State v. Swanson
| Decision Date | 04 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 28012-4-II.,28012-4-II. |
| Citation | 65 P.3d 343,116 Wash.App. 67 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Sigiel SWANSON, Appellant. |
Karen Mccarty Lundahl, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, for Appellant.
John Christopher Hillman, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.
Sigiel Swanson appeals the trial court's decision denying his petition for restoration of his firearm rights. Swanson contends that the court had no discretion to deny his petition once he demonstrated that he had satisfied the several requirements enumerated at RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(ii). Because RCW 9.41.040(4) does not expressly grant the restoring court any discretion or state a burden of proof, but does set forth several requirements that must be satisfied before an individual petitions for restoration, we hold that the restoring court serves a ministerial function—i.e., granting the petition—once the petitioner has satisfied the enumerated requirements. Thus, we reverse the trial court's denial of Swanson's petition.
On February 26, 1999, Swanson was convicted of fourth degree assault and interfering with a report of domestic violence. The incident that led to these convictions occurred on September 9, 1998. Both convictions were designated as domestic violence related crimes and were misdemeanors. Under Washington law, Swanson's fourth degree assault conviction resulted in the loss of his right to lawfully own and possess firearms. RCW 9.41.040(1)(b)(i).1
In April 2001, Swanson petitioned the Pierce County Superior Court to have his firearm rights restored. The State filed a response urging that the court deny Swanson's petition because he had not spent three years in the community without reoffending, which made him ineligible to seek relief. Swanson petitioned the court again on September 4, 2001. The State filed a response arguing that Swanson had not demonstrated that he was safe to own and possess guns. The court concluded that Swanson was eligible to petition the court for restoration of his rights and that RCW 9.41.040(4) gave the court discretion to grant or deny the petition. The court denied the petition, holding that Swanson presented no evidence to convince the court that his firearm rights should be restored. Swanson moved for reconsideration and the court denied the motion, holding that he was not a safe person in the community with a firearm. Swanson appeals the petition order.
We must decide whether RCW 9.41.040(4) confers discretion on the petitioned court to grant or deny a petitioner's request for firearm rights restoration.
Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. Stuckey v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 129 Wash.2d 289, 295, 916 P.2d 399 (1996). The fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent. Rozner v. Bellevue, 116 Wash.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991). If the statute is plain and unambiguous, its meaning must be derived from the statute's words alone. Rozner, 116 Wash.2d at 347, 804 P.2d 24. "A statute is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in two or more ways, but it is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable." Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash.2d 91, 105, 26 P.3d 257 (2001). The courts need not discern an ambiguity by imagining a variety of alternative interpretations. Berger, 144 Wash.2d at 105, 26 P.3d 257.
The statute at issue, RCW 9.41.040, is not a model of clarity. While it does specifically set forth several threshold requirements that an individual must meet before petitioning,2 it does not espouse any procedure to be followed at court respecting parties or time limits; it does not refer to burdens; it does not mention any requirements, other than pre-petition requirements, that a petitioner must prove or satisfy; and, it does not expressly confer or refer to the court's discretion. In short, the statute's plain language is unhelpful due to various omissions. Thus, we must evaluate the several omissions in order to understand the legislative intent with regard to firearm rights restoration.
But first, we pause to consider another argument. The State contends that the legislative findings and intent for the "Hard Time for Armed Crime Act"3 (the Act) bear on the question of a court's discretion in granting or denying a petition to restore firearm rights. The Legislature expressly intended that the Act deter criminals from possessing deadly weapons when committing crimes and to generally "stigmatize" the possession of such weapons by criminals. Laws of 1995, ch. 129, § 1.4 The "FINDINGS AND INTENT" section of the Act does not address firearm rights restoration in general or a court's discretion in the rights restoration context in particular. Thus, the Legislature's express findings and intent shed scant light on the issue that we face.
The Washington constitution commands that "[t]he right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired." CONST. art. I, § 24. In contrast to several other jurisdictions,5 a Washington citizen's right to bear arms is individual. With this in mind, we turn to various legislative enactments.
(1) RCW 9.96.010. This statute confers, upon the state governor, the power to restore the civil rights of an imprisoned individual whose term "is about to expire or has expired, and ... has not otherwise had his civil rights restored." The Legislature expressly made the governor's power discretionary.6
(2) RCW 9.96.050. This statute prescribes the procedure for restoring civil rights to parolees who have been finally discharged. It provides:
When a prisoner on parole has performed the obligations of his or her release ... for such time as shall satisfy the indeterminate sentence review board that his or her final release is not incompatible with the best interests of society and the welfare of the paroled individual, the board may make a final order of discharge and issue a certificate of discharge to the prisoner.
Although RCW 9.96.050 specifically excepts gun rights from automatic restoration, it is instructive because it vests the board with great discretion before granting an order of final discharge. But, as in RCW 9.96.010, that discretion is clearly set forth and the burden is plainly upon the parolees.
(3) RCW 9.92.066. This statute, which applies only to felonies committed before July 1, 1984 (see RCW 9.92.900), allows a person to apply for restoration of civil rights upon termination of his "suspended" sentence. The statute expressly makes restoration discretionary with the court.7 The statute does not affect Swanson's case directly because Swanson committed his crimes after July 1, 1984, the crimes were not felonies, and his sentences were "deferred" rather than "suspended." But, the statute is instructive because it contains a specific and plain grant of discretion.
(4) RCW 9.94A.637. This statute applies to persons on parole for felonies committed before July 1, 1984, and to persons convicted of felonies committed after that date. As Swanson's crimes were misdemeanors, the statute does not apply directly. But, the statute's procedure and phraseology are instructive. It states that, "[w]hen an offender has completed all requirements of the sentence... the sentencing court ... shall discharge the offender and provide the offender with a certificate of discharge." The discharge restores all civil rights lost by operation of law upon conviction, and the certificate of discharge "is not based on a finding of rehabilitation." RCW 9.94A.637(4). The restoration is clearly not in the court's discretion. Rather, restoration is automatic once the offender completes his sentence requirements.
(5) RCW 9.41.047. This statute governs restoration of firearm rights for individuals who have been involuntarily committed. Upon discharge, an individual who has been involuntarily committed "may ... petition a court of record to have his or her right to possess a firearm restored." RCW 9.41.047(3)(a). The statute states specifically that the petitioner must show that he (1) is no longer required to participate in a treatment program, (2) is no longer required to take medication to treat any condition related to the commitment, and (3) "does not present a substantial danger to himself or herself, others, or the public." RCW 9.41.047(3)(b) (emphasis added). The substantial danger requirement, which is similar in proof to the requirement that the trial court imposed on Swanson, is clearly set forth and is plainly a precondition to firearm rights restoration for individuals who have been involuntarily committed.
(Emphasis ours).
The convicting or committing court has no discretion to decide which crimes or commitments shall affect a person's firearm rights. This clear lack of discretion in the right removal context is consistent with the lack of discretion in the restoration context.
On its face, RCW 9.41.040(4) gives no discretion to the restoring court once the enumerated, threshold requirements are met. In fact, the only discretion that the statute contemplates...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Burch
...arises in law that all things or classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the legislature."State v. Swanson , 116 Wash.App. 67, 75, 65 P.3d 343 (2003) (quoting Wash. Nat. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 , 77 Wash.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d 633 (1969) ). Applying expressio ......
-
State v. R.P.H.
...infractions. The court told R.P.H., however, that he could try again in one year. When R.P.H. argued, based on State v. Swanson, 116 Wash.App. 67, 65 P.3d 343 (2003), that the court was required to reinstate his firearm rights if he satisfied the statutory requirements, the court invited hi......
-
State v. Hunter
...court erroneously based its decision on discretionary, non-statutory factors, and (2) pursuant to our decision in State v. Swanson, 116 Wash.App. 67, 65 P.3d 343 (2003), restoration of firearm rights is a ministerial, non-discretionary function of the courts if all of the requirements for f......
-
Hassan v. GCA Prod. Servs., Inc.
...or ordinance explicitly omits a provision, the court must "give weight and significance to th[e] ... vacancy." State v. Swanson, 116 Wash. App. 67, 76-77, 65 P.3d 343 (2003) (holding that where the statute does not include a particular requirement for the reinstatement of an individual's fi......
-
The Use of Pre-existing Exclusionary Zones as Probationary Conditions for Prostitution Offenses: a Call for the Sincere Application of Heightened Scrutiny
...restitution as an alternative to imprisonment are to provide reparation to the victims of crime and to prevent future offenses"). 140. 116 Wash. App. 67, 77, 65 P.3d 343, 348 141. Id. at 77, 65 P.3d at 348 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., State v. Williams, 97 Wash. App. ......