State v. Mark Vaughn

• Decision Date: 01 January 2001
• Docket Number: 00CA04,01-LW-2720
• Citation: 2001 Ohio 2455
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant. Case
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2001-Ohio-2455

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00CA04

01-LW-2720 (4th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District Hocking

2001

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: L. Jackson, Henniger, 4 East Main Street Suite 200, Logan, Ohio 43138

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Larry E. Beal, Hocking County Prosecuting Attorney, David A. Sams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 88 South Market Street, Logan, Ohio 43138

OPINION

EVANS J.

Defendant-Appellant, Mark Vaughn, timely appeals the Hocking County Municipal Court's denial of his motion to suppress, as well as certain actions of the trial court at the appellant's plea hearing where appellant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of no contest. We find no error by the trial court that merits a reversal of that court's ruling on the suppression motion or its guilty finding upon appellant's no contest plea. Consequently we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

On August 29, 1999, at 10:06 p.m., appellant was proceeding northbound on State Route 278, in the Village of Carbon Hill Hocking County, Ohio. Appellant drove his motorcycle through a bridge construction zone, passing between two staggered signs, which read "Road Closed." Deputy Graham, of the Hocking County Sheriff's Department, observed appellant pass between the "Road Closed" signs, while driving toward him.

The deputy, who was facing the oncoming motorcycle, turned on his overhead flashing lights to signal appellant to stop. Appellant did not stop and the deputy pursued appellant with both the flashing lights and siren of his cruiser turned on. During the chase, appellant's speed did not exceed the posted limit, but he did, at one point, lose control of his motorcycle and leave the roadway. After some miles of pursuit, appellant stopped and was arrested by the deputy.

At the time in question, an agreement apparently existed between the businesses and residents of Carbon Hill and the Ohio Department of Transportation regarding vehicle travel through this construction zone. That agreement provided that patrons of the business within the construction zone, the Bridge Inn, and Carbon Hill residents whose homes were also in the construction zone, would be permitted to use the closed road and bridge to access their homes and the business. Appellant was not a resident of Carbon Hill, nor was any evidence presented that he was a patron of the Bridge Inn on this night.

On August 30, 1999, appellant was arraigned on four charges:

1) fleeing and eluding a police officer after a signal to stop and causing substantial risk of physical harm to persons or property, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.331 (B) and (C) (3) ;

2) operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1);

3) driving upon a closed highway, in violation of R.C. 4511.71; and

4) reckless operation, in violation of R.C. 4511.20.

On September 7, 1999, a preliminary hearing was held on the felony charge of fleeing and eluding, under R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(3), resulting in a dismissal of the charge by the Hocking County Municipal Court for lack of probable cause.

On September 9, 1999, appellant filed a motion to suppress any statements made to police by him during the stop, any observations made by the police during the stop, any evidence gained from appellant's vehicle, and any other evidence indirectly gained through the stop. A hearing was held on this motion on October 18, 1999. Both the state and appellant filed briefs with the trial court on the issue of whether the deputy's stop of appellant was unlawful. A second hearing on the motion was held on December 1, 1999, and the court's denial of the motion was filed on December 20, 1999.

On December 10, 1999, after the second hearing on appellant's motion to suppress and prior to the trial court's ruling on that motion, an amended complaint was filed against appellant for fleeing and eluding a police officer after a signal to stop, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B). On March 8, 2000, the trial court conducted a plea hearing. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, appellant entered a plea of no contest to the misdemeanor charge of failure to comply, and all the remaining charges were dismissed.

During the plea hearing, the trial court apparently required appellant "to stipulate to facts sufficient for a finding of guilty of the charge before the trial court would grant Defendant-Appellant leave to enter a plea of No Contest." On March 8, 2000, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charge and imposed sentence.

A timely notice of appeal was filed on March 14, 2000, and an entry of conviction, nunc pro tunc, was filed on March 17, 2000. On July 14, 2000, a motion to supplement the record was filed, and the parties stipulated to the court's off-the-record prerequisite to granting appellant leave to change his plea to one of no contest. In his appeal, appellant presents the following assignments of error for our review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS?

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THAT IT REFUSED TO ACCEPT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S PLEA OF NO CONTEST WITHOUT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT STIPULATING TO FACTS REQUIRED FOR A FINDING OF GUILT?

I.

The appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. See United States v. Martinez (C.A.11 1992), 949 F.2d 1117, 1119; United States v. Mejia (C.A.9 1991), 953 F.2d 461, 464-465; United States v. Wilson (C.A.11 1990), 894 F.2d 1245, 1254. A trial court assumes the role of trier of fact during proceedings on a motion to suppress. See State v. Payne (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 364, 367, 662 N.E.2d 60, 61-62; State v. Robinson (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 560, 570, 649 N.E.2d 18, 25; State v. Rossiter (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 162, 166, 623 N.E.2d 645, 648.

The evaluation of evidence and credibility of witnesses during such proceedings are issues to be determined by the trial court. See State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 105, 684 N.E.2d 668, 685; State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1037; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584. A court's factual findings are to be accepted unless they are "clearly erroneous." State v. Babcock (Feb. 13, 1997), Washington App. No. 95CA40, unreported; see, also, United States v. Lewis (C.A.1 1994), 40 F.3d 1325, 1332. That is to say that a reviewing court is bound to accept the factual determinations of a trial court during a suppression hearing so long as they are supported by competent and credible evidence. See State v. Harris (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 543, 546, 649 N.E.2d 7, 9; State v. Claytor (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627, 620 N.E.2d 906, 908; see, also, State v. DePalma (Jan. 18, 1991), Ross App. No. 1633, unreported.

However, the application of the law to those facts is subject to a de novo standard of review. Harris, supra; State v. Anderson (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691, 654 N.E.2d 1034, 1036; see, also, Lewis and Wilson, supra. This de novo review will determine whether the trial court correctly applied the law. See id. With the proper standard of review established, we now turn to the arguments presented in appellant's briefs.

Appellant presents three bases why the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress was in error. First, appellant argues that the trial court's determination that a motorist has an absolute duty to stop at a police officer's signal is contrary to law. Second, appellant argues that it was reversible error for the court to require the parties to brief the state of the law of R.C. 2921.331(A) and then proceed based on R.C. 2921.331(B). Third, appellant argues that the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress was againstthe manifest weight of the evidence. We address these arguments in an order more conducive to our analysis.

A.

We are bound to accept the factual determinations of a trial court during a suppression hearing so long as they are supported by competent and credible evidence. See Harris, Claytor, and DePalma, supra. Therefore, we must compare the trial court's factual findings in its denial of the motion to suppress with the evidence in the record.

The trial court made the following factual findings based on the testimony presented at the motion to suppress hearings:

1) On August 29, 1999, at approximately 10:00 p.m., appellant was operating his motorcycle on State Route 278 in Hocking County, Ohio, near the Bridge Inn.

2) At the same time, Deputy Graham was on routine traffic patrol in a marked Sheriff's cruiser, in Carbon Hill, and observed appellant's single headlight approach him across a bridge which had a "Road Closed" sign upon it.

3) Deputy Graham turned on his cruiser's light bar in an attempt to stop appellant. Appellant did not stop or obey the deputy's signal, and the deputy pursued appellant, with the cruiser's lights and sirens on, for a distance of approximately three miles. The chase speed was approximately fifty m.p.h., which was not in excess of the posted limit, but was unsafe for the particular road conditions since the road was partially graveled.

4) At one point, appellant drove his motorcycle off the road, toward the woods and treeline, but then returned to the roadway and stopped his vehicle. Deputy Graham then placed appellant under arrest for failing to comply with the order of an officer and other charges.

5) The owner of the Bridge Inn, Denver Pickett, testified that the establishment was open for business on the date and time in question, and that the bridge over which appel

...