State v. Masangkay

• Decision Date: 07 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 52096-2-I.,52096-2-I.
• Citation: 91 P.3d 140,121 Wash.App. 904
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Jason MASANGKAY, D.O.B. 8/10/84, Respondent.

91 P.3d 140

121 Wash.App. 904

STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Jason MASANGKAY, D.O.B. 8/10/84, Respondent.

No. 52096-2-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

June 7, 2004.

Charles Wesley Lind, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Jason Brett Saunders, WA Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

COLEMAN, J.

Jason Masangkay pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree and was placed in custody at a juvenile detention facility. Less than three years after his release, he decided to join the Marines. He requested and was granted a "certificate of rehabilitation" to reinstate his right to possess firearms.

We reverse the trial court because RCW 9.41.040(3), which contains the "certificate of rehabilitation" language Masangkay relies upon, cannot be reasonably interpreted as authorization for Washington courts to issue certificates of rehabilitation.

FACTS

After pleading guilty to second degree robbery in juvenile court, 14-year-old Jason Masangkay was sentenced to several months in custody. As a result of his conviction, he lost the right to possess firearms. In December 2002, when he was 18 years old and had been out of custody for almost three years, Masangkay petitioned the court to grant him a certificate of rehabilitation under RCW 9.41.040(3), so that he could regain his right to possess firearms and join the Marines. He presented evidence that he had made substantial achievements toward becoming a good student and citizen during his time out of custody.

The trial court initially decided that Washington law did not authorize it to grant Masangkay's petition, but on reconsideration, it decided that RCW 9.41.040(3) could be interpreted to permit it to issue certificates of rehabilitation. The State appealed.

ANALYSIS

This case involves statutory construction, which is reviewed de novo. Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 128 Wash.2d 508, 515, 910 P.2d 462 (1996). The fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature. Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wash.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991). "Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself." Rozner, 116 Wash.2d at 347, 804 P.2d 24. When the legislature's intent is not clear from the face of the statute, the court may resort to various tools of statutory construction in determining which interpretation best advances the legislature's intent. Rozner, 116 Wash.2d at 347, 804 P.2d 24.

The question presented is whether the legislature intended RCW 9.41.040(3) to authorize Washington courts to issue a certificate of rehabilitation to allow a person convicted of certain felony crimes to regain the right to possess firearms. That statute provides:

Notwithstanding RCW 9.41.047 or any other provisions of law, as used in this chapter, a person has been "convicted", whether in an adult court or adjudicated in a juvenile court, at such time as a plea of guilty has been accepted, or a verdict of guilty has been filed, notwithstanding the pendency of any future proceedings including but not limited to sentencing or disposition, post-trial or post-factfinding motions, and appeals. Conviction includes a dismissal entered after a period of probation, suspension or deferral of sentence, and also includes equivalent dispositions by courts in jurisdictions other than Washington state. A person shall not be precluded from possession of a firearm if the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted or the conviction or disposition has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. Where no record of the court's disposition of the charges can be found, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person was not convicted of the charge.

RCW 9.41.040(3) (emphasis added). This question was left unanswered by this court in Nakatani v. State, 109 Wash.App. 622, 36 P.3d 1116 (2001), which stated in a footnote,

[T]the authority of Washington courts to issue [certificates of rehabilitation] is not before us in this case. We also express no opinion regarding Nakatani's right to request an equivalent finding of rehabilitation in a separate Superior Court proceeding. If Nakatani files such a petition, the trial court will then be in a position to evaluate whether and under what circumstances RCW 9.41.040(3) authorizes the court to issue certificates of rehabilitation or make equivalent findings.

Nakatani, 109 Wash.App. at 628 n. 3, 36 P.3d 1116. While Nakatani did not expressly reject the trial court's authority to issue certificates of rehabilitation, the issue is squarely before us now.

Masangkay contends that prior Washington cases have recognized RCW 9.41.040(3) as authorizing Washington courts to consider such petitions, but the State disagrees. The State argues that RCW 9.41.040(3) does not authorize the courts to issue certificates of rehabilitation and that RCW 9.41.040(4) is the exclusive means for Masangkay to regain his firearm rights. Under that statute, Masangkay must wait at least five years following his release from custody to be eligible to regain those rights.¹

Contrary to Masangkay's contention, no Washington case has gone as far as recognizing that RCW 9.41.040(3) has established a procedure for Washington courts to issue certificates of rehabilitation. In one case cited by Masangkay, Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wash.2d 133, 821 P.2d 482 (1992), the court merely acknowledged that the language of RCW 9.41.040(3) existed. In another case, Forster v. Pierce County, 99 Wash.App. 168, 172, 991 P.2d 687, review denied, 141 Wash.2d 1010, 10 P.3d 407 (2000), a convicted felon unsuccessfully argued that his receipt of a final discharge restoring civil rights in 1977 constituted a procedure equivalent to a finding of rehabilitation under RCW 9.41.040(3). The petitioner did not argue that the court was authorized to issue a certificate of rehabilitation, and the court never suggested that he could have petitioned for one.

In State v. Radan, 143 Wash.2d 323, 329, 21 P.3d 255 (2001), instead of addressing whether Washington had a certificate of rehabilitation procedure, the Supreme Court determined whether the "certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure" language of RCW 9.41.040(3) could be satisfied by certain Montana procedures. Again, the court recognized the existence of the certificate of rehabilitation language in RCW 9.41.040(3), but it did not hold that a procedure to issue certificates of rehabilitation exists in Washington.

The State makes several persuasive arguments why this court should not infer from RCW 9.41.040(3) an intention on the part of the legislature to create a procedure for Washington courts to issue certificates of rehabilitation. First, the legislature has adopted several statutory provisions detailing the procedure for reinstating firearm rights following a conviction or commitment for mental illness, such as RCW 9.41.040(4) and RCW 9.41.047. These provisions contain important criteria for the courts to apply when reinstating firearm rights. In contrast, subsection (3) provides courts with no guidance in determining what constitutes rehabilitation under the statute. Accordingly, courts applying this provision could potentially reach widely differing conclusions as to what constitutes rehabilitation.

Second, the absence of criteria for applying subsection (3) makes it difficult to infer an intention on the legislature's part to create such a procedure. The legislature has demonstrated its ability to craft statutes that create express procedures for restoring firearm rights. State v. Swanson, 116 Wash.App. 67, 65 P.3d 343 (2003). In Swanson, the court evaluated the various statutes that relate to restoration of firearm and other civil rights to determine the petitioner's burden of proof and whether a discretionary or mandatory standard applied to petitions submitted under RCW 9.41.040(4). Swanson, 116 Wash.App. at 73-75, 65 P.3d 343. While we reject the State's argument that the Swanson court's failure to discuss subsection (3) can be used to infer that no certificate of rehabilitation procedure exists, the Swanson decision does demonstrate the importance of including criteria for deciding when and how to issue certificates of rehabilitation. The legislature clearly has demonstrated that when it wants to, it can enact procedures for reinstating firearm rights with specific criteria. See RCW 9.41.047 (restoration of firearm rights for persons involuntarily committed for mental treatment) and RCW 9.41.040(4) (restoration of firearm rights for persons convicted of certain felonies). When compared with these statutes, the lack of criteria for issuing certificates of rehabilitation demonstrates that the legislature did not intend subsection (3) to act as a self-executing statutory authority.

This conclusion is also supported by the observation made in Radan that the language of subsection (3) was borrowed directly from ER 609(c) without a corresponding intention to create a substantive procedure. ER 609(c), which is based upon Federal Rules of Evidence 609(c), states:

(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.

Federal Rules of Evidence 609(c) refers to "certificate of...