State v. West
| Decision Date | 30 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-0614 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Terry Lee West, Appellant |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
Polk County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney, Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)
Rich Kenly, Backus, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Stauber, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his perjury conviction, arguing that (1) the district court admitted statements taken in violation of his Miranda rights; (2) the district court admitted involuntary statements; (3) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to disqualify the presiding judge; and (4) the district court committed plain error by failing to suppress evidence that violated his right to confrontation. We affirm.
In May 2011, police arranged a controlled-buy between an informant and appellant Terry Lee West. Police equipped the informant with video and audio recording devices. Police followed the informant to West's property and watched as the informant turned into West's driveway. After the buy, police followed the informant to a pre-determined location where the informant handed over 54.2 grams of marijuana. The video of the controlled-buy shows West reach into a bin and pull out a green substance that appears to be marijuana.
On June 1, 2011, police executed a search warrant for West's property. When police arrived, they had their guns drawn and ordered West out of his home. West was handcuffed and briefly questioned by multiple officers. Police told West that they already had enough information to charge him and that it was in his best interest to cooperate. They also told West that he might not be taken to jail if he cooperated. When asked about the controlled-buy, West initially denied giving marijuana to the informant, but then admitted that he "fronted" the informant two ounces of marijuana. West then reversed himself and denied giving the informant marijuana. When questioned further, West said he would not say anything without talking to his lawyer. At that point, officers stopped questioning West and placed him under arrest.
In a tin shed on West's property, police discovered several large marijuana plants. Police found smaller amounts of marijuana in West's home and in two semitrailers onWest's property. Police also found a large array of gardening supplies on West's property. And, outside of West's house, officers found what they believed to be marijuana stalks that had been cut at the base. In all, police seized over 5,000 grams of marijuana.
On June 13, 2011, after West had been formally charged with several controlled-substance offenses and while he was incarcerated at the county jail, an investigator served him with property receipts and forfeiture notices. Without prompting, West started talking to the investigator about his case. The investigator told West that he did not want to talk about the case because West was represented by a lawyer. The investigator also said that if West wished to talk, the investigator would set up a meeting with West's lawyer. Nevertheless, West continued to make admissions.
On June 30, 2011, the investigator visited West in jail again to serve him with another property receipt. The investigator surreptitiously recorded the conversation. When West started to talk about his case, the investigator again cautioned West not to make admissions and reminded West that he was represented by an attorney. West continued to talk and, without questioning, made several inculpatory statements.
After a trial on stipulated facts, West was convicted of three controlled-substance offenses. At a June 6, 2012 court trial to determine whether a firearm sentencing enhancement applied to these convictions, West testified regarding the controlled-buy, the evidence found during the search of his home, and his involvement in growing marijuana. Based on this testimony, West was charged with one count of perjury.
After his controlled-substance convictions were overturned by this court, State v. West, No. A13-0198 (Minn. App. Dec. 30, 2013), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2014),West moved to suppress his June 1, June 13, and June 30, 2011 statements as involuntary and obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The district court determined that all of West's statements were admissible in his perjury case but suppressed the June 1 statement in the remanded controlled-substance case.
Prior to West's perjury trial, he made a motion to remove the presiding judge. The judge also presided over the June 6, 2012 sentencing trial, and West argued that because she had "personal knowledge" of the case, she should not preside over the perjury trial. The judge denied the motion, and the chief judge of the district subsequently denied a similar motion. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found West guilty of perjury. This appeal followed.
West argues that he was subjected to custodial interrogation on June 1, June 13, and June 30, 2011, and was never advised of his Miranda rights. Accordingly, he contends that the district court erred by failing to suppress those statements. Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2013); see U.S. Const. amend. V; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). "Thus, a Mirandawarning is required if a suspect is both in custody and subject to interrogation." State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2010).
June 1, 2011 statement
The district court determined that West's June 1, 2011 statement was the result of a custodial interrogation and that West was not given Miranda warnings. The state does not challenge this determination. Instead, the state argues that the June 1 statement was admissible because the exclusionary rule does not apply to a collateral prosecution. The district court determined that, while the statement was taken in violation of West's Miranda rights, Miranda does not apply to shield a defendant from prosecution for perjury. Therefore, although the statement was not admissible as substantive evidence in the underlying controlled-substance case, it was admissible at West's perjury trial. Whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence in a particular case is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Maldonado-Arreaga, 772 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. App. 2009).
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 871 (Minn. 2015). For this reason, when a Miranda warning is not given, statements made during a custodial interrogation are not admissible in the state's "direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt." United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 1917 (1980). But the United States Supreme Court has "carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule . . . where the introduction of reliable and probative evidence would significantly further the truthseeking function of a criminal trial and the likelihood that admissibility of such evidence would encourage policemisconduct is but a 'speculative possibility.'" James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311, 110 S. Ct. 648, 651 (1990) (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645-46 (1971)). Because there is only a "speculative possibility" of encouraging police misconduct, voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach a defendant's testimony. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26, 91 S. Ct. at 645-46; State v. Tomassoni, 778 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 2010). "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." Harris, 401 U.S. at 226, 91 S. Ct. at 646.
Applying this concept, the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated that the exclusionary rule does not prohibit the substantive use in a perjury trial of a statement taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment. State v. Berge, 288 N.W.2d 687, 688 (Minn. 1979). In Berge, the defendant's testimony on cross-examination contradicted his testimony on direct. Id. On redirect, he admitted that he lied during direct-examination. Id. The defendant was charged and convicted of perjury based on this inconsistent testimony. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court erred by allowing the state to introduce the redirect testimony against him because "he was not warned, before he made his admission, that he had a privilege against answering the question." Id. The supreme court questioned whether such a warning was required, but concluded, "we need not rule on this point because it appears that the so-called perjury exception which is that perjury is not an acceptable alternative to the Fifth Amendment privilege would justify use of the evidence in any event." Id.
The district court properly determined that the exclusionary rule did not prohibit the state from introducing West's June 1, 2011 statement in his perjury trial. West testified at the June 6, 2012 sentencing trial and was subject to cross-examination about the statement. As this evidence was properly used to impeach West during the June 6, 2012 sentencing trial, there is no reason to exclude it from West's subsequent perjury trial. The exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring police...
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