State v. Matthews, A10–0246.

Decision Date27 July 2011
Docket NumberNo. A10–0246.,A10–0246.
Citation800 N.W.2d 629
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent,v.Audie MATTHEWS, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. The police officer's expert testimony that a police dog tracked a “fear scent” did not affect appellant's substantial rights.

2. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction of first-degree murder.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant State Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

Appellant Audie Matthews was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2010), for the March 8, 2008, shooting death of Blaine Christofferson. The district court convicted Matthews and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, Matthews asserts two arguments. First, Matthews argues the district court erred in admitting expert testimony that the police dog tracked a “fear scent.” Second, he argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Because we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood the “fear scent” testimony substantially affected the jury's verdict and the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction, we affirm.

In the early morning hours of March 8, 2008, police responded to a report that an individual wearing a mask and dressed in black shot and killed Blaine Christofferson in a parking lot near the Cherry Pit Bar in St. Paul, Minnesota. Using a police dog, the police officers located a mask, black clothing, and a gun, which, when tested, were shown to contain DNA samples that were consistent with Matthews' DNA profile.

Following the police investigation, a grand jury indicted Matthews for first-degree murder in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (causing the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of the person or another, while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery). Matthews pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. The State presented the following evidence at trial.

On the night of March 7, 2008, Christofferson and several friends went to the Cherry Pit Bar. Christofferson was carrying $2,000 on his person. As Christofferson's group drank alcoholic beverages, a male bar patron approached a woman in Christofferson's group. When the woman declined the patron's advances, he became angry and was removed from the bar. At closing time, Christofferson and his friends left the bar. While walking to the parking lot across the street, the ousted bar patron approached the group. Christofferson intervened to “calm things down” and then walked across the street to the parking lot. Nearby security cameras captured some of the events that followed.

The security videos show Christofferson and his friends walking toward their vehicle, which was parked in a lot near the Cherry Pit Bar. As Christofferson started to enter the vehicle, an individual dressed in black ran up to Christofferson and pulled him back. A struggle ensued and Christofferson lost his jacket. At the same time, a light-colored mini-van entered the parking lot. Christofferson was shot by the individual dressed in black. The exact timing of the shooting and the departure route of the shooter were not clear from the video. The light-colored mini-van exited the parking lot, headed east on Minnehaha Avenue, made a U-turn, and headed west on Minnehaha.

When the police responded to a 911 call reporting the shooting, three separate events of importance occurred at about the same time. A police officer observed the appellant, Audie Matthews, a few blocks from the scene of the shooting. Matthews was walking down the sidewalk, wearing a black shirt and black pants, but no coat or jacket. The officer thought Matthews' conduct was suspicious because the outside temperature was 5 degrees Fahrenheit. When the officer stopped and spoke with Matthews, the officer observed that Matthews was sweating profusely and had tree debris on his shoulder. Matthews told the officer that when he left the Cherry Pit Bar, he saw police in the area and decided to walk home because he did not have a valid driver's license.

Also, while en route to the crime scene, a police officer observed a fast-moving mini-van. The officer stopped the mini-van. The mini-van driver, who was later identified as Mursjoni Moten, jumped out and shouted, “I didn't shoot him, I didn't shoot him.” The officer noticed that the driver's side sliding door of the van was open.

Additionally, a police dog picked up a “fear scent” near the scene of the shooting and followed the scent through the neighborhood. The dog's handler, Officer Brady Harrison, testified at trial that a “fear scent” occurs “when someone is excitable or stressed out[;] someone that could have just been in an accident or someone that is running from the police will emit these odors from their apocrine glands which are located in the groin area and in the armpits of your body.” During the tracking, the dog located, and the police recovered, a winter hat, black jacket, gloves, ski mask, handgun, and another jacket. The clothing was recovered in a wooded area. The dog lost the scent near the location where the first officer stopped Matthews for questioning.

Matthews was interviewed at the police station later that morning. During the interview, Matthews stated that he met a woman at the Cherry Pit Bar and that they left the bar together and had sex in her car. Matthews stated that he left his coat and hat in her car. The police examined Matthews' shoes and concluded that the pattern on the shoes was similar to the pattern of the shoeprints near the clothing and gun found by the police dog.

Dr. Victor Froloff, a forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, testified that Christofferson was struck by a bullet that entered his lower right back and exited from the left side of his body. The bullet struck the spinal cord, causing immediate paralysis. Christofferson died of blood loss.

Two tape-recorded jailhouse phone calls between Matthews and his parents were played for the jury. In one phone call, Matthews said, [I]t was a situation that went wrong,” and [t]hings happened that wasn't suppose[d] to.” In the second phone call, Matthews said, They got shoeprints that, that match my shoes. They got foot prints that ... match my foot prints. They found the weapon, they got a coat, they got gloves, they got [a] hat ... DNA's going to pop up.”

A Bureau of Criminal Apprehension forensic scientist examined the handgun found that evening and the two cartridge casings found near Christofferson's body, and determined that the gun was used to fire the cartridges. A swab taken from the gun indicated a DNA mixture of three or more individuals. Christofferson and Matthews could not be excluded as possible contributors, but Moten, the mini-van driver, was excluded. Swabs were also taken from the black winter hat and brown ski mask. Matthews could not be excluded as a contributor from either item, but Moten was excluded.

Matthews did not testify and did not present witnesses on his behalf. The jury found Matthews guilty of first-degree murder and second-degree murder. The district court convicted Matthews of first-degree murder and imposed a life sentence.

I.

Matthews' first argument on appeal is that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in allowing expert testimony by Officer Harrison that the police dog picked up a “fear scent” near the crime scene, tracked it through the neighborhood as the police dog located various items of clothing, and stopped near where Matthews was found by the police. Specifically, Matthews argues that the “fear scent” testimony was not helpful to the jury, did not have foundational reliability, was not relevant, and was unfairly prejudicial. We conclude that Matthews is not entitled to a new trial because he failed to establish a reasonable possibility that the “fear scent” testimony substantially influenced the jury's verdict.

A.

As a threshold issue, the parties disagree as to the standard that controls our review of the “fear scent” issue. The parties' arguments reflect differing views of Matthews' efforts to preserve the issue at trial.

Matthews claims the record demonstrates that he made timely objections to the “fear scent” testimony, and therefore the harmless error standard controls our review. See State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883, 887 (Minn.2009) (explaining that if a defendant objects to the admission of evidence at trial, the admission of that evidence is reviewed under the harmless error standard). Under the harmless error standard, a defendant who alleges an error that does not implicate a constitutional right must prove there is a ‘reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.’ State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 568 (Minn.2008) (quoting State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn.2006)).

The State, on the other hand, contends that the record demonstrates that Matthews failed to make timely objections to the testimony and therefore the plain error standard controls our review. See State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn.2002) (explaining that if a defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence at trial, the admission of evidence is reviewed for plain error). Under the plain error review standard, the defendant must establish (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected the substantial rights of the defendant. Id. If these three prongs are established, we will correct the error only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or the public reputation of judicial proceedings. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn.1998). A plain...

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