State v. Mason
| Decision Date | 28 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-0412-CR-1037.,49A02-0412-CR-1037. |
| Citation | 829 N.E.2d 1010 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Garry MASON, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ryan D. Johanningsmeier, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellant.
Thomas W. Farlow, Julia Blackwell Gelinas, Lucy R. Dollens, Locke Reynolds LLP, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
Garry Mason was charged with promoting prostitution,1 as a Class B felony, child exploitation,2 a Class C felony, and possession of marijuana,3 as a Class A misdemeanor. Mason filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the State dismissed the case and brings this appeal. We consider the following issues:4
I. Whether the probable cause affidavit provided a substantial basis to establish probable cause for the search warrant where police failed to corroborate an anonymous informant's hearsay statements concerning Mason's alleged criminal activity.
II. Assuming that the search warrant and the affidavit of probable cause are invalid, whether law enforcement officers acted in good faith when they executed the warrant and relied upon a judicial finding of probable cause.
We affirm.
On March 2, 2004, Crime Stoppers of Central Indiana ("Crime Stoppers") received an anonymous tip that a white male named Garry Mason, approximately 50 years old, was taking young girls to his home at 3038 South Chase Street, Indianapolis, Indiana. The tipster stated that Mason was paying the girls, reportedly between the ages of 14 and 17, to have sex with him. Additionally, the informant said that Mason drove a tan Mazda pickup truck. The tip contained no information or facts concerning how the informant became suspicious or learned of Mason's alleged criminal activity.
Crime Stoppers forwarded the tip to the Crime Action Team of the Indianapolis Police Department ("IPD"). Subsequently, IPD researched records and confirmed that a white male named "Garry Lee Mason," age 51, resided at 3038 South Chase Street in Indianapolis. IPD also obtained a photograph of Mason from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
According to an affidavit for probable cause, the affiant, IPD Detective Sheryl McGlinsey, and IPD Detective Andrew Starks drove past the Mason residence on March 7, 2004. Detective McGlinsey described the house as a two-story single-family dwelling with gray siding. The detectives observed a tan Mazda pickup truck parked in front of the house. IPD began surveillance of Mason's house the next day, and IPD officers observed a person matching Mason's description coming and going from the residence and driving the tan Mazda pickup truck.
At about 5:00 p.m. on March 9, 2004, IPD Detectives Starks and Thomas Hildebrand watched as Mason left his house with an unidentified female, described as white, 15 to 17 years old, with a thin build and blond hair. Mason and the girl drove off in the pickup truck, and the detectives followed them. Mason dropped the girl off at about 5:30 p.m. in a neighborhood south of Fountain Square. The detectives continued to follow Mason as he returned to his house.
On March 10, 2004, Detective McGlinsey prepared an affidavit for probable cause that included details about the anonymous tip and the results of the investigation by IPD detectives as described above. On Monday, March 11, 2004, Detective McGlinsey presented the affidavit and a search warrant to Commissioner Jane Conley ("Commissioner") of Marion Superior Court 13 ("Court 13"), seeking authorization to search Mason's residence and truck for "photographs, videos, DVD's [sic], downloaded files from internet sources, computers and software or any indicia of sexual crimes against minors." Appellant's Appendix at 113.
The Commissioner signed the search warrant at 9:00 a.m. that same day, but Detective McGlinsey neither left a copy of the warrant and supporting affidavit with the Commissioner nor filed the documents with the Marion County Clerk's Office ("Clerk"). Detective McGlinsey explained later that IPD trained her to wait to file the warrant and affidavit at the time she makes the return.5 Appellee's Supplemental Appendix at 56. Detective McGlinsey testified that the Commissioner did nothing different than she had observed any other judge do with a search warrant when the Commissioner read the documents, signed the warrant, and handed the signed warrant and affidavit back to the detective. Transcript at 149.
Detectives conducted the search on March 15, 2004, and seized certain property. Counsel for Mason attempted to obtain a copy of the warrant and the affidavit from IPD, but his request was refused. On March 22, 2004, Mason's attorney contacted the Clerk to view or obtain a copy of the affidavit, but was told that no such record had been provided to the Clerk.6 On March 23, 2004, counsel for Mason attempted to file a document entitled "Verified Request for the Issuance of an Order to the Indianapolis Police Department to Return All Property Seized" with Court 13. According to counsel, Court 13 would not file the document absent a cause number under which to file it. Appellant's Appendix at 93. Also, the Clerk refused to assign a miscellaneous cause number to the matter and advised Mason's attorney to see the Marion County Prosecutor, who assigns cause numbers in criminal matters. Id.
After Court 13 refused to file Mason's request for return of property, Mason's attorney filed with the Clerk a Verified Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction ("Verified Complaint") against IPD and its police chief, Jerry Barker. The Clerk assigned the matter to Civil Division 10 of Marion Superior Court. The Honorable David Dryer conducted a hearing on the request for injunctive relief on March 26, 2004. Also at that time, Chief Barker and IPD filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction as the search warrant was issued by Court 13. Judge Dryer, however, did not dismiss the Verified Complaint, and the matter eventually was transferred to Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division 5, under cause number 49G05-0405-FB-080284, for consolidation with the criminal case against Mason.7
On April 8, 2004 — 28 days after the Commissioner signed the search warrant — Detective McGlinsey filed the search warrant and affidavit for probable cause with the Clerk. Detective McGlinsey explained that the delay in preparing the return was the "tremendous amount of items" seized during the search and that she was unable to complete the return before going on vacation. Appellee's Supplemental Appendix at 53. The return listed the following property seized during the search: computer monitor and tower, printer/keyboard, video camera, one box containing videos and photographs, one box containing miscellaneous items, two guns, marijuana, and miscellaneous paperwork. Appellee's Brief at 5; Appellant's Appendix at 113.
The prosecutor filed an information and probable cause affidavit on May 12, 2004, charging Mason with promoting prostitution, child exploitation, and possession of marijuana.
Mason filed a motion to suppress on June 10, 2004. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on July 29, 2004, granting the motion based upon a determination that the search warrant and affidavit lacked probable cause. The trial court rejected the State's argument that the evidence should not be excluded because the police detectives executed the warrant in good faith and in reliance upon the Commissioner's finding of probable cause. After the trial court denied the State's Petition to Reopen Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Correct Error, the State moved to dismiss the criminal charges against Mason, which the court granted.
The State appeals the trial court's grant of Mason's motion to suppress evidence due to a lack of probable cause supporting the warrant. The State does not challenge the validity of the warrant itself. Rather, the State claims that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence because the IPD officers who conducted the search did so in good faith and in reliance upon the Commissioner's determination of probable cause.
The State, on review, "bears the burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of the measures it uses in securing information." State v. Farber, 677 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. Furthermore:
On appeal from the grant of a motion to suppress[,] the State appeals from a negative judgment and must show the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law.... We will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court.... We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses; rather we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment.
Id. at 1113-14 (internal citations omitted).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and IC 35-33-5-1 all require that a search warrant must be supported by probable cause. We accord significant deference to a magistrate's probable cause determination, but we review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence de novo. Methene v. State, 720 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Hensley v. State, 778 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).
On review, we are required to determine whether the Commissioner had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause to support the search warrant existed. Query v. State, 745 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind.2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). We establish whether a substantial basis existed by focusing on whether reasonable inferences...
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