State v. Masters

• Decision Date: 18 September 1928
• Docket Number: 6186.
• Citation: 144 S.E. 718,106 W.Va. 46
• Parties: STATE v. MASTERS.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

144 S.E. 718

106 W.Va. 46

STATE v. MASTERS.

No. 6186.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

September 18, 1928

Submitted September 11, 1928.

Syllabus by the Court.

Ordinarily it is sufficient to allege an offense in the language of the statute. An indictment under section 97, chapter 43, Code need not allege that the defendant "knowingly" had an accident, since knowledge is not made a part of the offense.

Under the rules of criminal pleading and the established practice in this state, it is competent to charge two or more offenses of the same general nature in one count in an indictment.

An act of the Legislature (chapter 43, section 97, Code) making it a misdemeanor for an automobilist upon striking a person to fail to stop, give his name, and render such assistance as may be reasonable or necessary, or to do any one of the same is not violative of sections 10 and 14 of article 3 of the state Constitution.

A case wherein the indictment under said section held to be sufficient.

Error to Circuit Court, Berkeley County.

Criminal proceeding by the State against Doyle Masters. To review a judgment sustaining demurrer to indictment and discharging defendant therefrom, the State brings error. Reversed.

Howard B. Lee, Atty. Gen., W. Elliott Nefflen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Herbert E. Hannis, Pros. Atty., of Martinsburg, for the State.

Kilmer & Byrer, of Martinsburg, for defendant in error.

WOODS J.

The state, by virtue of section 31, chapter 135, Code, complains of the judgment of the circuit court of Berkeley county in sustaining the demurrer and notice to quash an indictment and discharging defendant therefrom. But two points are raised here: (1) The sufficiency of the indictment; and (2) the constitutionality of section 97 of chapter 43, Code, under which the same was drawn.

The indictment charges:

"*** That Doyle Masters heretofore, to wit, on the ___ day of August, 1927, in the county and state aforesaid, did operate on the public highway in said county a motor vehicle, and while operating said motor vehicle on said public highway in the said county did have an accident, in that he did hit with said motor vehicle and seriously injure and kill one Elmer L. Hicks; and the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further represent that the said Doyle Masters then and there after he had hit the said Elmer L. Hicks as aforesaid, did unlawfully fail to stop immediately and give his name, address, and number of his operator's license, and render such assistance as was reasonable and necessary against the peace and dignity of the state. ***"

The first attack on the substance of the indictment is that it is defective in not alleging that accused "knowingly" did have an accident. The indictment is drawn in the language of the statute. Ordinarily such is sufficient. State v. Riffe, 10 W.Va. 794; State v. Schnelle, 24 W.Va. 767; State v. Boggess, 36 W.Va. 713, 15 S.E. 423; State v. Pennington, 41 W.Va. 599, 23 S.E. 918; State v. Watts, 43 W.Va. 182, 27 S.E. 302. In the case of the sale of liquors, as to minors, where the statute simply prohibited such sale without some word like "knowingly" or other expression, the doing the act fixed the offense, no matter about the knowledge or ignorance or intent of the accused. In such case this court held it need not be alleged in the indictment that the party knew the purchaser to be a minor, or intoxicated, or in the habit of becoming so. State v. Baer, 37 W.Va. 1, 16 S.E. 368; State v. Smith, 61 W.Va. 332, 56 S.E. 528. The statute in the instant case does not make knowledge of the accident a part of the offense, and, under the general rule, it is not necessary for the state to so allege. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the very object of the statute, namely, the protection of the person and property of the traveling public from motorists who seek to dodge all responsibility in cases of accident on the highway to which they are parties . In most cases it would be impossible for the state to prove scienter beyond a reasonable doubt, while the accident itself might properly be proven.

Another point made is that the indictment does not contain the words "upon request." It is true the statute provides that, "upon request," the operator of an automobile shall give his name, address, and the number of his operator's license. The indictment under consideration alleges that the defendant did not stop upon the happening of the accident, and hence there was no opportunity for any request to be made of him as to the information he is required to give. The statute does not require impossible or idle acts. People v. Scofield (Cal. App.) 258 P. 656. The words in question pertain alone to situations where the defendant does stop.

The defendant also argues that the indictment charges three separate and distinct offenses in one count, and was therefore properly quashed. In case of accident, where the operator of a motor vehicle fails to stop immediately, he is guilty of an offense; if he does stop, and then drives on without making any attempt to render assistance which he must have seen was reasonable and necessary, he is still guilty of an offense; and if he stops and renders assistance, but refuses, upon request, to give his name, address, and number of his operator's license, this, also, constitutes an offense. But if he merely drives on, making no attempt to render assistance, or give his name, address, and number of his operator's license, the whole transaction involves only one offense, and calls for the imposition of but a single penalty. When a statute makes two or more distinct acts connected with the same transaction, or of the same general nature, indictable, each one of which may be considered as representing a phase in the same offense, they may be coupled in one count, and under the rules of criminal pleading and the established practice of our criminal courts, it is competent for the jury, under this form of indictment, to find the defendant guilty of one or more of such distinct acts, as proofs may warrant. State v. Miller, 89 W.Va. 84, 108 S.E. 487; State v. Jarrell, 76 W.Va. 263, 85 S.E. 525; State v. Calhoun, 67 W.Va. 666, 69 S.E. 1098.

The second point is the constitutionality of the act upon which the indictment is based. The act, chapter 43, § 97, Code, provides:

"In case of an accident, the operator of a vehicle shall stop immediately, and upon request, give his name, address and the number of his operator's license, and render such assistance as may be reasonable or necessary; provided, that in all cases of accident resulting in injury to any person the operator shall immediately report the details of the same to the commission. Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished with a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars; provided further, that any person convicted of failing to stop and give his name and render assistance in case of a serious injury to any person shall be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than one year. The penalty shall apply to an owner as well as to an operator."

Three objections are raised, namely: (1) That the words "accident," (2) "serious injury," and (3) "reasonable and necessary," are not defined by the act and are vague and uncertain in meaning, and violative of sections 10 and 14 of article 3, state Constitution.

The word "accident," as the context of the section in question clearly indicates, contemplates any situation occurring on the highway wherein a party so operates his automobile as to cause injury to the property or person of another using the same highway. The phrase "serious injury" has reference to a personal or bodily injury to another, i. e., a serious bodily injury. It is in common use and should be understood by a jury. "The words 'serious bodily injury' are words of ordinary significance, and should not be defined by a charge, as they would be as well understood by any jury of ordinary intelligence as any language by which they might be defined." Thomas v....