State v. Martin, A14–0044.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. A14–0044.,A14–0044.
• Citation: 849 N.W.2d 99
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Jeffrey Bruce MARTIN, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

849 N.W.2d 99

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant,

v.Jeffrey Bruce MARTIN, Respondent.

No. A14–0044.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

July 7, 2014.

Review Denied Sept. 24, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

A district court order that stays the imposition of a sentence and provides for the vacatur of a guilty plea and the dismissal of criminal charges at a later date is governed by the caselaw that applies to a stay of adjudication. Accordingly, if a prosecutor does not agree to such an order, a district court may issue the order only if the district court finds that the prosecutor has committed a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Sara Grewing, St. Paul City Attorney, John H. Stechmann, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Lee R. Wolfgram, Wolfgram Law Firm, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by JOHNSON, Presiding Judge; RODENBERG, Judge; and CHUTICH, Judge.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge.

Jeffrey Bruce Martin pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of engaging in prostitution. The district court stayed the imposition of a sentence and placed Martin on probation. Over the state's objection, the district court also stated its intention to vacate Martin's plea and to dismiss the charge at a later date if Martin successfully completes probation. The state appeals. We conclude that the district court erred because it did not find that the prosecutor committed a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

FACTS

Martin pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of engaging in prostitution. SeeMinn.Stat. § 609.324, subd. 3(a)(2) (2012). At the time for sentencing, the district court stayed imposition of a sentence and placed Martin on probation for one year, with conditions; ordered him to serve one day in jail and awarded one day of jail credit; and imposed fines and court costs. The district court also stated its intention to vacate Martin's guilty plea and to dismiss the charge after the passage of two years, if Martin successfully completes his one-year probation period.¹ The state did not object to a stay of imposition but objected to the district court's stated intention to vacate the guilty plea and dismiss the charge at a later date. The district court noted that the vacate-and-dismiss provision frequently is agreed to by parties in cases prosecuted by suburban municipalities in the same county and that it would be unfair if Martin could not obtain the same terms because his offense occurred in the city of St. Paul.

The state moved to amend the district court's order. Martin opposed the motion and, in the alternative, moved to withdraw his guilty plea. At the motion hearing, the district court denied the state's motion for the reasons it had identified earlier. The district court also reasoned that its order was a matter of sentencing, a matter on which district courts generally have broad discretion. The district court subsequently issued an order and memorandum in which it provided additional reasons for its decision. The state appeals. ²

ISSUE

Does a district court have authority to stay the imposition of a sentence, place a person on probation, and, without the prosecutor's agreement, vacate the person's guilty plea and dismiss the charges against the person at a later date if the person successfully completes probation?

ANALYSIS

A.

For purposes of this opinion, it is helpful to review a district court's alternatives to imposing an executed sentence after a determination that a person is guilty of a criminal offense.

First, a district court may pronounce and impose the terms of a sentence but stay execution of the sentence. SeeMinn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.C.04 (2012). A stay of execution is expressly authorized by a statute that allows a district court to order intermediate sanctions or place a defendant on probation instead of executing a sentence, unless “a sentence of life imprisonment is required by law [or] a mandatory minimum sentence is required by section 609.11.” Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a) (2012). If a district court stays execution of a sentence, the person stands convicted of the offense charged but is not required to serve the sentence, so long as he or she abides by the terms of probation. SeeMinn.Stat. §§ 609.135, subd. 1, .14 (2012). If the person successfully completes probation, he or she “shall be discharged.” Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 2(f). If the person violates the conditions of a stay of execution, the district court may revoke the stay and order the execution of the previously imposed sentence. Minn.Stat. § 609.14, subds. 1, 3(2).

Second, a district court may stay the imposition of a sentence. A stay of imposition is expressly authorized by the same statute that authorizes a stay of execution, and a stay of imposition operates much like a stay of execution. SeeMinn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1. If, however, the district court stays imposition of a sentence, the person stands convicted, but the district court does not actually pronounce a sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.C.05 (2012). If the person violates the terms of the stay, the district court may pronounce and impose a sentence and either stay execution of the sentence or execute the sentence. SeeMinn.Stat. § 609.14, subd. 3(1); Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. 2.C.05. A feature unique to a stay of imposition is that, upon a person's successful completion of probation, a felony or gross misdemeanor conviction may be reduced in degree, though a misdemeanor will remain a misdemeanor. SeeMinn.Stat. § 609.13 (2012).

Third, a district court may, in limited circumstances, stay the adjudication of a defendant's guilt. “A stay of adjudication, which almost always requires the prosecutor's consent, is a procedure whereby the district court, upon a defendant's guilty plea or a fact-finder's determination of guilt, does not adjudicate the defendant guilty but imposes conditions of probation.” State v. C.P.H., 707 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Minn.App.2006). If a district court orders a stay of adjudication, and if the defendant successfully completes probation, “the defendant avoids a criminal conviction.” Id. at 703. The legislature has determined that a district court's authority to order a stay of adjudication should be narrowly circumscribed: “Except as provided in section 152.18 or 609.375, or upon agreement of the parties, a court may not refuse to adjudicate the guilt of a defendant who tenders a guilty plea ... or who has been found guilty by a court or jury following a trial.” Minn.Stat. § 609.095(b) (2012) (emphasis added). The supreme court has stated that a district court's authority to order a stay of adjudication should be “relied upon sparingly.” State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Minn.1996). Specifically, a district court may order a stay of adjudication “ ‘only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor's clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.’ ” Lee, 706 N.W.2d at 496 (quoting Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541). This limitation is necessary to protect the principle of the separation of powers. See id.

Fourth, a district court may approve a continuance for dismissal. A continuance for dismissal is

an agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant that prosecution will be suspended for a designated period of time on certain conditions, including that the defendant refrain from committing additional offenses and waive the right to a speedy trial. The district court does not make a finding of guilt, and the defendant does not make an admission of guilt. At the end of the designated period, if the defendant has met the conditions, the matter is dismissed.

C.P.H., 707 N.W.2d at 703 (citation omitted). The legislature has determined that “[t]he decision to offer or agree to a continuance of a criminal prosecution is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion resting solely with the prosecuting attorney.” Minn.Stat. § 609.132 (2012). The rule of criminal procedure that governs continuances for dismissal, which is entitled “Pretrial Diversion,” provides that a prosecution “may be suspended for a specified time and then dismissed,” so long as certain conditions are satisfied, including the condition that the agreement “is in writing and signed by the parties,” and the condition that there are sufficient advantages to suspending the prosecution. SeeMinn. R.Crim. P. 27.05, subd. 1(1), (1)(a), (1)(d). A continuance for dismissal differs from a stay of adjudication in that it occurs before a determination of guilt. State v. Strok, 786 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn.App.2010). Nonetheless, we have said that, for purposes of appellate review, a continuance for dismissal is “functionally equivalent” to a stay of adjudication. State v. Prabhudail, 602 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Minn.App.1999), review denied (Minn. Jan. 18, 2000). Consequently, we review a continuance for dismissal by applying the caselaw that applies to a stay of adjudication. See Strok, 786 N.W.2d at 302–03. Accordingly, a district court may order a continuance for dismissal “ ‘only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor's clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.’ ” Id. at 303 (quoting Lee, 706 N.W.2d at 496 (quoting Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541)).

B.

The first step in resolving this appeal is to identify the law that governs, which depends in part on the proper characterization of the relief ordered by the district court. The order from which the state appeals does not implement any of the recognized procedures described above. Indeed, the district court expressly stated that it was not selecting any of the previously recognized alternatives.

The state contends that the district court's order is the equivalent of a stay of adjudication and, thus, should be analyzed in the same manner as a stay of adjudication. The...