State v. Martin
| Decision Date | 26 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 28109.,SD 28109. |
| Citation | 291 S.W.3d 269 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Luther Dwayne MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Chris Koster, Attorney General, and Karen L. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, of Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Luther Dwayne Martin ("Defendant") was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of murder in the first degree. See Section 565.020.1 Count I charged Defendant with the death of Jerae Nicole James ("Victim"). Count II charged Defendant with the death of Victim's unborn child.2 The jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on each count, and the trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. Defendant asserts ten points of alleged trial court error, challenging, inter alia, the selection and composition of the jury, the admission of certain evidence, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Finding several points so deficient as to prevent their review and those remaining to lack merit, we affirm the convictions.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, State v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d 181, 184 (Mo. banc 2001), the facts are as follows. Victim, a seventeen-year-old, traveled with her family and a friend to Mountain Grove to visit her grandparents. Around 6:00 or 6:30 p.m. on October 7, 2001, Victim left the rest of her family to take her friend home and sell some illegal drugs. When Victim failed to return to her family in Mountain Grove when expected, her mother called Victim's cell phone several times but got no answer. After unsuccessfully searching for her daughter for several hours, Victim's mother called the police and reported her missing.
A couple of days later, Pulaski County deputy sheriff Bill Anderson ("Deputy Anderson") saw a car in a field. The vehicle appeared to have what he thought was soot on the rear passenger door, and he decided to stop and investigate. When Deputy Anderson approached the vehicle, he saw that the windows had been darkened by smoke and it was obvious to him that there had been a fire inside. Deputy Anderson ran the license plate and discovered that the vehicle was owned by a person later determined to be Victim's grandfather. Deputy Anderson then opened the car door and observed the following: 1) the driver's seat was almost completely burned, and the front passenger seat was also damaged; 2) partially burned, rolled-up paper stuck in the console between the front seats; 3) a bottle of power steering fluid and a can of charcoal lighter fluid; 4) a partially burned, size four, right-hand, military-issue, black leather glove with the name "Richadson" written inside; 5) Victim's driver's license; and 6) one of Defendant's phone bills in the back seat.
Deputy Anderson also noticed that while the car's gas cap was still on, the filler door to the tank was open. Checking under the hood, Deputy Anderson saw that someone had removed the oil fill cap and a partially burned piece of paper was stuck inside it. Deputy Anderson also located Victim's cell phone on the ground behind the car's trunk. A check of its log revealed that a 9-1-1 call had been placed from it on October 7th at 8:47 p.m. In all, it appeared to Deputy Anderson that there had been attempts to start a fire in multiple areas of the car, including the engine compartment. Thinking what he had discovered was a stolen car, Deputy Anderson called the Waynesville police department. Officers from several different jurisdictions then arrived on the scene. One of them ran Victim's driver's license and discovered that she had been reported missing.
The gravel roads in the area around the field where the car had been located were very dusty. The officer who ran Victim's driver's license noticed that the car was also very dusty, except for a spot in the center of its trunk where it looked like the dust had been disturbed when the trunk had been pushed down by a hand. The officers could not locate any keys to the vehicle but initially gained access to its trunk by folding down the back seat. Inside the trunk was a body. After locating an electronic trunk release inside the car's glove box, the officers opened the trunk lid and saw that the person inside (later identified as Victim) was bound with duct tape around her hands and ankles, gagged, and in a fetal position. The sweatpants Victim was wearing were burned away on her upper right thigh, and a burn injury could be seen on the back of that thigh.
Because his phone bill had been found inside Victim's car, Defendant was asked to come to the St. Roberts' police department to answer some questions. After being advised of his Miranda3 rights, Defendant agreed to talk with a highway patrol sergeant. Defendant told the sergeant that he had no idea why his phone bill was in Victim's car as he had never met or seen her before. A couple of days later, Defendant gave officers consent to search his vehicle and his barracks. The following items were located during the search of Defendant's vehicle: 1) a black leather, size four, military-issue, left-handed glove with the name "Richardson" written inside; 2) two standards manuals from the Fifth Engineer Battalion—one intact and one (with Defendant's name on it) missing pages eighteen through twenty-five; 3) a pair of sweatpants with a dark substance on them that appeared to be the product of a fire; and 4) inside the car's trunk, pages eighteen and nineteen from the incomplete standards manual, twisted length-wise. Defendant's fingerprints were taken, and one matched a print that was lifted from just above the lock on the trunk of Victim's car.
An autopsy revealed the cause of Victim's death to be asphyxia from carbon monoxide poisoning due to smoke inhalation. Victim's asphyxia also caused the death of her unborn child. There were large amounts of black, sooty material in Victim's larynx, indicating that she was alive when the fire was burning. No illegal drugs were in Victim's system at the time of her death, but a three-quarter-inch baggie containing white-yellow powder was found inside the sock on her right ankle. Other relevant facts will be discussed in the context of the points to which they relate.
Defendant raises ten points on appeal, claiming the trial court erred by: 1) denying his Batson4 challenge to the State's peremptory strike of a black venireperson; 2) failing to strike three members of the panel for cause based on what he claims was a demonstrated predisposition in favor of the death penalty; 3) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence; 4) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence; 5) refusing to admit into evidence a taped interview of an individual questioned during the investigation of Victim's murder who stated therein that he had heard another individual claim to be the person who had killed Victim; 6) allowing a medical examiner and fingerprint expert to testify about other experts' reports; 7) failing to grant his motion to dismiss the case or take other remedial action based on the destruction or loss of a witness statement in violation of Brady v. Maryland;5 8) denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his car; 9) denying his motion in limine to prevent officers from testifying that the sweatpants seized from his car had "soot" on them; and 10) overruling his objections to a jury instruction based on MAI-CR3d 300.03.
Points III and IV claim the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support Defendant's convictions. We will first address those two points together, then review the balance in the order presented.
Defendant's fourth point contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence.6 Specifically, Defendant argues the State's evidence was insufficient to prove Defendant: 1) acted after deliberation; and 2) was present when the murder took place.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d at 184. We accept as true all evidence (and the reasonable inferences therefrom) that tend to prove guilt and ignore all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Gray, 230 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Mo.App. S.D.2007) (internal citations omitted).
This standard applies even when all evidence of a defendant's guilt is circumstantial. "Great deference is given to the trier of fact, and an appellate court is not to act as a `super juror' with veto power over a verdict." Therefore, we do not weigh the evidence or determine the reliability or credibility of witnesses.
State v. Mitchell, 203 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Mo.App. S.D.2006) (quoting State v. Daniels, 179 S.W.3d 273, 285 (Mo.App. W.D. 2005)) (all other internal citations omitted).
The crime of murder in the first degree as set forth in section 565.020 is committed if the defendant: "[1] knowingly [2] causes the death of another person [3] after deliberation upon the matter." Section 565.020(1). Here, the evidence was unclear as to whether Defendant acted alone or with others. As a result, the court's verdict director7 ascribed "the elements of the offense to the defendant or the other person or persons." State v. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. banc 1989) ( ) (internal citations omitted).
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