State v. Martin

• Decision Date: 08 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. A07-1262.,A07-1262.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lamonte Rydell MARTIN, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

773 N.W.2d 89

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lamonte Rydell MARTIN, Appellant.

No. A07-1262.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 8, 2009.

Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

Appellant Lamonte Martin was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2008), and crime committed for the benefit of a gang, Minn.Stat. § 609.229, subd. 2 (2008), for the shooting death of Christopher Lynch. Martin was automatically certified to stand trial as an adult under Minn.Stat. § 260B.007, subd. 6(b) (2008). A Hennepin County jury found him guilty of both counts. The district court entered judgment of conviction of first-degree premeditated murder against Martin and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release. We affirm.

On the evening of May 3, 2006, police responded to a report of a shooting in a residential neighborhood in north Minneapolis. When police arrived, Lynch had already been taken to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. An autopsy revealed that Lynch had been shot 11 to 13 times. Through their investigation, the police learned that Martin, Cornelius Jackson, and Jonard McDaniel chased Lynch and his cousin, Jermaine Mack-Lynch, and shot Lynch.

The State indicted Martin, Jackson, and McDaniel for the murder of Lynch. Specifically, Martin was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder and crime committed to benefit a gang. The State moved for joinder of the trials of Martin, Jackson, and McDaniel. The defendants objected to the joinder motion. Following a hearing, the court granted the motion. Subsequently, the State successfully moved to sever the McDaniel trial.

During voir dire, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge of potential Juror 43, and Martin raised a Batson challenge. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Initially, the court denied the peremptory challenge, but after further questioning of the juror, the court concluded that the prosecutor had established a race-neutral reason for striking the potential juror.

At the combined trial, the State's theory was that Lynch was an innocent victim and that his murder was "collateral damage" in an ongoing gang dispute. The State presented evidence that Mack-Lynch was a member of the Tre Tre Crips gang and that the 19 Block Dipset gang was a rival gang to which Martin, Jackson, and McDaniel belonged. The State also presented evidence that the two gangs have had violent encounters.

Mack-Lynch testified that on the day in question, he and Lynch were walking to the home of Mack-Lynch's brother, Charles Pettis. As they were walking, they saw a white Malibu in which Martin was the driver and Jackson and McDaniel were passengers. After the car slowed down and the occupants looked at Mack-Lynch and Lynch, the car stopped. Jackson and Martin got out and started chasing them.

Mack-Lynch and Lynch ran down the alley to the back of Pettis's house, where Lynch stopped because he was short of breath. Mack-Lynch continued running down the alley, thinking that Jackson and Martin would follow him because he was a gang member. Mack-Lynch then doubled back to the front of Pettis's house and told his brother that "One Nines" were chasing him. Subsequently, they heard gunshots and saw Jackson and Martin in a yard across the street firing shots with handguns into the backyard of a nearby house. Mack-Lynch and Pettis ran across the street and found Lynch wounded in the backyard. McDaniel then drove the white car into the alley. Jackson and Martin jumped in the car and the three drove away. According to Mack-Lynch, Jackson was wearing a black hat, and Martin was wearing a red hat.

Mack-Lynch admitted that he had a 2005 conviction for unlawful firearm possession and that currently he was under indictment for first-degree murder for a 2006 homicide. He denied having made any type of "deal" with the prosecution in exchange for his testimony.

Pettis also testified that he saw Jackson and Martin standing in a yard across the street. Pettis then heard shots fired. He saw Jackson and Martin get into a white car and drive away. Pettis and Mack-Lynch then found Lynch wounded in the backyard. During an interview with the police that same day, Pettis denied knowing the identity of the shooters. But when the investigator left the interview room, Pettis stated in a phone call to a third party: "I know who did it" but "like I'd really tell these motherf* * *ers [police] who shot my cousin." According to Pettis, he lied to the police because he "wanted to deal with it my way" by "getting revenge ... on the street." Subsequently, Pettis saw physical evidence from the murder scene, changed his mind, and decided to cooperate. On cross-examination, Pettis admitted prior felony convictions for car theft and robbery and that he currently had a pending charge for aggravated robbery. He denied getting a deal from the prosecution in exchange for his testimony.

Ten-year-old S.H., who lived next door, witnessed the shooting from his back porch. He could not see the two shooters' faces, but he did notice both men were wearing hats. Other witnesses testified that they saw two men flee and get into a white car. Witnesses also stated that one of the men was wearing a red baseball cap.

The State presented testimony that Martin, Jackson, and McDaniel made admissions to various gang members regarding their involvement in Lynch's murder. Paris Patton, a member of the 19 Block Dipset gang, and Kiron Williams, a member of the Vice Lords gang, were in federal custody on narcotics charges. They agreed to testify in exchange for the possibility of a reduced sentence in federal court. Both testified that Martin, Jackson, and McDaniel were members of the 19 Block Dipset gang. Patton testified that about three days after Lynch was killed, McDaniel asked him if he had a gun because he had gotten rid of his after using it "on that little boy" who was with Mack-Lynch. About a month after the murder, Patton overheard Jackson say Lynch was on his knees begging for his life when Jackson shot him. Williams testified that McDaniel, Martin, and Jackson all told him they were involved in killing Lynch. According to Williams, Martin bragged to him about chasing Mack-Lynch and then killing the person who was with him. Williams also testified that Jackson told him that he chased Mack-Lynch and Lynch, that Mack-Lynch got away, and then he caught up with Lynch, who pleaded for his life before he was shot.

Minneapolis Police Captain Michael Martin, a member of the special operations division, testified as the State's gang expert. He explained that the 19 Block Dipset gang operates primarily on the north side of Minneapolis and has engaged in murders, drive-by shootings, assaults, and drug crimes. He indicated that retaliation and respect are "the foundation for the gang culture." Several other witnesses testified about incidents in which they were shot at or where persons they knew had been killed by gang members. Other police officers also testified regarding incidents involving 19 Block Dipset gang members and criminal activities in north Minneapolis.

The jury found Martin guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and crime committed for the benefit of a gang (with an underlying crime of premeditated murder). The district court entered judgment of conviction of first-degree premeditated murder against Martin, and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release. This appeal followed.

I.

Martin argues that sentencing a defendant who was a juvenile at the time the crime was committed to life in prison without the possibility of release (LWOR), under Minn.Stat. §§ 260B.007, subd. 6(b), and 260B.101, subd. 1 (2008), violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and usual punishment."¹ We review the question of whether a statute is constitutional de novo. State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 310 (Minn.2006).²

In State v. Chambers, the defendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the charged offenses, asserted that the sentence of LWOR as applied to him violated the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state constitutions. 589 N.W.2d 466, 479-80 (Minn. 1999). We observed that in determining whether a sentence is "cruel and unusual," we must look to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 480 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)). We held that the fact that Chambers was the only individual to be sentenced to LWOR for a crime committed while under the age of 18 did not result in a constitutional violation. Id.

Martin urges us to reconsider our holding in Chambers on the ground that the differences between juveniles under 18 and adults renders them less responsible for their conduct than adults and, therefore, a sentence of LWOR is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment. He urges us to overrule Chambers in light of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005).

We are "extremely reluctant to overrule our precedent under principles of stare decisis." State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn.2005). We require a "compelling reason" before a prior decision will be overruled. Id.

In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time of their crimes is cruel and unusual punishment, abrogating prior decisions of that Court. 543 U.S. at 573-74, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The Court concluded that there are three "general differences" between juveniles under 18 and adults: a general lack of maturity; greater susceptibility to outside pressures and influences;...