidence obtained by the Willmar detective, including the evidence obtained from Jennie-O and DPS, be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree?
The first issue is whether the district court erred in determining that the exclusionary rule does not apply to biographical information in a criminal case. There is no dispute that, in a criminal law context, the ICE agents' search, seizure, and interrogation of appellant were unconstitutional. The parties' dispute is whether the type of information on the I-213 form is subject to the exclusionary rule.
The United States and Minnesota constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures and protect persons from compelled self-incrimination. U.S. Const. Amends. IV, V; Minn. Const. art. I, §§ 7, 10. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence seized in violation of the constitution generally must be suppressed. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178 (Minn.2007). Whether the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission of evidence in a particular case is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359 (Minn.2004). When reviewing a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in not suppressing the evidence. Id.
In its memorandum, the district court concluded that biographical information cannot be suppressed, even when the information is obtained after an unlawful search, seizure, and interrogation. In support of its conclusion, the district court cited State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.1977); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102 (Minn.1979); and State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704 (Minn.1990). These cases pertain exclusively to facts involving the relationship between the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by Miranda2 and post-arrest booking questions.
In Widell, the supreme court was asked to determine whether "routine booking questions relating to name and address or similar matters must be preceded by a Miranda warning." 258 N.W.2d at 797. The court stated that "`booking questions have value to the criminal process independent of any tendency to uncover admissions' and that `police have a legitimate interest in orderly records identifying the names, addresses, and places of employment of those arrested.'" Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 295 Minn. 65, 69, 203 N.W.2d 348, 351 (1972)). It held that "Miranda warnings need not be given before asking routine booking questions." Id.
Two years later in Link, after the defendant was lawfully arrested and administered a Miranda warning, she told the arresting officer that she did not want to talk. 289 N.W.2d at 107. At the police station, she was asked "biographical questions and innocuous questions about the care of her baby and about a black Cadillac circling the police car." Id. The defendant challenged the propriety of the questioning under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 106. The court, relying exclusively on Widell, stated that the questioning after the Miranda warning was not unconstitutional because "[b]iographical questions are not proscribed by Miranda" and because "[q]uestions about the baby and [the car] had nothing to do with investigating criminal activity, but were necessary to safely taking Link and her child into custody." Id. at 107.
In Hale, the defendant, while being booked and before receiving a Miranda warning, responded to a "routine booking question" about a cut on his finger by explaining that he "got bit." 453 N.W.2d at 706-07. The defendant argued that his answer should be suppressed because he was not issued a Miranda warning before making the statement. Id. at 707. The supreme court rejected his argument and, relying on Widell and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), stated that "[r]outine booking questions are exempt from Miranda requirements." Id.
After our review, it is clear that Widell, Link, and Hale do not support the district court's broad legal conclusion because in regard to the Fourth Amendment, they are inapposite. These cases do not even purport to pertain to the Fourth Amendment's search-and-seizure concerns, do not discuss the exclusionary rule as it pertains to the Fourth Amendment, and do not state holdings that apply to biographical information provided after an illegal search and seizure. Instead they address routine booking questions — questions not intended or expected to produce incriminating admissions — at a police station following a lawful detention, the value of which is orderly recordkeeping. In striking contrast, appellant was interrogated while handcuffed in her home after a warrantless raid by federal agents, agents who clearly intended to uncover incriminating evidence from appellant about her status as a legal resident. The district court's application of this case law to appellant's case is erroneous.
To resolve this issue, it is helpful to address INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984). In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court reviewed two deportation cases that took place following unlawful arrests. One appellant challenged an immigration court's jurisdiction over his person, but did not object to the admission of evidence offered against him. 468 U.S. at 1040, 104 S.Ct. at 3484. In contrast, the other appellant did not object to jurisdiction, but rather to the evidence offered against him. Id. In the jurisdictional challenge, the Court said that the "`body' or identity of a defendant or res...
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