State v. Matthews
| Decision Date | 19 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. COA14–109.,COA14–109. |
| Citation | 764 S.E.2d 699 (Table) |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Megael Jermaine MATTHEWS. |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Alexandra M. Hightower, for the State.
Tin Faulton Walker & Owen PLLC, by Matthew G. Pruden, for Defendant–Appellant.
Megael Jermaine Matthews (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered upon his convictions for attempted first degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious bodily injury, and discharging a firearm into occupied property inflicting serious bodily injury. For the following reasons we find no error.
On the evening of 24 April 2011, Charlotte–Mecklenburg police responded to a report of a single vehicle accident at the intersection of West Sugar Creek Road and Hubbard Road in Charlotte. Officer Derrick Bowlin responded to the call, and when he arrived at the scene he found a single vehicle parked in the grass off of the road with several bullet holes in the side. When Officer Bowlin approached the car, the passenger in the driver's seat told him that he had been shot. Later, Officer Bowlin joined other police officers at an address in the 4500 block of Christenbury Hills Lane, about a mile and a half from the scene of the car accident, after reports had come in earlier that day that shots had been fired in that vicinity.
Earlier that same afternoon, upon hearing gun shots, Tiffany Amaya looked through her living room window on Christenbury Hills Lane and observed two men walking toward the back of a house. She later described these men as black and approximately 5'9? in height. She described one of the men as in his early 20's with short dreads and wearing a bright blue shirt.
Based on information from neighbors, Detective Ritter and other officers were posted outside of 4542 Christenbury Hills Lane at approximately 10:00 p.m. when two men were seen exiting from that residence, one of whom was later identified as Defendant. As soon as Defendant exited the building, Detective Ritter placed him in handcuffs and frisked him for weapons. Immediately after, while still in handcuffs, Defendant was placed in the back seat of a patrol car on the scene. During the approximately forty-five minutes that Defendant was detained in the back of the patrol car an officer was present outside of the car. Defendant has testified that at this time he did not feel free to leave, but that he was told several times that he was not under arrest.
After forty-five minutes in the police cruiser, Defendant was uncuffed and asked to exit so that a show-up identification could be performed. It was at this time that Ms. Amaya was asked to perform the show-up identification of a suspect. Ms. Amaya observed that the suspect, Defendant, was approximately 5' 9?, had dreads, and was wearing a navy blue shirt, which she identified as a different color from the shirt worn by the person she had observed walking behind the house. She was unsure whether the suspect was the person that she had observed previously in the afternoon.
At the scene, Detective Manassah questioned Defendant about what he had done that day, and then requested that he accompany the officers to the Law Enforcement Center (“LEC”) for questioning. With Detective Manassah's permission, Defendant called his father, who drove to the scene and accompanied Defendant to the police station. During the ride, Defendant was unrestrained, sat in the front seat, and used his cell phone.
At the LEC, Defendant was placed in an interview room and the questioning began at 12:09 a.m. During the questioning, Defendant gave several different accounts of his story. Eventually, Defendant confessed to shooting the victim after discovering that the $100 bill the victim had paid Defendant in a marijuana transaction was counterfeit. At this time, 4:31 a.m., Defendant was placed under arrest and read his Mirandarights.
During the interview, Defendant was left alone several times, and was told that there was a bathroom down the hall if he needed to use it. Defendant was also able to privately speak with his father in the interview room shortly after 3:00 a.m.
Defendant was later indicted by a Mecklenburg County Grand Jury on one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, one count of discharging a firearm into occupied property inflicting serious bodily injury, and six counts of discharging a firearm into a vehicle in operation. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to police. A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on 11–12 April 2013. This motion was denied on 15 April 2013.
On 15 April 2013, Defendant's case was called for trial in Mecklenburg County Superior Court, the Honorable C. Thomas Edwards, Judge presiding. After the State presented its evidence, Defendant moved for a dismissal, which was denied. Defendant presented no evidence, and the jury returned verdicts finding Defendant guilty of all charges on 22 April 2013. That same day, the trial judge sentenced Defendant to a term of 125 to 161 months in prison for the charge of attempted first degree murder, under which the judge consolidated the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious bodily injury. The Judge also sentenced Defendant to a consecutive term of 72 to 96 months for the charge of discharging a firearm into occupied property inflicting serious bodily injury, and consolidated the remaining charges under this sentence. That day, 22 April 2013, trial counsel for Defendant allegedly entered an oral notice of appeal in open court. The notice, however, was not recorded by the court reporter and does not appear in the transcript of the trial.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements made to the police during a period of questioning that occurred before Defendant was read his Mirandarights; (2) whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where his attorney did not raise a Fourth Amendment argument in his motion to suppress Defendant's statements to police; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle in operation where there was no direct evidence that the vehicle was in operation at the time the shots were fired.
Defendant appeals to this Court as of right under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–27(b) and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1444(a). Now on appeal, Defendant contends trial counsel orally entered notice of appeal per Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure at trial. However, Defendant's oral notice of appeal does not appear in the transcript. In an attempt to remedy this situation, Defendant's trial counsel has filed an affidavit in the record that certifies he entered such oral notice of appeal at trial on 22 April 2013.
Furthermore, Defendant points to State v. Williams,in which this Court held that it had jurisdiction to address the merits of a defendant's appeal where
the record reflect[ed] that the State, the trial court, and Defendant's counsel all proceeded as if proper notice of appeal had been properly noted. Upon Defendant's request, the trial court appointed the Appellate Defender's Office to represent her, and stayed the execution of judgment pending resolution of the matter in the Court of Appeals. The trial court stated in its Appellate Entries form that “[D]efendant has given Notice of Appeal to the N.C. Court of Appeals,” and “ordered that [Defendant] is allowed to appeal as an indigent.”
State v. Williams,215 N.C.App. 1, 4, 714 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2011) (alterations in original), affirmed, 366 N.C. 110, 726 S.E.2d 161 (2012).
In the case before us, all parties have proceeded as if notice of appeal had been properly noted: the trial court appointed the Appellate Defender's Office to represent Defendant, the trial court noted in its appellate entries that “[t]he defendant has given Notice of Appeal to the N.C. Court of Appeals,” and “ordered that the defendant is allowed to appeal as indigent.”
Under these circumstances, in comporting with our holding in Williams,we hold that Defendant's right to appeal is preserved and this court has the appropriate jurisdiction to resolve this case on the merits.1
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The North Carolina Supreme Court has previously held that:
On review of a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court determines whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. The trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. The conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo.
State v. Haislip,362 N.C. 499, 499–500, 666 S.E.2d 757, 758 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Furthermore, “[w]here a defendant fails to challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact relating to the motion, our review is limited to whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law.” State v. Allen,200 N.C.App. 709, 712–13, 684 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2009) (citations omitted).
Here, the Defendant has not contested any of the findings of fact on appeal, merely the application of the law to the facts. Therefore, our review of the motion to suppress is on an entirely de novobasis.
As the State notes in its brief, the law differentiates between the “free to leave” test under the Fourth Amendment for the purposes of the seizure of a person and the “restraint of movement” test found under the Fifth Amendment for the purposes of a detainment that rises to the level of a formal, custodial...
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